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ART. I. — *Jesus the Son of Mary, or the Doctrine of the Catholic Church upon the Incarnation of God the Son, considered in its Bearings upon the Reverence shown by Catholics to his Blessed Mother.* By the REV. JOHN BRANDE MORRIS, M. A., sometime Petrean Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford; and now one of the Professors at Prior Park. London: Toovey. 1851. 2 vols. 8vo.

THIS is a work professedly written to conciliate a certain class of Protestants, and to bring them into the Church by removing the obstacle to their conversion which they are supposed to find in the worship which we pay to the Blessed Mother of God. It attempts to do this by showing that, since Protestants concede that "the Word was made flesh," and that Mary, the Mother of our Lord, "was a good woman," they must concede that this worship is proper; or, in other words, they must concede that this worship is in perfect accordance with the statements of the Fathers, and the definitions of the Church in regard to the Incarnation, and therefore that they cannot reject it as improper without falling into Nestorianism and Pelagianism. In working out his design, the author shows ability, zeal, and learning; he brings together valuable materials very much to his purpose, and which must be new and striking to most of his Protestant readers.

With all deference, however, we must be permitted to express some doubts as to the utility of such works. Works, written in a proper spirit, against Protestants, for the purpose of showing them the utter untenableness of

any form of Protestantism, cannot be reasonably objected to; but works written for Protestants, for the purpose of vindicating to them particular dogmas or practices of our Church, can hardly be of much use. To Protestants individually, when they manifest a serious, candid, and inquiring mind, when they show themselves really desirous of knowing and embracing the truth, and perfectly willing to be taught it, we should exhibit all patience, and do our best to answer all their objections, however frivolous; but in our public addresses to Protestants collectively, as a body or aggregation of bodies outside of the Church, it is never well to apologize, in the modern sense, for our religion, or to assume the attitude of defence. Our proper method is always to attack, and compel them to act on the defensive. The party which acts on the defensive only, which suffers itself to be attacked in its lines, and seeks only to prevent them from being broken, in some sense confesses its own weakness, and declares that it has no expectation of conquering and seeks merely to save itself from defeat, which seldom fails to dispirit its own forces and to embolden and invigorate those of the enemy. Whatever apparent advantages Protestants have ever gained in their controversies with Catholics, they have gained by acting on the offensive; by simply throwing out objections, and keeping us busy with refuting them. Once put them on their defence, and compel them to state and defend their own thesis, and you have already vanquished them, for they have no defensible thesis.

There is no Catholic dogma, taken apart from the authority of the Church, that is defensible. Deny or waive the commission of the Church from God to teach, therefore her presence as infallible teacher, and there is nothing that she teaches us of faith that a wise man will undertake either to deny or to defend. To waive that authority, and to descend into the arena to combat with Protestants, is to concede them in the outset all they contend for, namely, the possibility of determining what is Christian faith without an infallible church. We can then combat only with arms borrowed from the Scriptures and the Fathers, and if with such arms we combat them successfully, the victory inures to them, not to us. We defeat ourselves by our very success, for our doctrine is, that, without the infallible authority of the Church, Chris-

tian faith is not determinable. We can in our controversies with Protestants appeal to the Scriptures and to the Fathers only to prove what the Church has always believed and taught as Christian faith; but unless the Church is already conceded to be infallible in believing and teaching, this does nothing to settle the question as to what really is Christian faith. There are very few Protestants who will be favorably affected by such an argument, for there are very few, if any, who hold themselves bound to believe a doctrine because the Church has always believed and taught it. The great majority of them, at least as we have known them, would regard that as an excellent reason, not for believing, but for disbelieving a doctrine. How often do we find Protestants alleging as a sufficient reason for rejecting a doctrine, that it is a doctrine believed and taught by the Church, — Popish doctrine!

Protestantism is not merely a protest against this or that Catholic doctrine, but primarily and essentially against all church authority, — against believing any thing because the Catholic or any other body called a church believes and teaches it. The best method of dealing with it is, in our judgment, not to stand up and ward off its blows, but to summon it to the bar and compel it to answer for itself. It is of little use to define and defend our particular doctrines against it; we should rather compel it to define and defend the doctrines it professes to oppose to us. Let our controversialists with one accord, resolutely and perseveringly, attack Protestantism in its principle, or want of principle, and show that it has no positive character, nothing but negation, nothing positive to oppose to the authority it denies, for a dozen years or so, and very few Protestants would be found to pay it the least reverence. They would themselves be forced to see that Protestantism has in reality no principle, no bottom, and nothing but sheer negation, which is sheer falsehood, to oppose to Catholic faith. It is really nothing but negation, and what passes for its principle is really nothing but the denial of all principle. It is a mere system of negations, leading to universal negation, that is, universal falsehood. We ordinarily treat it — not Protestants, but Protestantism — with quite too much tenderness and respect. In itself it is absolutely nothing, and is intelligible only by the truth it denies. It has no being in itself, no substantive exist-

ence of its own, and consequently, the moment that it is thrown back upon itself, and compelled to maintain for itself an affirmative existence, it fails, melts into thin air, and vanishes in vacuity.

Take any so-called Protestant doctrine you please, analyze it, and you will find that it consists of two parts, one affirmative, the other negative. The affirmative part will in all cases be found to be, as far as it goes, the Catholic doctrine, — what the Church believes and teaches, and always has believed and taught. Take, as an instance, the doctrine of justification by faith alone. If there is any doctrine which can be called Protestant, it is this. But this doctrine is affirmative and negative. Its affirmative part is justification by faith; but this is Catholic doctrine, not Protestant. It is, and always has been, the doctrine of the Church, and is hers as much as is any other doctrine. The distinctively Protestant element is expressed, not in the words *justification by faith*, but in the little word “alone,” which Luther added in his version of the Scriptures. This little word is strictly negative, and serves only to deny the necessity of good works to justification, that is, the necessity of intrinsic justice to justification, as the Church teaches. As God is a God of strict justice and infinite veracity, and cannot declare, pronounce, or repute one just who is not just, it follows that without intrinsic justice there is and can be no justification, and therefore the Protestant opposes to the doctrine of the necessity of intrinsic justice, not something positive, not a substantive doctrine, but a sheer denial, that is, sheer falsehood. The same conclusion may be obtained by analysis in the case of all the so-called Protestant doctrines. What they have that is positive or affirmative is Catholic doctrine, and therefore not distinctively Protestant; what they have that is distinctively Protestant is purely negative, and therefore false.

We must bear in mind, that of contradictories one is always necessarily false, and the other necessarily true, for truth can never contradict truth, nor falsehood contradict falsehood. Truth is always in being, and all being is true; falsehood is in not-being, and all not-being is false. All false assertion is in asserting that not-being is being, or that being is not-being. If to the Catholic faith there is and can be opposed nothing but simple denial, the

truth of that faith and the falsity of the denial, or simple negation opposed to it, follow necessarily. If, then, Protestantism as the contradictory of Catholicity be proved to be purely negative in its character, it is proved by that alone to be false, and Catholicity is proved to be true. The Protestant by simply denying Catholicity has not therefore done enough to put the Church on her defence. He has as yet done nothing to his purpose, and before she can be required even to plead to his allegations, he must oppose to her some affirmative doctrine, some truth, which he has, but which she denies.

Now what we contend is, that our Catholic controversialists should waive all direct defence of Catholicity, and compel the Protestant to state and define this affirmative doctrine, this truth, which he thinks he has to oppose to her teaching. We insist on this, because it is a fact well known, infallibly known, by every Catholic, that the Protestant has, and can have, no such doctrine, no such truth, — that he has, and can have, only pure negation. He sustains himself now by attacking us on the strength of some fragments of Christian doctrine which he has stolen from the Church. When he is let alone he denies, and denies only; when hard pressed, he defends himself by abandoning his distinctive Protestantism, and resorting to these fragments of Catholicity. We must deprive him of this subterfuge, by showing that these fragments are not his, that the truth of which they are fragments is held by the Church in its unity and integrity, and that he must confine himself to his denials. The moment we force him so to confine himself, his aggressive power is gone, and he has more than he can do to take care of himself. He is then forced to comprehend that the positive elements on which he has been accustomed to rely, and which have served to keep him in countenance with himself, are not his, and that he as a Protestant has never had any right to claim them. He will then understand that, reduced to his distinctive Protestantism, he is reduced to pure negation, which is only another name for pure falsehood, and then that he must either escape to the Church, or sink into universal nihilism.

Every body knows that Protestants never state and defend any thesis of their own against us. Their method is to attack every thing and to defend nothing. They throw

out their objections without any inquiry, not only whether they are really objections to the Church, if sustained, but whether the principles which they must imply, if urged at all, are or are not sound. Nothing is more common with them than to urge contradictory objections, or to object to the Church for reasons which mutually destroy one another. The objections they usually urge, if objections, are so only by virtue of a principle from the logical consequences of which they would themselves recoil with hardly less horror than we. Now, what we ask is, that our controversialists, instead of laboring to prove that the objections urged do not lie against the Church, should attack these objections themselves, and show Protestants what it really is they must maintain, if they persist in urging them. At first, Protestants will pay no heed to what we tell them; they will continue for some time their old course, and reply to us only by a few sneers, a little personal abuse, or silly anecdotes against a pope, a cardinal, or an individual Catholic. No matter. If we keep on, if we persevere unitedly in carrying the war into their country and attacking them in their camp, they will soon be obliged to heed us, if they would not lose all their followers, and be forced to engage in earnest in the work of defending themselves. This is all that we want, for the moment we can compel them to act on the defensive, we have vanquished them.

Mr. Morris understands this, and to some extent acts on it. He aims to refute the Protestant objections to the worship we pay to Our Lady, by showing what they imply, and what would be the consequences of admitting them. This is very well as far as it goes; but in the first place, it is objections to a particular Catholic doctrine or Catholic practice that he analyzes and refutes, not objections to the authority of the Church, without which we could not ourselves defend the doctrine or practice objected to; and in the second place, the consequences which he shows must follow from admitting the objections urged are such as most Protestants can very easily accept, and from which very few except Catholics recoil. To show to a Catholic that the worship he pays to the Blessed Mother of God is in perfect harmony with the doctrine of the Incarnation, as set forth by the Fathers and defined by the early Councils, and that to deny its propriety is to fall into Nestori-

anism and Pelagianism, is enough, all that can be necessary in his case; but it is just nothing at all to the great body of Protestants, or if something, it is only a good reason to them for being Nestorians and Pelagians. Who among Protestants are to-day any thing but Nestorians and Pelagians? Who is there to recoil from Nestorianism because it denies the Incarnation, or from denying the Incarnation because to deny it is to deny grace and to fall into Pelagianism? The author assumes too much when he assumes that Protestants hold that "the Word was made flesh." Some of them profess thus much, but very few of them hold it with sufficient firmness to feel themselves bound by any logical inference you can draw from it, while the immense majority of them do not even hold it in words, and glory in denying it. We are acquainted with no Protestants who rise above Nestorianism, and Pelagianism is the grand heresy of the age. All Protestants who are not Manichæans are Pelagians. It is of no use to appeal to the symbols and formulas of the Protestant sects, for these are no longer believed, and are kept only for the purposes of controversy. There may be a few thousands of individual Protestants in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States who really intend to believe the doctrine of the Trinity and that of the Incarnation as held by the Church in the early ages, and who would consider it a sufficient reason for rejecting a doctrine that it evidently contradicted them; but the great mass, whether they know it or not, are ingrained unbelievers, and can be convinced by no *ratio theologica*, no theological reason, or arguments drawn from the analogies of faith.

Mr. Morris is unquestionably an able and learned man, but he was a Tractarian, and in spite of himself he judges Protestants generally by what he found to be true of the Tractarians. He may, perhaps, be disposed to retort upon us that we were Unitarian, and judge the Protestant world by what we found to be true of Unitarians. But we were Presbyterian and well acquainted with Anglicanism before we became Unitarian. Moreover, when we were a Unitarian our principal study was of the non-Unitarian sects. The Unitarians with whom we associated were not a mere clique with a peculiar language and profession of their own, living and conversing only among themselves, and hardly deigning to notice any thing occurring out of their

own "set." In this they differed essentially from the Tractarians. These were a clique in the bosom of the Establishment, living, to a great extent, solely among themselves, with very little intercourse with any but persons of their own stamp. They all had the same mark, and it was as easy at a glance to say of one of them, He is a Puseyite, as it is to say of this man, He is a Quaker, or of that man, He is a Methodist minister, or a Presbyterian parson. Even when converted and received into the communion of the Church, nay, when carried through a course of theology and raised to the priesthood, the Puseyite is as unmistakable as before. No man of the least discernment could mistake the production of a converted Tractarian for that of one who had been brought up a Catholic from his childhood. At every page the peculiar habit of thought and mode of expression of the "set" are apparent. Besides, you have but to look into the natural heart, abroad upon the Protestant world, and to observe the tendencies of the Protestant mind everywhere, to find conclusive proof that our judgment, by whatever it may have been influenced, is far more conformable to fact than that of the converted Tractarians. It is far more unfavorable, we grant; but whoever considers the nature, tendencies, and effects of heresy will for that very reason conclude that it is the more likely to be the true judgment. In judging the Catholic world our rule is, The more favorable, the truer the judgment; in judging the uncatholic it is, The more unfavorable, the truer the judgment. The presumption is always in favor of the Catholic, and we can believe no evil of him till it is proved; on the other hand, the presumption is always against the heretic, and we can believe no good of him till it is proved. We require proof to believe evil of a Catholic, or to believe good of a heretic. The most favorable construction must be presumed to be the true one in case of the former, the least favorable the true one in case of the latter.

The Tractarians, in the judgment of Protestants, are virtually Papists, and Father Newman has proved, in his own inimitable way, and by a perfectly legitimate application of his doctrine of development, that Tractarianism is repugnant to genuine Anglicanism, and, we may add, then *a fortiori* to all other forms of Protestantism. It will not do, then, to take Tractarians as in any sense the repre-

sentatives of the Protestant world. They represent nobody but themselves, and are merely Protestants struggling to get out of Protestantism into Catholicity, without disowning the Anglican Establishment or going to Rome. They have much in them that we like, but, logically considered, they can command no respect. They are neither fish nor flesh, nor yet good red herring. They are nice men, but shockingly bad logicians. In the general movements of our age they are a fact, but a fact of no great significance, and becoming less and less significant every day. *The Westminster Review*, under its new management, is a far better index to the tendencies of the Protestant mind even in England than *The Christian Remembrancer*, and *The Weekly Despatch* than *The Guardian*. Divine grace may be operating in this or that locality in an extraordinary way for the conversion of Protestants, but the Protestant world, as such, pursues its natural course towards the denial of all Christian doctrine, and therefore of all truth. Nothing is more evident than this to every one who has looked out from his own clique, and accustomed himself to take broad and continental, instead of narrow and insular views. England is not all the world, nor are converted and unconverted Tractarians all England. If the author could, to use his own favorite word, — which, as he and his school use it, we detest, — *realize* this, he would write a work much better adapted to the state of men's minds than is the very elaborate treatise before us.

Even under a purely literary and logical point of view, we are far from being able to commend the author's learned volumes as warmly as we could wish. It is unpleasant to have to find fault with every work that comes to us from a converted Puseyite. We exceedingly regret it. We wish some of the school would write and publish a work strictly Catholic in thought and expression, so that we could prove to them that we have no personal dislike to them, and are as willing to commend the true and the good coming from them as from any other source. We do not like the attitude we have been obliged to assume towards them; but it is not our fault. These gentlemen were a clique, a peculiar school, before their conversion, and, unhappily, they remain so since, though no doubt unintentionally, and without suspecting it. The only difference we can detect in mental and moral characteristics be-

tween a converted and an unconverted Puseyite is, that the former believes a little more, and the latter a little less. We have just read a pleasant, though not a very able work, entitled, *A Tour in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, &c.*, by James Laird Patterson. The author commenced his travels as a Puseyite, but had the happiness to be converted in Holy Week at Jerusalem, where he was reconciled to the Church. According to his account, he was conditionally baptized, and afterwards read his abjuration of Protestantism. Here it is the custom, we believe, for the convert to read his abjuration before receiving the Sacrament, — to put off Protestantism before being clothed upon with Catholicity. But it has struck us that the account given by Mr. Patterson is significant, and may explain many things which have puzzled us in the converted Tractarians, especially of the development school. They appear not to have been required to abjure their heresies before being reconciled to the Church; at least, they seem never to have comprehended that such a requirement was made, or at all necessary, in their case.

It would seem from all that we can learn respecting them, that these excellent converts never came to the Church because oppressed with the burden of sin, — because they wished to have quenched the flames of hell already kindled in their bosoms. They were not children of wrath as others, but were already good pious Christians in a degree, and needed not to have the Christian life begotten in them, but helps, which they could not find in the Anglican Establishment, to live that life in its perfection. They came to the Church, not to obtain sanctity, for that they already possessed, but to attain to *heroic* sanctity, the sanctity of canonized saints, which they became convinced that they could not have outside of the Roman Catholic Church. They had nothing to put off, no old life to reject, to anathematize, for the life they had lived was, as far as it went, the true Christian life, and what they wanted was something more than they already had, — not something radically different. Here, we apprehend, is the source of whatever misunderstanding there is between them and us. They retain their belief in the sanctity of the life they lived in the Establishment, and look upon conversion, at least in their case, as a putting on of Catholicity without any putting off of Puseyism, and their Catholic life as

a continuation of their Puseyite life under circumstances and conditions far more favorable to its development and growth. If they had been forced, as we were, to feel that we must come to the Church that we might have life, not merely that we might have it more abundantly, and that conversion and reception into the bosom of the Church were the commencement, not merely the continuation, of the Christian life, we suppose we should have found little in them with which we could not have sympathized. They would then have distrusted their past life, intellectually as well as morally, and would have set themselves to learn as little children. They would have relied on none of their past historical reading or patristic learning, nor paraded it before us till they had reviewed it in the light of Catholic faith and theology. They would then have disturbed us with no novel speculations, and insisted upon no novel theories for the explanation of facts which have no existence out of the darkened understandings of heretics.

We have no wish to disparage in any respect whatever the merits of the illustrious author, to whose ability, learning, zeal, and piety we pay a willing tribute ; but he seems to us to lack artistic taste, scientific method, and sound didactics. He is deficient in grasp and vigor of thought, in clearness and force of expression. His work has, properly speaking, no beginning, middle, or end, and he himself tells us that we may begin to read either with the first or the second part, as we choose. He has brought together a rich mass of materials, collected with great pains and labor, but he has not melted them down, and cast them into a uniform and consistent whole. His style is dry, hard, involved, and obscure. Without being verbose, it is needlessly diffuse, accumulating proofs, which do nothing to strengthen each other, on points where very little proof is required, and leaving the points most in need of proof unsustained by a single authority, — overloading with commentaries points which were originally clear and certain, and passing over with scarcely a remark those which were doubtful and in need of being elucidated. Indeed, we are at a loss to understand the author's state of mind, or to form any conception of the class of persons for whom he writes. He fails from first to last to win our confidence in his own judgment, and he very seldom enables us to deter-

mine the principle on which it rests, or the relation of that principle to the well-known principles of Catholic faith and theology. For the most part, his conclusions, we presume, are orthodox; but we feel very often that the processes by which he obtains them are exceedingly heterodox. His mental tastes and habits, his style and manner of writing, are to a great extent Protestant, or those of a man to whom truth has been presented piecemeal. He does not march straight to the heart of his subject, and lay open its central principle, from which all that appertains to it may be explained in its unity and real order. He proceeds, even when his intention is the reverse, from facts to principles, from particulars to universals, from multiplicity to unity, in the true Protestant style. He does not appear to have learned that principles are before facts, the universal or general, the generic, before the particular, and unity before multiplicity, or that, if the general is never obtainable without the particular, it is never obtainable from the particular; that unity is no induction from multiplicity, ontology from psychology, nor principles from facts. Hence he is seldom, if ever, truly logical. The Catholic has truth as a whole, in its unity and integrity, and therefore his method is to descend from the general to the particular, from unity to multiplicity, from principles to facts, and therefore a strictly logical method. He, when faithful to his privileges, borrows his light from the Creator, not the creature, enlightens facts by principles, not principles by facts, and particulars by the general, without which they are unintelligible, not the general by particulars. But the Protestant, having at best only some faint and broken reflections of truth, can only proceed by way of induction, which never leads to the truth, but the farther from it. And hence it is that Protestants, whatever their learning and ability, are always illogical and sophistical.

Logic, as an art, is the intellectual application of principles, and is determined, not by the human mind itself, but by the real or intelligible order which exists and operates independently of the human mind. Its office is not to discover principles, but to apply them; not to invent truth, but to demonstrate it. It always presupposes the mind that is to use it is already in possession of the principles to be applied, or of the truth to be demonstrated or proved. Truth is being, or that which is or exists independently of the

perceiving or reasoning mind, and principles are simply the ontological truth, either originally or by participation. Logic, therefore, depends on the real order, as much as does intuition itself, and consequently must proceed from, not to, the ontological truth or principle. It is then and must be deductive, and consequently all induction, not resolvable into deduction, is illogical, a mere sophistry. The peculiar Protestant philosophy, it is confessed on all hands, is the inductive, or, as it is sometimes called, the *Baconian* philosophy. This philosophy starts avowedly with the assumption that the general, the universal in the language of the Schoolmen, or, as we may say, the principle, is unknown, and that nothing is immediately apprehended by the mind but particulars, or simple facts. Its pretence is to rise from facts to the principle, from particulars to the general, from multiplicity to unity, from psychology to ontology, from man and the universe to God. But as the essence of logic is the application of principles to facts, not of facts to principles, &c., thus imitating in its own order, faintly, very faintly assuredly, the creative act of God by which he produces existences from nothing, (for facts without principles, particulars without the general, are unintelligible, and to the mind as if they were not,) it follows of necessity that no inductive philosopher is or can be a good logician, and if he ever reasons logically at all, it is only on condition of reasoning illogically. If a Protestant is ever logical, it is only by denying while he affirms his own system, which is supremely illogical.

Now it seems to us that the learned author has not sufficiently distrusted his Oxford logic, which has for its basis the inductive philosophy. There is no doubt, that, to most of us who are converts from Protestantism, the truth has been presented, as he says, "piecemeal," and that we came to it in its unity and integrity only by successive steps, or rather by successive illuminations. This has been owing in part to the disadvantage of our position and training. But when a Protestant has once been really converted, he is inexcusable if he then finds it necessary to continue the Protestant method. His Protestant method never brought him to the Church; he was brought in spite of that method, by the power of Divine grace, his will co-operating therewith, and, so far as reasoning entered for any thing into the process, by his unconsciously in some

cases, consciously in others, adopting and pursuing the Catholic method. Moreover, once converted and instructed in his faith, he has the truth in its unity and integrity. He can now seize it in its central principle, see the universe, natural and supernatural, from the point of view of its Creator, and descend from God to creature. He holds, so to speak, in his hand the principle of all things, from which all facts, all particular questions, are solvable. To proceed now as an inductive philosopher, as a Protestant who has truth only as reflected in faint and broken rays from the creature, is to forego his high privilege as a Catholic, and to derive, as to his manner or mode of thinking and writing, no advantage from his conversion. This is, as it seems to us, the precise case with our author. His conversion appears to have been a putting on of Catholicity without a putting off of Protestantism, or the grafting of certain Catholic truths into his Oxfordism. Hence he attempts to explain and vindicate Catholicity by Oxford logic and philosophy. All this was natural, considering that the converts of his school regarded their Oxford life as sinning only by defect, as faulty only in respect to what it lacked, not in respect to any thing it professed to have. Still, if the author had reviewed his Oxford logic and philosophy, and freed himself from their trammels, we should not have had occasion to accuse him, as we have done, of lacking grasp and vigor of thought, clearness and force of expression. If on becoming a Catholic he had taken the pains to adjust his philosophy to the ontology of the Catechism, he would have given us no occasion to complain of the diffuseness and obscurity of his work; and he would have compressed it within a third of its present dimensions, and made it far more complete, intelligible, and conclusive. As the case now stands, we are often at a loss to determine what he really means, and as we see he has an unsound philosophy, we dare not rely on his judgment, when we can determine his meaning, unless we can justify it from other sources. Whether it be Catholic or not, he gives us no means of knowing, for he does not connect the principle on which it rests with, or show its relation to, the well-known principles of Catholic faith and theology, although this is precisely what he proposes to do, and would have done, if he had followed Catholic instead of Protestant logic.

The author divides his work into three parts. In the first part he labors to prove, from the admission that "the Word was made flesh," that our Lord was perfect God and perfect man, and therefore we can predicate of him in his human nature all that we can predicate of a perfect man, — or of any man, sin excepted. In his human nature, he has the proper faculties, affections, and duties of humanity, and therefore owed to his Virgin Mother submission, the love and obedience due from a son to his mother. All this is true, and the author has admirably developed and proved it. In this respect we can warmly commend his work. In his second part, he undertakes to prove from the admission which Protestants must make, that "Mary was a good woman," that our Lord, from the first moment of his conception in her womb, enriched her with all communicable graces, and especially with full and complete knowledge of his own person and character, and of the whole mystery of redemption. Now, as Mary was at the least a good woman, she would naturally wish to know what manner of child it was that the angel had announced should be born of her, and which was conceived by the Holy Ghost in her womb. This wish would be known to the child as soon as formed, for all knowledge was infused into his human soul, by virtue of the hypostatic union, from the moment of conception. He knew the wish as soon as formed, and could comply with it, for he had all power. Thus as a dutiful and loving son he was bound to do so, and of course did do so. But it may be said that he owed a duty to his Father as well as to his Mother, and it may not have been the will of God, his Father, that he should have communicated this knowledge to his Mother so soon and at once. Very true, it *may* have been so, but it is for you to prove that it was so. Therefore it was not so, and therefore he did communicate it! (Vol. I. pp. 352, 353.) This is a tolerably fair specimen of the author's logic, when he is not assisted by the Catholic author he chances to cite. There are many things very proper in pious meditation, which are, nevertheless, of no value as arguments, and which are very unsuitable to be proposed to those who are without; for some things may be very edifying to the pious believer, that are by no means convincing to the unbeliever. We say nothing of the conclusion at which the author arrives, for we do not know what is the current

teaching of our divines on the subject. We have had, in the little time we have been in the Church, as much as we could do to learn what is of faith, without making ourselves acquainted with all the remote consequences which theologians have drawn from admitted theological principles. We know that Our Lady had the grace of humility, and that if it was the will of God that she should for a time remain in ignorance of some things pertaining to the mystery of redemption, or the person and character of her Son, which we can conceive might have been the case, she would have had no wish to be enriched all at once with the knowledge supposed, for she had no will not in accordance with the Divine will. We must, then, know by positive revelation what was the will of God in the premises, before we can conclude any thing as certain on the subject, one way or the other. Consequently, to us, the whole fabric of doctrine which the author has constructed on the supposed Protestant admission that "Mary was a good woman," even if true, has no solid foundation in any thing he has advanced. We do not, let it be understood, dispute his conclusions; we only question the process by which he professes to obtain them.

The author starts with a false principle, namely, that moral evidence can never give certainty, or any thing more than probability. The certainty of the believer, he supposes, is due not to evidence at all, but solely to the gift of faith, *donum fidei*, received in the Sacrament of Baptism. But the gift of faith adds nothing to the objective certainty, or the certainty of the matter of faith. What it gives is subjective certainty. It gives us a clearer view and a stronger hold of the objective certainty, but does not create or in any manner affect that certainty in itself. It consists in a supernatural illustration of the understanding, and a supernatural inclination of the will; but for this very reason it gives us a supernatural facility, not only to believe the truth proposed, but also to detect error and uncertainty, and consequently, instead of facilitating our belief of what is not objectively certain, or what is merely probable, it renders it all the more difficult for us to believe it; and hence, of all people in the world, Catholics are the least credulous. To deny all objective certainty, or to allow only an objective probability, is simply to declare all faith, except as an infused habit, absolutely impossible. Over-

looking this fact, denying all objective certainty, the author does not even aim in his logic to establish the objective certainty of his conclusions, and appears to suppose that he has done all that can be required of him when he has rendered it probable that they are not improbable, or incredible. He concludes *a posse ad esse*, and seldom asks any thing better than the argument *de congruo*, — and what is worse, he contends that we can have nothing better. This proceeds from his false philosophy. He and his school are genuine psychologists. They do not, perhaps, intend to deny all objective truth; but they all contend that the form under which it is apprehended depends on the human mind itself, and that the truth apprehended by us would appear very different, if our minds were differently constituted, as we may suppose it actually does to superior beings. If this be so, there can be no objective certainty, and then no demonstration, and no absolute proof, moral or metaphysical, as has been shown over and over again by those who have so fully refuted the Kantian philosophy, whether as taught by Kant himself, or as modified by Coleridge, the metaphysician of the Tractarian school. The doctrine refutes itself; for if the *nexus* between the premises and the conclusion be not necessary, there is no objective certainty; and if no objective certainty, how can you affirm fitness or congruity, or even probability? But if there is, why start with the assumption that there is not, and that the form of the object depends, either in whole or in part, on the subject? No doubt some Catholics have been trained up psychologists, which we regard as their misfortune, but no Catholic is ever a psychologist in his theology. Truth is properly defined by St. Augustine to be being, that which really is or exists, and either we are unintelligent beings, or we apprehend it, as far as we apprehend it at all, as it is or exists independent on our minds; for it is of the essence of intellect to apprehend truth, as St. Thomas himself teaches, in teaching that truth is the object of the intellect, as good is the object of the will. Superior beings see farther than we do, and know truths that we do not; but truth, as far as we see and know it, wears to us the same form that it does to them. We regret, therefore, that the author has retained his Oxford logic and metaphysics. It is not well to set out by denying in principle all objective certainty,

then to proceed to prove a thing, for aught we know, may be, and thence to conclude that it is fit to be, and if fit to be therefore it is, and may be taken as the principle from which Catholic doctrine may be concluded or vindicated. The fabrics we thus erect are simply castles in the air.

The author, we are sorry to see, is not careful to mark the distinction between opinions in the Church and the opinions of the Church. He places the opinions in the Church, which he is not forbidden to hold, on the same line with doctrines of the Church, which he is not permitted to deny, and concludes indifferently from either, what is to be received as "the mind of the Church." This is inexcusable. He has the right, when contrary opinions are held by respectable theologians, to adopt which opinion he chooses; but he can hold it only as an opinion, not as faith. Where there are contrary opinions, both of which it is lawful to hold, either may be held as an opinion, but neither can be held as Catholic doctrine, or as a principle from which positive arguments in defence of Catholic doctrine may be drawn; for the opinion that could be so taken it would not be lawful to dispute. It would in fact cease to be opinion, and become faith. The author must remember that he is avowedly writing for Protestants, and in his arguments with Protestants for Catholicity he cannot conclude from what are mere opinions amongst our own theologians. He may refer to these opinions for the purpose of warding off Protestant objections, but he cannot make them the basis of an argument to prove that a given doctrine is Catholic doctrine, and ought to be believed as such. Among the *loci theologici*, or theological topics, we do not recollect ever to have seen opinions in the Church enumerated. We do not say that the opinion of the author is not generally the sounder opinion, but we do say that he often treats opinion as if it were faith, and erects on it a fabric which he will find very apt to excite the derision or the blasphemy of those for whom he professes to write. We hold the worship which we pay to Our Blessed Lady too sacred and too tender to be exposed, as the author exposes it, to the rude scoffs of an unbelieving world, and we think that, if he chose to defend it at all, he should have done so with more reserve, or at least with arguments, and from principles, which are able to stand the test of the most rigid logical criticism, not with

principles which are perhaps questionable, and arguments which are at best ridiculous.

We are told (Vol. I. p. 8) that the first two sections of the work "may be said to be little more than an expansion of meditations, which mainly contributed to the author's own conversion." This is obvious enough on their very face, and no doubt accounts for much in them of which we are obliged to complain. As the meditations of an Anglican, working his way to the light, of which he catches partial glimpses from afar, whose rays now and then reach and cheer him with their warmth and brightness, and render visible without dissipating the darkness which surrounds him, they are most admirable, and not unworthy of being studied. But why publish them, with all their necessary crudeness and inaccuracies? Why not correct them by subsequent Catholic study and experience? In them we see too plainly the Oxford student, who has as yet no clear and distinct perception of the truth, stumbling over difficulties which a more thorough knowledge of Catholic theology would prove to be no difficulties at all. The author appears here with all his Oxford prejudices, with full confidence in his Oxford historical and patristic reading, and that lofty contempt which Oxford students always affect for the learning and judgment of Catholics. He disparages the edition of the Fathers by the learned Benedictines of St. Maur, and seems never to have thought it possible for a Catholic divine, not a graduate of a Protestant university, to instruct him, or in any manner to aid him in his researches after truth. Even the Angel of the Schools is too common an authority among Catholic students to command his respect. If he consults a Catholic author it must be an ancient Father whose sense is uncertain, or a modern doctor whose language is not always clear and definite, or whose speculations do not enter into the current theology of the Church. All this is perfectly natural in an Anglican in the process of his conversion to Catholicity, but we must be pardoned for saying, that it is not precisely what we look for in a professor in a Catholic college.

The author makes a great display of learning. He amends the Hebrew of the Old Testament, and the Greek of the New, with wonderful facility, if not felicity, — corrects the text of a Father wherever the received reading

does not happen to be to his purpose, and settles the genuineness or spuriousness of works attributed to ancient authors, without the least hesitation, deciding against all Christian antiquity without the slightest misgiving. He gives up arguments and historical readings, on which the ablest of our divines have uniformly insisted, and does it not to win the confidence of Protestants, but to save Catholics from the reproach of ignorance and credulity, or their criticism from the derision of their learned adversaries. Now in all this, for aught we know, he may be right. We are not learned enough to pass judgment on the solidity and accuracy of his learning. But the lofty airs he assumes, and his low appreciation of all Catholic intelligence and scholarship are not precisely fitted to win our confidence. It would be well for us who are converts to learn what Catholics really know, before we take it upon us to treat them as mere sciolists and pious fools, or for granted that we have brought into the Church an invaluable treasure in our Protestant cultivation and learning. The Church, perhaps, could have contrived, with the blessing of God, to get along without us, much better than we without her. After all, we brought her nothing to boast of, nothing but our sins, our ignorance, and our infirmities. Our conversion is not likely to create a new epoch in her history. And for us to suppose that we can throw new light on the sacred mysteries, and clear up in a new and more satisfactory way the abstruse points of theology which Catholic theologians have not yet settled, would, were it not presumptuous, be simply ridiculous. We ought to consider ourselves as knowing nothing except what we have learned since our reconciliation to the Church, at the feet of her teachers and pastors.

For ourselves, we confide in no judgments we formed prior to our conversion, and trust no historical or patristic reading we had then made, save so far as we have since reviewed it in the light of Catholic faith and theology. We have felt it necessary to learn all anew under the direction of Catholic teachers, who happen never to have been schismatics or heretics, and whom we have found abundantly able to instruct us in every branch of science and erudition. We know no reason why this should have been more necessary in the case of a converted Unitarian, than in that of a converted Puseyite. Indeed, it strikes us

as less necessary, because the line of demarcation between Unitarianism and Catholicity is so broad and distinct, that no one of ordinary discernment can mistake it; while Puseyism runs so near to Catholicity on so many points, so successfully counterfeits Catholic doctrines and practices, that, if we are not on our guard, we may easily mistake the one for the other. Human nature in the absence of Satanic temptation can go far, and with Satanic aid may go much farther, in counterfeiting Catholic faith and sanctity, and it is not always easy to distinguish the asceticism of the Stoic, which springs from pride, from the asceticism of the Christian, which springs from humility, or the sanctity of Littlemore, for instance, so praised by Father Dominic, from the supernatural sanctity of the Catholic. It requires an extraordinary grace to be a discerner of spirits. The same counterfeit is often effected in doctrine, and the resemblance of the counterfeit to the genuine is often so close, as to be most difficult even for well-informed persons to detect. The Oxford converts themselves were deceived, for the sanctity which they believed they possessed, of which they were accustomed to boast, and to which for a long time they referred as a full justification of their remaining in the Anglican Establishment, they held to be true Christian sanctity, when in reality it was no more Christian sanctity than is that exhibited by some Moravians, Methodists, and Quakers, or even some of the ancient or modern Pagans. The closer the resemblance of one's life to Catholicity before, the more liable is he to err after, his conversion; and the farther removed one's heresy from orthodoxy before his conversion, the less liable is he to retain it afterwards. The Tractarian converts, from the peculiarity of their doctrine and practice prior to their reconciliation to the Church, are, of all classes of English and American converts, precisely those who are the most likely to originate a new heresy among us, or to fail to apprehend and maintain Catholic doctrine in its integrity. Their writings must always be read with the presumption against them. Therefore, of all should they be the most careful to rely in nothing on their past life, save as they review it in the light of what they have learned since their conversion, not under instructors who, like themselves, are but recent converts, of their own class, but under such as have been Catholics from their youth. These hints and

suggestions may not be called for, and our impression with regard to the Tractarian converts may be wholly unauthorized; but we fear that what we have said, ungracious as it may seem, is not misplaced or mistimed. We sincerely wish, therefore, that, instead of giving us the meditations which mainly contributed to his own conversion, the author had given us meditations and arguments that originated in his Catholic faith and study, and therefore such as ought to convince those without of the truth of Catholicity. He would then have written, not as a convert from Puseyism, but as a Catholic.

Our limits do not permit us to give a full analysis of the author's work. The great body of his work is undoubtedly Catholic, sound, and really meritorious. But aside from the faults we have already found with its style, logic, and philosophy, and aside from the fault we shall soon have to find with the theory on which it is confessedly written, there are one or two points on which the author, in his direct teaching, is undeniably heterodox. In his table of contents we find this startling proposition: "Even fatalism would not exempt from moral responsibility." Here is his illustration and proof of it:—

"It has been shown by Butler, in his admirable Analogy, that, if the opinion of a necessity or fate could be proved, it would do little to influence practice with any reasonable man. Whatever excuse can be made for the man who murders, or the child who steals upon the score of necessity, will also serve as an excuse for the magistrate who executes the one, or the parent who punishes the latter. And this among other considerations shows, that however intoxicated with fatalism men might be at the first draught of it, still after a while men would be treated as if they were free, and forced against themselves to believe it. The very words for 'fate' imply a speaker or distributor who made the fatum to exist. Now if it be true that that fatalism which puts this reflection out of sight would leave moral obligations where they are, then predestinationism itself would not destroy them, the Catholic doctrine of predestination far less."—Vol. I. p. 119.

This is wretched sophistry, as well as bad theology. Butler is no great authority with us, but as cited by the author he does not attempt to prove that fatalism is compatible with moral responsibility; he simply contends that men, if they held it, would be *practically* obliged to act as if they held it not, and to distribute rewards and punish-

ments as they do now,—a mere truism. He does not assert, and far less does he prove, that, if fatalism were true, they would be *morally* responsible agents, and therefore subjects of moral praise and blame. Because men would do as they do now in their practical conduct, through an irresistible fate, even assuming fate to be the decree of God, it would not follow that predestinarianism itself would not take away moral responsibility. Fate, whether taken in the old heathen sense, or as the author explains it, stands opposed to free will; and does the author mean to say that without free will we should or could be morally responsible? Predestination, in the Calvinistic sense, is repugnant, and always held by Catholic divines to be repugnant, to moral responsibility, because it destroys free will. It is simple fate, and renders its author, or he who spoke the *fatum*, the real actor in all the acts of man. And hence Calvin makes God the author of sin. Predestination, in the Catholic sense, does not take away moral responsibility, most assuredly, simply because it does not take away free will; because it is not *fate*, or a predestination that executes itself without the free concurrence of the will of the predestinated, that is, the free concurrence of a will intrinsically free not to have concurred. How predestination, which is certain and infallible, can coexist with the freedom of the will, is a mystery which human reason cannot explain. But if the word *fate* has any meaning in our language, it denies free will, and if there is any thing certain in theology or philosophy, it is that the denial of free will is the denial of all moral obligation, of all merit and all demerit. It is therefore false, and, reference had to the definitions of the Church condemning Calvinism and Jansenism, even heretical, to say that “even fatalism would not exempt from moral responsibility.” The author, in his whole chapter on predestination, from which we have taken the passage cited above, seems to us either to use language very loosely, or else to be writing on a subject which he has by no means mastered. We can gather very little that is definite from what he says. This, however, may be owing to our own ignorance and dulness of apprehension.

But here is another passage which, with all respect, we would recommend to the notice of his Eminence, Cardinal Wiseman, to whom these volumes are dedicated by the author:—

“Now suppose a state of things in which it was an acknowledged principle, not only that Christ did every thing as an example to us, but also that it was a clear case that he on several occasions disguised his real meaning, though he knew people in general would draw a conclusion from his words just the opposite of that meaning. If this was the state of things in which the Fathers lived, it is plain that they might treat heretics as our Lord did the impertinent thoughts of his disciples, when he answered them by this wise but evasive *climax*. [St. Mark xiii. 32.] Hence it is clear, that if a number of passages can be quoted from the Fathers, in which the ignorance is ascribed to Christ’s human nature without more ado, such passages may be nothing more than a convenient answer to present difficulties, and not in the least a statement of their real doctrine upon the subject. Until the reverse of this can be distinctly proved, it will not avail to quote these passages in defence of the Ignorantists [Agnostæ]. There is no Catholic divine now-a-days, probably, who would not admit that such evasive answers were not only no lies, but absolutely allowable when impertinent questions were put. There are a very few, if any, Protestants, who would not practically use this principle in real life, however indignantly they may at first sight repudiate it. It is lawful in some cases for inferiors to answer superiors in this way ; as, for instance, if you asked a servant if he had been ever guilty of theft, for no one is obliged to criminate himself ; but there are far more cases, where it is lawful for superiors to evade questions which inferiors have no right to ask. Hence it was lawful for our Lord and Master, the absolute ruler of his creatures, to answer impertinent thoughts in this manner. And, by parallel reasoning, it was lawful for the Fathers to answer heretics in a way which, while it disguised their own sentiments probably, nevertheless did the heretics good. For it is always lawful to lead a man away from a greater sin by leading him to a less : thus nobody in his sane senses would deny that it was a virtuous deed to induce a man to stupefy himself by drink, who would only use his wits to avail himself of a solitary opportunity for murder of a man in mortal sin, or adultery mutually agreed upon. If any body would deny it, it must be simply because he had never given the question a thought, or else because he was so dull of conscience as to prefer the ruin of two souls to the temporary suspension of the powers of one. Now if the Fathers could lead the heretics to blaspheme the human nature of Christ, to do so was to lead them to a less sin than blaspheming his Divine nature, which blasphemy might never be forgiven, neither in this world nor in purgatory.”—Vol. I. pp. 263–265.

The doctrine which the ordinary reader will draw from this language is, that it is sometimes lawful to lie for the interests of truth, and to do evil for a good end ; in other

words, that "the end justifies the means," — the very doctrine which is so generally, and so falsely, laid to the charge of Catholic theologians, especially the learned Fathers of the Society of Jesus. The author himself seems to warrant this interpretation of his language, for he says expressly, "Jesus would be condemned of jesuitry by those out of the Church, if he lived in our days." (Vol. I. pp. 296, 297.) The author is not writing for Catholics, who may be presumed to know their own doctrine, but avowedly for Protestants, who are supposed to be ignorant of it, and who expect, as he must know, that a Catholic writing on this subject, which has been so much controverted, so foully misrepresented, and made the occasion of so much scandal, will state the Catholic doctrine in a form as little likely to be mistaken for the one commonly charged against us as the truth will possibly permit. It is fair, then, to presume, if he not only does not disclaim expressly the doctrine charged, of which he clearly is not ignorant, but uses language which seems to warrant it, and in some respects certainly does warrant it, that he really holds and intends to teach it; for, under such circumstances, an author's doctrine is to be inferred fully as much from what he refrains from denying as from what he actually asserts, and the rule for interpreting his language is to put upon it, not the most favorable, but the least favorable construction that it will bear, — especially when, as in the case before us, he is *ex professo* explaining and defending *œconomia* in presenting the truth, that is, the presenting it so as to avoid as much as possible the giving of scandal, or leading people into error and sin. If the author holds that what is called Jesuitry, the doctrine that it is lawful to lie for the truth, and to do evil for a good end, is really reprehensible, why does he use language that may, without violence, be understood to imply it? Or why does he not take special pains to frame his language so as to guard against it, by marking clearly the distinction between it and the true Catholic doctrine?

What the author in the secrets of his own heart intends, we know not, and judge not, for we are treating of the author, not the man. We presume he means right, but he evidently thinks loosely, and expresses himself carelessly, almost wantonly. He neglects to distinguish between not telling truth, and telling what is not truth. No doubt it is

sometimes lawful, nay, sometimes our duty, to conceal or not disclose the truth we may happen to know, but it is never lawful to do so by telling that which is not true. When we are questioned by those who have no right, or on matters on which they have no right, to question us, and when the truth, if told, would scandalize or lead men into error and sin, as sometimes happens, we are free to practise what the Fathers called *aconomia*, or prudently to withhold it, and to evade the questions put; but never are we free to withhold it or to evade the questions put by answering what is false, or what, in a sense the hearers may not with due diligence ascertain, is not true. If the hearers are misled by the answers given, it must be by their own fault, not ours, — by the inferences which they unnecessarily draw from our words. If the answers we give, in order to escape telling the truth we are either not bound to tell or bound not to tell, are false, in every sense, according to ordinary usage of language in like cases, or are true only by virtue of some mental restriction or reservation, or some peculiar sense of our own which the hearer has no natural means of ascertaining, they are inadmissible, for then they are literally lies, and it is never lawful, under any circumstances whatever, to lie. Such, briefly stated, is the doctrine of our theologians, as we could easily prove by citations, were they necessary for any other purpose than to show our learning, and within this doctrine can be brought all the examples from our Lord and the Fathers which the author refers to.

“It is lawful in some cases for inferiors to answer superiors in this way; as, for instance, if you asked a servant if he had been ever guilty of theft, for no one is obliged to criminate himself.” In case the superior has no right to the true answer to the question, conceded; but if he has, the case is not so clear; for it is not certain that no one is ever bound to criminate himself, or rather, when juridically interrogated, to confess an act which may criminate him. Under the Common Law, which obtains in England and most of our States, no man is bound to criminate himself; and it is understood on both sides that the state must convict the criminal by other testimony than his own, unless that is voluntarily given, or else not convict him at all. But this is not, as it seems to us, necessarily a principle of universal law. The good of the republic requires that

crimes should be detected and punished, and the criminal, in his quality of citizen or subject, may be obliged, for aught we can see, if the republic chooses, to testify as a witness against himself, as well as against another; and if so, he must be bound to give true and faithful answers as much as any other witness. But be this as it may, and even conceding the right of the servant, in the case supposed, to give an evasive or equivocal answer, he certainly has no right to answer what is not true, or what, without any regard to his own mental restriction or mental reservation, of which his master can know nothing, is necessarily false. "There are far more cases, where it is lawful for superiors to evade questions which inferiors have no right to ask." Undoubtedly, within the limits of the rule we have laid down; but there are none in which they have a right to evade even such questions by direct, plain, and necessary falsehood, or by an answer which must necessarily imply, in the ordinary usage of words in such case, what is not true.

"For it is always lawful to lead a man away from a greater sin by leading him to a less." The author here shows that he holds that the alleged evasions of our Lord and the Fathers, of which he has just spoken, did lead men into sin, though a less sin than that which they led them from. We deny both the fact here supposed, and the principle on which the author attempts to justify it. The so-called evasive answers of our Lord and the Fathers, or *œconomia*, as it is termed, which they on some occasions practised, did not of themselves lead men to any sin at all, and it is nothing short of blasphemy, at least in the case of our Lord, to allege that they did. The principle alleged in justification is false. Sin is never lawful, for by its very definition it is the transgression of the law, and therefore it can never be lawful to lead a man to commit sin, since to lead a man to commit a sin is to participate of its guilt. Otherwise there would be gross injustice in punishing the accessory to a crime, whether before or after the fact. It is lawful to lead a man from a greater sin, though in doing so you do not, cannot, and know you cannot, prevent him, if you do so, from committing a less sin; but never is it lawful to lead him from it by leading him to commit the less; for in the former case the direct and only positive influence of your action is to prevent sin, which is always not

only lawful, but laudable, and all that can be said is, that you were not able to prevent all the sin the man was determined to commit; but in the latter case the direct tendency of your action is to lead a man to commit sin, which is never lawful. "Nobody in his sane senses would deny that it was a virtuous deed to induce a man to stupefy himself by drink, who would only use his wits to avail himself of a solitary opportunity for murder of a man in mortal sin, or adultery mutually agreed upon." If stupefying himself with drink in the case supposed is sin on the part of the man himself, we deny it; for we may never do evil that good may come. If you say the stupefaction is not a sin on the part of the man himself, we concede your conclusion, but then it is nothing to your purpose; for then it only implies that it is a virtuous act by lawful means, or means not unlawful, to lead men from sin, which, indeed, nobody in his sane senses will deny, whether the sin be great or little. The case is to your purpose only on condition that stupefying one's self with drink is always in itself sin, and if it be so, it is undeniable that you cannot, without sin, for any purpose whatever, induce a person so to stupefy himself. Whether it would in the case supposed be or be not a sin, we are not called upon to decide.

"If the Fathers could lead the heretics to blaspheme the human nature of Christ, to do so was to lead them to a less sin than blaspheming his Divine nature, which blasphemy might never be forgiven, neither in this world nor in purgatory." Certainly, if blaspheming our Lord in his human is indeed a less sin than blaspheming him in his Divine nature; but to blaspheme the human nature of Christ is unquestionably a sin, and therefore the Fathers could not lawfully lead the heretics to commit it even for the purpose of preventing them from committing the greater sin of blaspheming his Divine nature. What the author might have said, all he needed to say, and perhaps all that he thought he was saying, is, that it was lawful for the Fathers to prevent, if they could, the heretics from blaspheming the Divine nature of Christ, though they suffered them, since they could not prevent them from doing the one or the other, to blaspheme the human nature, and that in doing so they would have been performing a virtuous action, because they would have prevented, if not all sin, at least

the greater sin. If he had said this, nobody could have objected, or pretended that he favored, what is popularly called Jesuitry, — a doctrine which he ought to know, if he does not know, is no Catholic doctrine, and is falsely and calumniously laid to the charge of the illustrious Society of Jesus.

What the author really intends may or may not be orthodox, but his doctrine as he develops and sets it forth is certainly false and scandalous, for his language is well fitted to confirm the calumnious accusations of Protestants against us. This is not the first time we have encountered this detestable doctrine among the Tractarian converts. We found it in Dr. Newman's Essay on Development; we have found it in some of their contributions to *The Dublin Review*, and it seems to have been adopted by the whole school, both before and since their conversion. The Tractarians in the Anglican Establishment were, as they felt, in a false position. They held doctrines and observed practices which that Establishment repudiated, while they asserted its full authority to teach, and their duty of unreserved submission to its teaching. Their study was to advocate what their Church condemned without compromising themselves, or saying any thing which could be made the ground of convicting them of positively departing from her standards. The most disingenuous publication we recollect ever to have read was the famous Tract No. 90, written by Dr. Newman before his conversion. The position of the whole school was a practical lie, and its more distinguished members were laboring with all their might to teach their Church, while they confessed her right to teach them, and made as if they learned only from her. They thus contracted a habit of disingenuous writing, which, while it suggested their meaning so plainly that nobody could really mistake it, yet did not often positively commit them to any thing for which their Church could call them to an account. They were aware of this, even boasted of it, and they justified it on the ground that the end they had in view was a good end, and that they were laboring in the interests of Catholic truth and piety, — the precise ground assumed by our author in defence of the Fathers, and even of our Lord himself. When the excellent Father Glover sent Dr. Newman, then at Rome, by the hands of the lamented Father Shaw, our

first article against his Essay on Development, with the request that he would read it, he replied, as Mr. Shaw informed us, "that he had heard of the article, but he had no time nor wish to read it. He had no hard feelings against the writer personally for having written it, but he was sorry that he had done so, for he had reason to believe that the Essay was doing great good in England." So he looked only at the effects his theory was producing, or supposed to be producing, in a particular locality, without at all troubling himself with the question whether it was true or false; that is, he was willing that the theory, even if false and mischievous, should go uncontradicted, if for the moment it *per accidens* facilitated the conversion of a few Anglicans. This is the only principle we can deduce from the reason he assigns for regretting the publication of our article against his Essay, and this is identically the principle Mr. Morris generalizes and sets forth in the work before us, or what is properly termed Jesuitry.

We find it, in consequence of this Tractarian habit of expressing more on some occasions than is professed, exceedingly difficult to hold the writers who have come to us from the Tractarian school to any fixed or definite statements. They are vague and uncertain, loose and vacillating. They do not distinctly state a thesis and abide by it. They are developmentists. Their thesis grows or changes as they proceed, expands or contracts, becomes now this, or now that, according to the exigencies of the argument. Father Newman, in his Lectures on the Difficulties of Anglicans, has occasion to touch his theory of development. He approaches it with great modesty, and with statements perfectly unexceptionable. You begin to feel that he has renounced it, or that after all he has never really meant any thing more by it than is warranted by the received theology of the Church. His first statement is perfectly satisfactory, and if we stop with it, we have no objection to offer. But we read on, and what in an ordinary writer would be only a logical development, or an illustration of his thesis, becomes unexpectedly an increase or growth of the thesis itself. The development, instead of a logical or an illustrative development, which merely enables us to see the original statement in its true light, and in its logical contents and relations, turns out to be a development by accretion, and takes in other and additional statements,

which entirely change the character of the original thesis, although a careless reader might not observe it. This is, we suppose, an illustration of what he means by growth of doctrine. Just so is it with the author before us. His first simple statement of Catholic morality is unexceptionable; but as he proceeds to develop it he takes up new principles,—accumulates a series of illustrations which develop his doctrine into another, almost totally the reverse of the one with which he set out. You see this, you feel it, you know it; yet, if you accuse him of holding the doctrine with which he ends, you will have no little difficulty in convicting him of doing so; for he has so expressed himself, that, if hard pressed, he can contract his doctrine to his first simple statement, and, when the pressure is removed, expand it to any dimensions he pleases. The great body of Catholic readers will, in consequence of their own logical training, be disposed to interpret him always in accordance with his primitive statements; Protestants for whom he writes, and who better understand his method of writing, since it is very much their own method, will much more truly interpret him by his last statements, and take his developed as his real doctrine. It is singular, that complaints of the sort we here bring are precisely the complaints which the Fathers and all our modern controversialists uniformly bring against the heretics they are opposing. Our author and his school, if free from heresy, have at least the usual arts of heresy, and a most heretical manner of writing.

The author is a developmentist, and along with his main design has evidently wished to show, on the one hand, that Protestants can make nothing of the Fathers without the infallible Church as living interpreter of them, and on the other, that Catholics can make just as little of them without the theory of development. The former is done to show Protestants why he is a Catholic, the latter to show us why he was an Anglican, or not sooner converted,—how he can be a Catholic now without blaming himself for having been so long an Anglican, notwithstanding his profound knowledge of the Fathers. He could not remain an Anglican, because he could not without the Church determine fully what is Christian doctrine; he could not become a Catholic before the invention of the theory of development, because such are the omissions and contra-

dictions of the Fathers, and such the discrepancies between their teachings and those of the present Church of Rome, that it was impossible, without a theory which Roman divines had never recognized, or at least never made use of, to reconcile the Church with the Fathers, and the Fathers with one another, or a given Father with himself. He does not say all this in just so many words, but he seems to us to imply it throughout his book. Catholics may, he says, reconcile the difficulties presented by St. John Chrysostom without the theory of development if they can; he cannot, and does not attempt to do it. He does not, we own, bring the theory prominently forward, but he presupposes it, and confessedly attempts to explain only those difficulties which would be difficulties in case the theory were received as true. There can be no reasonable doubt that he holds it, nor is there known to us any reason for supposing that it is not still held by Father Newman and all the converts of his school, or that they do not still consider its invention or its statement and regular development as an important contribution to Catholic theology.

We have no intention of entering anew, at any great length, into the discussion of Dr. Newman's theory of development. We have heretofore discussed it sufficiently. We have taken great pains to reëxamine the question within the last three or four years, and have been only the more confirmed in the judgment of it, which we have already expressed over and over again. We think the theory uncalled for, unauthorized by a single Catholic writer of the least note, and also false and pernicious. *The Dublin Review* had the temerity, indeed, to cite Suarez in support of it; it might as well have cited our own pages, for the statement of Catholic doctrine which we opposed to it was given in almost the very words of Suarez literally translated, although we had not read him at the time on the subject. We have since read him, and we must tell *The Dublin Review* that its charge, that we, in commenting on its citation from him, took his statement of a theory he was combating for his own, is not well founded. From that citation alone, we had collected the doctrine of Suarez correctly, notwithstanding the Reviewer had cited him very unfairly.

We do not ourselves lay claim to any extensive or profound knowledge of the Fathers; we have neither read

them all, nor all the works of any one of the more voluminous of them. But we have at least looked into some of them, and ascertained enough to be able to assert, without rashness, that they present no difficulties which require for their explication the development theory; and we can easily prove as much from the pages of Mr. Newman's Essay and the book before us. Both Mr. Newman and his disciple, Mr. Morris, afford ample evidence that all the doctrines which they call developments, in so far as they specify them, were believed and held by the Church from the earliest ages. That the faith in the course of time has, in some respects, gained in evidence, light, and distinctness, as says St. Vincent of Lerins, no man who knows any thing of the subject doubts; but that the Church has in process of time taken up or evolved new doctrines, implied in or required by the original *depositum*, unknown to her or to her Fathers in the first ages, we do most unequivocally deny. That we can in all cases sustain this denial without appeal to the decisions of popes and councils, we do not assert; but in arguing with a Catholic, or one who professes to be a Catholic, that is no objection. We are not obliged, in order to sustain it to a Catholic, to prove by an authority independent of popes and councils, that a given doctrine was known and believed at a given time, for if that authority has decided that it has always been the faith of the Church from the first, the question is settled, and no Catholic can open his mouth.

Here is where, we apprehend, the developmentists are principally at fault. They probably do not always consider their theory as absolutely necessary to remove any difficulties the Catholic may encounter in explaining and vindicating the faith to Catholics; they more frequently consider, most likely, their theory as chiefly necessary in the case of those without, or more especially in the case of learned Anglicans. These, not accepting the authority of the Church, cannot, without such theory, get over the difficulties presented to their minds by the Fathers, nor can we without it satisfactorily explain those difficulties to them. But the theory is either true or false. If true, it is as true for us as for them; if it is false, we have no right to propose it to them. Do our developmentists hold that their theory is false, or, as Mr. Newman calls it, only "an expedient," and simply make use of it to remove the un-

founded prejudices of Protestants, justifying themselves in doing so on the ground that it is lawful to use falsehood in the interests of truth? This, we have seen, they are not free to do. Either we need the theory to explain the alleged difficulties to ourselves, in case we are to explain them at all, or we do not. If we do not, the difficulties are themselves unreal, imaginary, and the theory of development itself is false; for there has been no development in the sense it alleges. If we cannot explain to Protestants the difficulties they find, or imagine they find, without it, we must let them go unexplained. We are anxious for their conversion, but we would not knowingly advocate a false theory, even if by so doing we could convert the whole world. God could save all the world, if he would; indeed, he wills all to be saved, and provides all with sufficient means; but he will save no one at the expense of truth, or without the voluntary concurrence of the subject, or in any other way than the one he has established. It will not do, as we have observed is sometimes the case with the converted Tractarians, to understand what St. Paul says about beguiling as if it authorized us to deceive or cheat people into a belief of the truth.

Certain it is, that the theory cannot be accepted or used if it be false, or not true. To use it as an hypothesis or expedient for the explication of certain alleged facts, whether true or false, will not answer, because it is itself only an induction from those facts, and therefore a fact or a no-fact itself. To allege it, in case it is false, is not simply to allege a false explication of a fact, but a false fact. It depends for its truth on the facts it is to explain, and cannot be conceived as true if those facts, in the character alleged, are themselves unreal or do not exist. If, as commonly believed, the faith has come down to us from the first in its purity and integrity, without diminution or addition, the facts alleged do not exist, there has been no development in the sense of the theory, and therefore the theory, which must presuppose those facts, is false and in direct contradiction to the truth; consequently, inadmissible even as an hypothesis or expedient. The developmentists should, then, first of all establish the necessity of the theory, by establishing the existence of an order of facts which demand it. What we ask of them, then, first of all, is to give us a precise statement, with full evidence

of their reality, of the facts which they propose to explain by their theory, or of what they call developments, or proofs of development. Regarded as an hypothesis or expedient for the explication of facts, nobody objects to it, in case the facts themselves exist; for it is then only a general or scientific statement of them, since those facts must themselves be developments. Under this point of view, the objection is not that it does not explain the facts, but that the facts do not themselves exist, and cannot be said to exist without denying the whole Christian religion.

Now, we respectfully request the developmentists, in the first place, to establish the fact, not that there has been development in some sense; or that there have been from time to time, and even may be hereafter, new definitions of faith on the occasion of new errors or heresies; or that certain points of faith, originally formally proposed indeed, but *in globo*, as we may say, have, in the course of time, as they have been controverted and made the subject of special study, been more distinctly drawn out and precisely stated than they were at first, — for this no Catholic denies, or dreams of denying; but that there has been the order of facts they contend for, or actual development in the sense their theory presupposes, — that is, that, as time has rolled on, new doctrines have been evolved from the original *depositum*, or assimilated to it, which were unknown to the primitive believers and not formally, though indistinctly, believed by them, — for their theory means this, or it means nothing; and in the second place, to draw up a complete and authenticated list of the doctrines, dogmas, or propositions of faith, which they hold to have been obtained by development, together with the exact date of the time when they respectively first became known to the Church, and were adopted as part and parcel of her creed. Till they do thus much, all controversy with them on their theory, save as to its metaphysics, must be carried on in the dark, and be incapable of being brought to any definite issue. Surely this request is reasonable, and we hope they will not refuse to comply with it. We make the request far more for their sake than for our own. We think that they have taken up their theory without any thorough examination of the real character of the facts which they propose to explain by it, and that they continue to hold it, because they have never seriously undertaken to define it

even to themselves, and have never settled in their own minds, with exactness and precision, what they do or do not mean by it. We have found all the advocates of the theory with whom we have conversed, however clear and definite on other subjects, no sooner touching upon it, than they become all at once vague and uncertain in their views, vacillating in their expressions, and unable to hit upon any statement which seems exactly to express what they mean. This comes, we apprehend, from the fact that what they mean is neither defined in their minds nor capable of being defined, and that any statement they can frame will either express too much or too little to satisfy them. If the developmentists should undertake to comply with our request, they would most likely discover this, and find that they either mean no more than their opponents concede, or else that they mean what no Catholic can hold, and therefore come to the conclusion, either that they have been making a great ado about nothing, or that they have unwittingly fallen into a most grave error, which it imports them to lose no time in abandoning. Their theory would either vanish in smoke, or be found untenable and pernicious, as hateful to them as it is to us. We do them no injustice when we say, that they are not only inexact writers, but loose thinkers. The attempt to write with a little more exactness and precision would soon compel them to think with more exactness and precision.

No doubt, many will think that remarks like these cannot, without injustice, be applied to Dr. Newman. Dr. Newman is in some respects, we grant, clear and acute as a thinker, and choice and exact as a writer; but he is a man of a sharp rather than a broad and comprehensive intellect. He has little faculty of grasping a subject in its unity and integrity, and he never masters a subject by first seizing it in its central principle, and thence descending to its several details. To use a form of expression borrowed from himself, he takes in an idea, not as a whole, but by viewing it successively under a variety of separate aspects,—by walking all around it, and viewing it successively under all its aspects. He thus attains only to particular views, never to unity of view, or to the comprehension of the idea as a whole. No man has, within the range of these particular views, a clearer or a keener sight than he, and no man can more clearly, vividly, distinctly, accurately, or forcibly ex-

press what he thus apprehends. But nevertheless, whenever he attempts to mould his particular views into a systematic whole, he becomes confused, obscure, vague, and vacillating. His mind is a purely inductive mind, the impersonation of the inductive philosophy, and proceeds not from unity to multiplicity, from principles to facts, but the reverse. He will seize on a particular fact, and generalize it into the basis of a universe. In consequence of the narrowness and unphilosophical character of his mind, his attention is fixed for the time being always on one particular aspect of a subject, which he necessarily treats provisionally, as if it were the entire subject in its unity. His language, chosen for the expression of that particular aspect, lacks breadth, comprehensiveness, and becomes inappropriate, obscure, and false as the representative of the truth not merely as he views it, but as it really is in itself, independent of him. So we cannot, with all his particular merits, which are very great, exempt him from the common complaint which we make of his whole school.

The greater part of the offence we take at what the developmentists inculcate is not to what they openly, distinctly, and formally state; but to what they hint, insinuate, or bring in incidentally, or as it were by way of illustration, or development. The direct thesis, when they have a direct thesis, which they profess to maintain, we can in most cases accept; but they no sooner state it, than they bring in surreptitiously, as if in illustration or support of it, matter which we are obliged to reject with horror. Incidentally Mr. Morris tells us that St. Augustine's doctrine of predestination and grace was in his time a novelty, that is, we suppose, a development, and that it was not generally accepted in the East (Vol. I. pp. 130, 131). This grave charge against the great doctor of grace, if it could be sustained, since it is undeniable that the doctrine taught by St. Augustine in his latest writings on this subject is that of the Church, would go far towards sustaining the theory of development. But there is not a word of truth in it. It is no new charge; it was made by the old Pelagians, and especially the Semi-Pelagians, and their successors in modern times have never ceased to repeat it. Suarez* takes it up *ex professo*, and refutes it; and the great Bos-

* Prolegomenon VI. cap. 6.

suet, in his *Defense de la Tradition et des Saints Pères** against M. Simon, who had insisted upon it in his *Histoire Critique des principaux Commentateurs de Nouveau Testament depuis le Commencement du Christianisme jusqu'à Notre Temps*, etc., replies to it at great length, completely refuting it in both its parts, and, what is more to our present purpose, expressly denying and refuting the theory of development at the same time. Mr. Morris is found in bad company when he brings this charge, and we advise him in the next edition of his work to cancel it. It is true, he brings it for a very different purpose from that of M. Simon, Grotius, and other Pelagians or Semi-Pelagians, and without looking upon it as a charge at all; but Suarez terms it "a calumny," *calumnia*, and Bossuet treats it as virtually heretical, and we cannot look upon it as any more true when alleged by a developmentist than when alleged by a Pelagian, when for a good than when for a bad purpose. Bossuet and Suarez, on a question of this nature, are very respectable authorities, and, besides, they sustain themselves by a most formidable list of Fathers, both Eastern and Western, among whom in the East we find St. Gregory Nazianzen, and our author's favorite, St. Ephrem, both of whom teach the same doctrine as St. Augustine. But after all, it is possible that the testimony of Catholic divines who have never had the advantage of being brought up in heresy will not weigh much with our author, when opposed to his favorite theory, and hence we will spare ourselves the trouble of citing some decisive passages bearing on the theory, from so decidedly a Catholic doctor, and therefore so inconsiderable an authority, as St. Thomas of Aquin.

In the third part of his work, the author undertakes to prove the immaculate conception of Our Lady, or her perfect immunity from all stain of original sin. We have only glanced at this part, for it carries on a discussion in which we have no wish to engage. We believe as firmly in the immaculate conception as any one can believe a point which has been questioned, and on which the Church has not as yet formally pronounced, and we always avail ourselves of the privilege allowed us when we say the Litany of Our Blessed Lady, our own dear Mother, to add, "*Re-*

* Livre V. chap. 5 et seq.

gina, sine labe concepta, ora pro nobis." We know no reason why, if it be of faith, the Church cannot so declare it, and whether it be so or not she is the judge, not we. Whether it is or is not desirable that she should decide the case which has for so many years been pending in her court, it is not for us to say. She does not need our consent, or our counsel, and we have not the impertinence to tell her what we do or do not wish. We look to her to instruct us, and we trust we need but to hear her voice to be ready to obey it, whether it commands what we have or have not wished. But there is little doubt in our mind, that the doctrine of development is favored by many, because they wish the Church to define the immaculate conception to be of faith, and that those who wish to advocate the theory are extremely solicitous to have this decision made. The former think the doctrine would much facilitate, if not the definition itself, at least its reception; the latter, that the definition would give the seal of the Church to their theory. A learned friend of ours, in a conversation the other day, after conceding that Mr. Newman's theory of development was wrong, yet would have some theory of the kind allowed, because of the general desire to have this question defined. We see no need of any theory of development in the case. The simple question to be decided is, not whether the immunity of Our Lady from all stain of original sin is or is not sufficiently developed to be ruled an article of faith, but whether it be or be not an Apostolic and Divine tradition. If it is, the Church can declare it to be so; if not, she cannot define it to be of faith, for to define a point to be of faith is neither more nor less than to declare it to be an Apostolic and Divine tradition. The definition demands no doctrine of development, either to be made or defended, and in defining it the Church will give no more countenance to such a doctrine than she does in deciding any litigated point of faith. We see nothing in our theology to change in case the definition should be made. We should not, unless the Church expressly so decided, regard the definition either as a development or as the result of development; for the fact that it has not hitherto been made would count for nothing, since the case is not now taken up anew, but has really been in court ever since a serious controversy first arose on the subject, and the action has been continued without being de-

cided. Why the Church has not decided it sooner, or why, having delayed it so long, she should decide it now, is no affair of ours. She is the legitimate judge, not only of what is the faith, but of the time when it is proper to define it.

But it is time to draw our remarks to a close. We cannot expect that all we have said will be acceptable to the Oxford converts and their friends. We expect to be censured, and censured severely; but we have said nothing in wantonness, or from any personal motive. The author and his friends have never crossed our path, and are not likely to do so. Their line in life runs remote from ours. They have done us personally no injury, and conferred on us no benefits. Personally there is no reason in the world why we should be opposed to them, or should not in all respects sympathize with them. We have no prejudices against them because they are converts, and can have none, for we are a convert ourselves, and only a year older as a convert than Dr. Newman himself. In learning, cultivation, piety, and fervor, we are not worthy to be compared with the meanest of them. Why, then, should we attack them? Sure enough, why should we? Certain it is, the odds are against us, and most people will presume that, in a controversy between them and us, they must be in the right and we in the wrong. If they are as wrong as we pretend, how happens it that there is nobody in England to show it?

Then, again, it may be said, these converts against whom you are writing are learned and peaceable men, men who have left all to follow Christ, for the most part priests of the Church, devoting themselves without reserve to the glorious work of training souls for heaven, and of winning back England, their native country, to the faith. Why attack them? Why disturb them in their sacred work? Why throw obstacles in their way? All this and much more may be said, all this and much more we have said to ourselves, and it has not been without a full sense of the responsibility we incur, nor without a painful struggle, that we have written what we have. It has been from no private motive, it has been from no indifference to the work in which they are engaged, that we have undertaken the ungracious and most unpleasant task of criticizing their writings. We have done what we have, because we

fear, and not we alone, that they are originating or reviving a destructive heresy, from which both England and this country may receive great harm. Neither learning nor talents, nor zeal nor piety, are perfect safeguards against heresy. Jansenius, for aught we ever understood, was a really learned man, a great man, and an exemplary bishop; and yet he originated a most pestilent heresy. Gioberti is a man of talents, genius, and learning, and he was so scrupulous in the outset that he said his Office on his knees; and yet has he made shipwreck of his faith, and, as we are told, is living now in Paris without a single exterior or interior mark of the sacerdotal character. God may be doing a great work in England, and bestowing freely his grace for the conversion of those who have been so long estranged from his Church, and we certainly have no disposition to interrupt the work, even if it were in our power, or to increase the difficulties of those engaged in it. But England is not all the world to us, and the present moment is not all the time we consider. Erroneous or heretical writings do not all their mischief at the moment of their publication, nor in the country of their authors. The language of England and the United States is the same, and works written and published there find their way here, and exert here hardly, if any, less influence for good or for evil, than if originally written and published here. They may, owing to peculiar circumstances, exert there, for the moment, a good, or not a bad influence, and yet exert here an influence only decidedly bad, and both here and there, hereafter, a most pernicious influence. We have a right to look, under our pastors, to the interests of truth in our own country, and to condemn any books which come under our notice that are likely to do grave injury here, although circumstances may counteract their evil tendency elsewhere. But in reality we believe the writings of the school in question are doing great harm even in England, and we judge so from what we see in the anti-Catholic periodicals of that country, all of which charge, without any qualification, the doctrine of development upon the Church, and tell us that Rome, having failed in her attempts for three hundred years to vindicate her corruptions by denying that she has added to the faith, now concedes that she has made additions, and hopes to defend them by calling them *developments*. It is because

we have honestly believed, whether mistaken or not, that the writings of this school are filled with many grave errors, and cannot but be deeply prejudicial to orthodoxy, both here and in England, both now and hereafter, that we have written against them. What we have done we have done conscientiously, and not without seeking guidance from the Source of all light, and receiving instructions from those from whom it is our duty to learn in all docility. We have written with great plainness and directness, because the case seems to require it; with earnestness and decision, because we could not write otherwise if we would; but we have written nothing in pride or in anger, and if any thing has escaped us that is contrary either to Christian truth or to Christian charity, we wish to retract and condemn it in advance. We have nothing to say as to why the task of exposing them has been left to us, yet it is easy to see, by a reference to existing facts, why the task could be better performed here than in England.

Let not our readers, however, suppose for a moment that we are blind or insensible to the many merits of the men in question. The greater part even of the work before us is truly excellent, and it contains upon the whole a masterly discussion of the subject it professes to treat. What is objectionable, though it pervades in some sense the whole work, really takes up but a very little of its space, and probably would not be noticed by a majority of readers, or, if noticed, would be set down not to an unsound theory adopted by the learned author, but to his want of accurate information on some points, and to the inexactness and carelessness of his language. This is probably the case with most of his English Catholic readers. We cannot so set it down, for the reasons we have given in the course of this article; yet let no one so wrong us as to imagine that we question the good faith of the author, or doubt his determination to be a true Catholic believer. He is, we make no question, an excellent professor, a faithful and zealous priest, who would give his life for the faith, or for a flock intrusted to his charge. In all these converts of whom we speak, there is much to command our warm admiration. They are free from much of the timidity and compromising spirit heretofore not unfrequently encountered in English Catholics. They are no slaves to public opinion; they are open and fearless in the

profession of their faith. They are, and that in our estimation atones for much, no Gallicans, that is, no favorers of the doctrines usually termed Gallican, though by no means peculiar to Frenchmen. They are for the most part, as far as we have been able to discover, in regard to the mutual relations of the spiritual and temporal orders, genuine Papists. They show no desire to reduce the primacy of Peter to a mere primacy of order, nor, with all their Anglican prejudices, any wish to make Catholicity as near like Anglicanism as possible. On all questions of this nature they are honorably distinguished, and nobly maintain the ground which we in our humble way and with our feeble abilities attempt also to maintain. They exhibit much of the robustness and sturdy independence which we admire in the English character. They also appear to have a deep and tender devotion to the Blessed Mother of God, with which we should be sorry not to sympathize with all our heart. In a word, were it not for the Tractarian habits they still retain, their low estimate of Catholic learning and talent, their bad logic and false philosophy, and their abominable theory of development, we would cut our right hand off sooner than write, and pull out our tongue by the roots sooner than speak, one word against them.

The principal errors which we detect in our author and his school appear to us to have originated very innocently, and we are far from intending any moral blame in indicating them. These writers seem to us to have begun their study of Catholic theology where they should have ended. They appear to have begun with the Fathers instead of the modern theologians, or the great scholastic doctors. In the correspondence we have had with some of them, they have sneered at contemporary theologians for studying compendiums. Now we believe, with all deference, that all study of Catholic faith and theology should commence with compendiums, and first of all with that admirable compendium, the Catechism. From the Catechism we would proceed to the next briefest and simplest compendium, and from that we would proceed to St. Thomas and his commentators. When we had well mastered scholastic theology, we would proceed to the Fathers, but not till then, because to us the key to the Fathers is in the scholastic theology. We prize the Fathers above all price, and when once one is prepared to read them, there is no reading,

after the Holy Scriptures, more or equally profitable. But without such preparation, without the key which unlocks their sense, one is almost as liable to misapprehend and wrest them to his own hurt as he is the Sacred Text itself. They were written at a remote period, with special reference to the peculiar controversies, states of mind, and modes of thought at the time, and the reader who alights on them without a previous accurate knowledge of the chief points of Catholic theology will find them filled with obscurities, and bristling with difficulties, which he will hardly be able to solve or clear up.

Our Tractarian friends, brought up to look upon contemporary Catholics as an ignorant, feeble, cunning, credulous, and superstitious set of mortals, far inferior in learning, talents, and morals to themselves, and accustomed to regard the Scholastics as dealing mainly in vain subtilties and distinctions without a difference, very naturally passed from the study of their jejune Anglican theology to the study of the Fathers, whom they were forced to read through the spectacles of their more famous Anglican divines. They thus not only had not the requisite preparation for studying them, but had views and habits which wholly unfitted them for studying them, with even passable success. They have come from the Fathers down to the Scholastics, whom they have studied not profoundly, and have interpreted them by the Fathers, instead of interpreting the Fathers by them. Hence their theory of development, and other errors, adopted to reconcile the Fathers and the later theologians. Nothing was more natural, and we ourselves fell into kindred errors, partially for the same reason; and had we not been put to the study of a brief compendium, and from that upon a rigid course of scholastic theology in one of the commentators on St. Thomas, we might and most likely should have continued in them to this day. Having, to some extent, made ourselves acquainted with Catholic theology, the Fathers became somewhat intelligible to us, and we cannot now find the difficulties in them with which they formerly seemed filled. St. Augustine is now by preference our master in theology and philosophy. Our friends on the other side of the water will understand from these remarks, that it is not themselves personally that we censure, but solely what we regard as their errors.

- ART. II.—1. *The Life of the Rt. Rev. FRANCIS KIRWAN, Bishop of Killala.* Translated from the Latin of GRATI-ANUS LUCIUS, by the Rev. C. P. MEEHAN. Dublin: Duffy. 1847.
2. *Life of Most Rev. OLIVER PLUNKETT, Archbishop of Armagh.* By the Rev. GEORGE CROLY, of Maynooth College. Dublin: Duffy. 1850.
3. *The Annals of the Four Masters.* Translated from the Original Irish, by JOHN O'DONOVAN, LL. D. Dublin: Hodges & Smith. 1846–50. 3 vols. 4to.

IN the year of grace 1535, Henry the Eighth of England issued a proclamation, in which he ordered that "the name of the Bishop of Rome should be struck from every liturgical book"; in which he placed the clergy under the inspection of the sheriffs of counties, and declared it treason to deny that "the jurisdiction, title, and qualification of Supreme Head of the Church belonged to the King alone." This paper marks the date of the formal schism of England. Six years afterwards, in "a great court," or Parliament, at Dublin, certain Milesian-Irish chiefs and Anglo-Irish barons elected this Henry King of Ireland. The crown was presented to him at Greenwich Palace, and accepted; the harp was quartered in the royal shield; a new seal was struck, and the English ambassadors were instructed to have the additional title recognized and respected abroad.

By the election of such a king, that principle of confusion was introduced into Irish politics which has pervaded all subsequent Irish history. The Parliament of 1541 had not the excuse of ignorance for their choice of an odious schismatic as the head of their new dynasty. The divorce of Queen Catharine, the proclamation of 1535, the martyrdom of Fisher, More, and the Carthusians, must needs be towntalk at Dublin. True, Catholic princes and even the Holy Father entertained some hopes of Henry's repentance; true, his six articles of faith were all forms of Catholic doctrines; true, previous to 1541 his representatives at Dublin were all Catholics; true, the disorganized Celtic constitution needed the insertion of authority and unity, and could only get them from without: yet, with all due allowance for the electors, we must still

condemn them. They sacrificed duty to expediency, the eternal interests of religion to local, and, in some cases, merely personal purposes. To make their responsibility the greater, the election was the work of one order alone, the lay nobility. The clergy and the commons had nothing to do with it. The clergy looked on in silent apprehension of the visitations to come; the people, ill-informed as to events in England, seem to have manifested a good deal of indifference to the Dublin ceremonial. With what horror those who understood the political consequences of the election must have regarded it, may be inferred from the entry in the *Annals of Donegal Convent* (called usually "The Annals of the Four Masters") of the first appearance of the English schism.

We insert the passage from the *Book of Obits and Martyrology*, published by the Irish Archæological Society in 1844.

"A. D. 1537. A heresy and a new error broke out in England, the effects of pride, vainglory, avarice, sensual desire, and the prevalence of a variety of scientific and philosophical speculations, so that the people of England went into opposition to the Pope and to Rome. At the same time they followed a variety of opinions, and the old Law of Moses, after the manner of the Jewish people, and they gave the title of Head of the Church of God to the King. There were enacted by the King and Council new laws and statutes after their own will. They ruined the Orders who were permitted to hold worldly possessions, viz. monks, canons, nuns, and brethren of the Cross; and the four mendicant orders, viz. the Minors, the Preachers, Carmelites, and Augustinians. The possessions and living of all these were taken up for the king. They broke the monasteries. They sold their roofs and bells, so that there was not a monastery from Arann of the Saints to the Iccian Sea that was not broken and shattered, except only a few in Ireland, which escaped the notice and attention of the English. They further burned and broke the famous images, shrines, and relics of Ireland and England. After that they burned in like manner the celebrated image of Mary, which was at Ath-Truim, and the Staff of Jesus, which was in Dublin, performing miracles from the time of Patrick down to that time, and which was in the hand of Christ while he was among men. They also made archbishops and sub-bishops for themselves; and although great was the persecution of the Roman Emperors against the Church, it is not probable that ever so great a *persecution* as this ever came from Rome hither. So that it is impossible to tell or narrate its

description, unless it should be told by him who saw it."—pp. xvii., xviii.

Though in the outset many supposed the divorce question to be a merely diplomatic dispute with Rome, others, more wise, foresaw in it the fruitful seeds of heresy. Shane O'Neil, Prince of Ulster, took alarm at the proclamation of 1535. Marching to Dublin with his forces, he asked and received solemn assurances of the ulterior Catholic intentions of King Henry, and was accompanied on a pilgrimage to Our Lady of Trim by the Lord Deputy Grey, who, "kneeling before her, heard three or four masses very devoutly." The Deputy's devotion and assurances deceived for a time the excited Catholics. But every arrival from Chester or Bristol brought over fresh reports of the progress of the revolts against Rome, and soon a faction favorable to the new doctrines was formed at Dublin under the leadership of Archbishop George Browne, Cranmer's friend and correspondent. This unhappy prelate was full of zeal for the new doctrines, but, previous to Henry's election, was constrained to dissemble. In 1538, he writes to Cranmer that a rumor having spread of his intention to destroy the "ymages and ydoles," he had contradicted it, though his heart well enough inclined him so to purge the land; the same year he was reproved by Henry for burning a relic of St. Patrick, the famous *Baculus Jesus*. After the act of election, by virtue of a commission which he said was dated two years earlier, he began to rifle the churches of his own diocese, whence he remitted to the royal treasury "gold, silver, and precious stones valued at £ 326 2s. 11*d.*, other 'stuffs of superstition' worth £ 1710 2s. 0*d.*, and one thousand pounds of wax tapers, valued at £ 20." During the short remainder of King Henry's reign, very few conversions were made in Ireland. Agard, a Dublin official, writes to Secretary Cromwell, that, "except the Archbishoppe of Dublin, only Lord Butler, the Master of ye Rolls, Mr. Theasurer, and 2 or 3 mo of small repytaciones, none may abide the herryng of *it* (the king's supremacy) either spirituals as they call them, or temporals." In vain the spoils of five hundred religious houses and twice as many churches were offered as prizes of conversion; in vain the pride and passions of the townsmen were appealed to. The spoils of the Church were left to foreign

adventurers, "the younger sons of good families out of England," the Chichesters, Croftons, and Kings, founders of the most cruel landlord class that ever a nation suffered under. Among the receivers there are not half a dozen native names. Archbishop Browne and the apostate Bishops of Meath, Kildare, and Limerick were English by birth, and nominees of Henry; the Butler family, and Mieler Magrath, apostate Archbishop of Cashel, are the only notable exceptions to the general rule of Irish fidelity.

The expedition of Henry to France after his election, and the bodily sufferings of his last days, as well as the doubt, in which he kept his ministers till the last, of his ultimate views, preserved Ireland during his time from every formidable attack of the Reformation. The first systematic attempt was made in the reign of Edward the Sixth, under the directing genius of Cranmer. Browne was declared Primate, and a new hierarchy was ordered in Council. One Goodacre was by Cranmer ordained Archbishop of Armagh, a Dr. Lancaster was ordained Bishop of Kildare, and a Dr. Bale, Bishop of Ossory. Sir Edward Bellingham, "with 600 horse and 400 foot," was sent to support these nominations, and to assist in stripping the shrines hitherto unplundered. The Catholic populace now began very clearly to comprehend the nature of the new religion. In Cashel they rose and drove the apostate Archbishop out of his see, suffering him to escape to England, where he lived and died a pensioner of the crown; in Kilkenny, Dr. Bale "preached very peaceably," (as they did not understand him,) "until he ordered some of his people to pull down pictures and statues and burn mass-books and vestments," when, as he reports it, the citizens "rose up, slew five of my servants, and barely suffered me to escape with life." Dr. Goodacre, admonished by these tidings, never ventured to Armagh, while the other heretical prelates assumed their functions only in garrison, or rode on occasional pastoral visitations accompanied by troops of horse. Edward's short and Queen Mary's still shorter reign left "the Reformation" as powerless, in Ireland, when Elizabeth ascended the throne, as when Agard wrote to Cromwell, twenty years before, that they could not abide the hearing of it. The Catholics were rather forewarned than intimidated. The acts of Henry, the attempt of Cranmer, and the sudden death of Mary, were to

them so many warnings to recruit their strength and perfect their defences. From the first year of Elizabeth's reign, it was evident that the Protestant policy was to present but one alternative, confiscation or conformity. Her deputy, the Earl of Sussex, summoned a Parliament at Dublin, in 1559, which was very slimly attended. At this Parliament a majority of those present adopted the oaths of abjuration and supremacy, and made it treason to refuse them. None but peers were exempt from being so sworn, and the form of words used made the declaration retrospective as well as prospective; compelled Catholics to swear that their religion was an idolatry, that the Sovereign Pontiff had no power over their consciences, but that their sovereign lady, the Queen, was alone the possessor of "the title, jurisdiction, and style of Supreme Head of the Church." The attempts to proselytize by pains and penalties began with Queen Elizabeth, and ended with Queen Anne. The policy of Protestantism changed at the accession of the present dynasty to the throne, in 1714. Since then, perversion by education has been the favorite scheme of every successive government, from Lord Bute's to Lord John Russell's. Each system has been tried a century and a half, with most diabolical energy and perseverance, and each has signally and totally failed. A summary of the facts of each attempt, of the experiments in each policy, will be the best service we can render to this subject.

The confiscation of Church property in Ireland was soon followed by the confiscation of the property of the Catholic laity, who refused the oaths of abjuration and supremacy. The Earl of Desmond in the South, and the O'Neil family in the North, were prominent chiefs of the Catholic nobility. Having both refused to take the oaths, their immense estates and those of all their kinsmen and allies were confiscated; Desmond's by Elizabeth, in 1575, and O'Neil's by James the First, in 1610. By the first confiscation the entire province of Munster was partitioned among Protestant adventurers from England, and a few native apostates; by the second, the whole province of Ulster was vested in the London Companies and the Scotch Presbyterians. Leinster, being chiefly in the hands of the Butlers, the Fitzgeralds of Kildare, and other apostates, did not undergo the horrors of a wholesale confiscation; but Connaught, under Strafford's viceroyalty, in

1638, shared the fate of its neighbors, and a dozen years after was reconsecrated by Cromwell. In one short century the entire soil of the island changed masters. Every title which could insure possession, every evidence of legal proprietorship, the very principle of property itself, was systematically violated, on a scale limited only by the limits of the kingdom. The grandsons of an old, unquestioned proprietary were homeless wanderers, obliged to sell their souls to England, or their swords to the Continental kings. A new aristocracy was lodged in the castles of the banished Catholics; an aristocracy without one common feeling with the people; an aristocracy whose merit was their heresy, and whose tenure was to remain anti-Irish. In the mouldering ruins of convents, and the ashes of villages consumed in war, their genealogies took root, and growing from such a soil, what could they produce but that they have produced, — warfare, disloyalty, famine, and death? Whoever wants to understand the causes of the present misery of Ireland will find them in the four confiscations of the island which Reformed Parliaments and sovereigns decreed, each of which was carried out by a war as cruel and devastating as the principle upon which it was undertaken. The Desmonds were in arms against Elizabeth from 1575 until the last heirs of the name were lost in the shipwrecked Armada; the O'Neils and their allies were in arms against the confiscation of their province from 1585 until 1602; the Catholics throughout the country rose almost unanimously against the Puritan Lords Justices, Borlase and Parsons, in 1641, and remained in arms till the surrender of Galway in 1652. After the restoration of the Stuarts, the acts of settlement and explanation confirmed all the previous confiscations, including even the grants of Cromwell to regicides. Yet in 1685, the Catholics enlisted for King James and their Church, and remained in arms until the surrender of Limerick, six years later, when thirty-nine thousand of them were permitted by treaty to transport themselves to France. Four religious wars within one century attest the virulent energy with which the policy of force was followed up, while estates remained to be plundered, or a Catholic nobility to be exterminated. After Elizabeth's confiscation, Edmund Spenser found Munster "a heap of carcasses and ashes"; after the "crowning mercies" of

the Puritan invasion, not "a soul escaped" of the garrisons of Drogheda and Wexford; after the Williamite war, Parson Story, who traversed the five counties watered by the Shannon, pronounced that district "a fine country, if it had inhabitants." To sum up the cost in human life of these wars, it is only necessary to know that the Irish population at Queen Elizabeth's accession was estimated at 2,300,000, and at Queen Anne's, 1,700,000.

The violation of all law which marked these confiscations, both of personal and ecclesiastical property, further involved the violation of three express conventions, securing liberty of worship to Catholics. Henry the Seventh, on taking possession of his lordship in Ireland, had expressly and solemnly undertaken, among other engagements, "that the Church of Ireland shall be free and enjoy all its accustomed privileges." This stipulation was confirmed by Henry the Eighth, at his election as king, and was flagrantly violated by the same Henry, by Edward, Elizabeth, and the succeeding sovereigns. Charles the Second, in his declaration at Breda, had expressly guaranteed the freedom of the Irish Church, which at and after his restoration he as expressly invaded. Having requested a synod of the Irish clergy, in 1666, he submitted to them the Gallican propositions, adopted by the University of Paris three years before; the Irish prelates, refusing to purchase toleration at such a price, were imprisoned, or found safety in exile. Of the entire number, but three bishops were allowed to remain in the kingdom, two of whom were bedridden from old age. Again, in 1691, by the first six articles of the treaty of Limerick, liberty of worship was guaranteed in the name of the Most Holy Trinity, and sanctioned by the sign manual of the king; yet the treaty was not three years old when an act of explanation was passed, exempting from its provisions all who refused to take an oath more offensive than the oaths of Elizabeth,—that is, all who were included in it at first.

Of the illustrious martyrs of the Irish Church, under the six persecutions, it would be almost impossible to abridge the record. Among them, most illustrious for station and heroism, were O'Hurley, Archbishop of Cashel, burned to death in Dublin; O'Kelly, Archbishop of Tuam, murdered in his carriage at Sligo by Puritan soldiers; O'Brien, Bishop of Emly, executed by Ireton; McEgan,

Bishop of Cloyne, executed by Ireton; Oliver Plunkett, Primate of all Ireland, executed at Tyburn in 1678; Peter Talbot, Archbishop of Dublin, who died in prison; Shane O'Neil, assassinated by Elizabeth's order; the last Earl of Desmond, assassinated by Elizabeth's order; Lord Connor Maguire, executed at Tyburn, under Charles the First; Lord Burke of Brittas, executed under Charles the Second; Sir Phelim O'Neil, executed by order of Cromwell at Dublin; Redmond, Count Hanlon, assassinated by order of Ormond; Father Richard Molony, executed in 1694, for being found in Wales without "a registered certificate." Each Regular Order has its own martyrology in Irish history since the Reformation. The Dominicans count over sixty of their brethren who died gloriously for the faith, during Cromwell's wars, and the Franciscans, who were still more numerous, were equally afflicted and equally heroic. Of the number who died in battle and in exile, only the recording angel has the full account.

The last generation that experienced the horrors of open, undisguised persecution was that which lived under Queen Anne. Her penal laws have been justly described by Burke as "ferocious." By the second Parliament of her reign it was enacted that a son becoming Protestant might make his Catholic father tenant for life, and seize the fee simple and rental of the estate to his own use; a Catholic inheriting property and refusing to conform, by the same statute, was set aside in favor of "the next Protestant heir." By another act of the same year (2 Anne, cap. 3, sec. 7), if an unregistered priest was found at large, a heavy fine was levied upon the country, and paid over to the informer. This last act gave rise to the pursuit called "priest-hunting," in which several fortunes were made. By the 8th of Anne, a tariff of rewards was fixed: for an archbishop, bishop, or other superior, £ 50; for other ecclesiastics, £ 20 per head. A Portuguese Jew, named Garcia, was one of the most infamous detectives during this reign. In 1718 he arrested seven unregistered priests, "for whose detection he had a sum equal to two or three thousand pounds of our money." A contemporary writer says: "He sometimes put on the mien of a priest, for he affected to be one, and, thus worming himself into the good graces of some confiding Catholic, got a clew to the whereabouts of the clergy." The excesses of infamy to which this law

carried the informers was the apparent cause of the reaction against the whole code which set in a few years later.

During these persecutions the resources displayed by the Irish Church were admirable and miraculous. In 1666, notwithstanding the penalties which hung over their heads, there were 1100 of the regular clergy and 780 seculars on the Irish mission. Twenty years afterwards the regulars had increased to about 2,000. After the violation of the treaty of Limerick, between the years 1692 and 1696, 495 seculars and 424 regulars were transported from the kingdom. Even the poor nuns were banished, and at Ypres, Antwerp, and Lisbon the dispersed communities of Dublin, Waterford, and Limerick found refuge. The majority of the Irish sees were for many years administered by vicars, the bishops being easily detected and expelled. A Bishop of Raphoe contrived, in the disguise of a shepherd, to watch over his people from the uplands of Derry and Donegal; DeBurgo, the learned Bishop of Ossory, disguised as a common sailor, found his way into his diocese, and contrived to remain. Missionary priests in mechanical attire would frequent the taverns in cities, gather a few Catholics together, retire as if to carouse, and then administer the sacraments in secret and in haste. One of the churches of Dublin is popularly called "Adam and Eve's Chapel," from a neighboring tavern of that name, in which the parishioners were obliged to meet their pastors in those trying times. The Irish colleges founded on the Continent, at the instigation of the exiles, by the Catholic princes, the Popes, and the illustrious Barberini and Ludovisian families, poured a constant supply of missionaries, catechisms, and books of devotion into Ireland. To the Irish press at Paris, Louvain, and Rome may be partly attributed that general knowledge of the principles of our holy religion which the poor Irish peasantry have never lost.

We placed the era of proselytism by education at the accession of the house of Hanover to the throne. At this point a separate narrative in the history of the Anglican schism opens; for which, we regret to say, the materials are very difficult of access. The clever episcopal memoirs, and the learned annals, quoted at the head of the present article, are confined to events of the seventeenth and previous centuries. The struggles of the Irish Church with

the corrupt and seducing policy of the state, in the last century, are less known, though surely not less important to be known. A proselyting policy had been urged at an early period by the Anglican Archbishops Usher of Armagh, and Daniel of Tuam, and by Bedell, Bishop of Dromore. Upon their theory Usher collected "the Epistles of the Irish Saints," to prove that antiquity was for, and not against them; and Daniel and Bedell had their Bibles in Irish published. So long, however, as there was a Catholic proprietary to be confiscated, or a Catholic hierarchy to be destroyed, arms and force were preferred to antiquarian arguments and Celtic translations. Hugh Boulter, Anglican Archbishop of Armagh, and leader of "the Castle party" in the Irish House of Lords during part of the reign of the first two Georges, was the restorer of Usher's theory. By the 2d and 3d George I, the Established clergy were ordered to provide a free school for young Papists in every parish; but these good, easy men allowed the act to lie as a dead letter. In 1733, Boulter obtained the endowment by Parliament of an "Incorporated Society" to do what the parsons neglected, — "to educate the Popish and other natives." In his correspondence with the English Privy Council, he puts his design in a few clear words. "One of the most likely methods we can think of," he writes, "is, if possible, instructing and converting the young generation; for, instead of converting those that are adult, we are daily losing many of our meaner people, who go off to Popery." The Establishment was, at this time, sorely in need of recruits. "A great part of the churches," says Boulter, "are neglected and going to ruin"; so that "it became necessary to give as many as six or seven parishes to one incumbent to enable him to live." Under this energetic heretic and his successor, Dr. Stone, the "Charter Schools" certainly could not complain of any scarcity of funds. Their Parliamentary grants were equal to £ 80,000 per year; a German baron bequeathed them £ 56,000, and an Irish Earl £ 40,000. The Hibernia Schools, founded by George the Third, for similar purposes, were equally well endowed: up to 1826, they had received of public money £ 240,356, about a million and a quarter of dollars. The "Blue Coat" and other charity schools sprung up about the same time; finally, "the Kildare Street Society's

Schools" were founded, which gave way to the present "national system of education."

Here surely was a vantage-ground and crowning mercy for Protestantism. There were no other schools tolerated but their own, and their own had the public treasury for a revenue. If ever the Irish were to be converted, this was the time, and these were the means. But what was the result? The system not only failed, but in its failure demonstrated anew the utter hollowness and heartlessness of the Anglican schism. It escaped for a time unexposed. A Protestant Parliament voted the supplies, ordered the reports to be printed, and took no further interest in the matter. At length a great philanthropist, the humane Howard, visited Ireland on his "circumnavigation of charity." The committees of Parliament received him with respect, and many improvements in prisons and hospitals were made at his suggestion. He brought the subject of the Charter Schools to the attention of Parliament. In 1787, they ordered an inquiry, and found that, of 2,100 scholars reported, only 1,400 could be produced. Howard and Sir Jeremiah Fitzpatrick, Inspector of Prisons, served on the commission, and were examined. Both stated that the children "were in general filthy and ill-clothed"; that "the diet was insufficient for the support of their delicate frames"; that many of the schools "were going to ruin"; that many of the scholars "were without shifts or shirts, and in such a condition as was indecent to look on." Howard concluded his evidence by asserting that "the children in general were sickly, pale, and such miserable objects that they were a disgrace to all society, and their reading had been neglected for the purpose of making them work for their masters." This was the ripe result of Dr. Boulter's schools, which, however, lived on in their rottenness and pretences for half a century longer. The selfsame design, in a less obnoxious, but more insidious spirit, actuates the present state schools founded in 1834, and the Queen's Colleges recently erected.

With the state schools partial toleration had its rise. The Irish Catholics having withheld, as a body, from the Jacobite attempts of 1715 and 1745, they began to be considered by the new dynasty as not entirely deserving of perpetual persecution. At the date of Charles Edward's invasion, Lord Chesterfield was Viceroy at Dublin, where he flattered

himself he could govern by exquisitely turned compliments. An accident, by which many Catholics who assembled to hear a mass by stealth in an old Dublin building were killed, gave him an opportunity of permitting the erection of an unostentatious chapel. From this date the oppressed began to breathe more freely. In 1757, some Catholic gentlemen, of whom the principals were Mr. Wyse, a Waterford merchant, Charles O'Connor, a country gentleman and antiquary, and Dr. Curry, a Dublin physician, formed the first Catholic Association, for the purpose of petitioning Parliament. After twenty years of desultory effort, they obtained the first Relief Bill, enabling Papists to lease real property, to take apprentices, and to vote at elections. Content with this miserable toleration, they rested from their labors. Somewhat later, John Keogh, a wealthy Dublin merchant, founded the second Catholic Association, which obtained the Relief Bill of 1793. By this concession, Catholics were permitted to sit on juries, to enter the learned professions without taking the oath of supremacy, to hold real property in fee, and to establish schools and colleges. Maynooth and Carlow Colleges sprung up on the enlarged prospect thus opened, and the Catholic merchants and aristocracy began to feel themselves of some account in civil life. It is unnecessary to enlarge this notice of the slow growth of mere toleration by detailing the promises made by Pitt in 1800 and never fulfilled, or to dwell upon the merits of the last Relief Bill, obtained in 1829 by the third Catholic Association, under the leadership of Daniel O'Connell. A century of agitation was just closing, in which the ablest intellects of Ireland and England had used their greatest efforts in the cause of toleration, when we wake as from a dream, and, rubbing our eyes in "the middle of the nineteenth century," find a new penal enactment placed on the British statute-book, and another Catholic Association sitting at Dublin!

Such is a summary view of the attempts by armed force, and by false education, to establish the abominable principles of the Reformation in Ireland. How glorious to the Church is the result! How humiliating to the pride and self-love of heresy! Were ever combatants apparently more unequal? Was ever contest, except that of the early Church against Pagan Rome, so mysteriously

prolonged, and so unexpectedly ended in the victory of the weak? In the one camp is arrayed all the power of England, — her immense revenue, her masterly diplomacy, her conquering armies; the wealth of India is at her hand, and the thunders of annihilation wait but her word. In the other camp we find a simple peasantry, at first following, but soon losing, their disunited nobles; we find them without adequate resources, institutions, or leaders for such a contest, with such an enemy. Yet we see how it stands with both at the end of three centuries. We see Ireland at this very hour as resolutely Catholic as ever before, and England, richer, mightier, more despotic than ever, unable to enforce her last law against the passive hierarchy of the Irish Church. The more we know of the facts of this contest, the more we reflect upon the causes of these things, the more we are forced to exclaim, “The hand of God is here!”

ART. III. — *The Works of Daniel Webster.* Boston: Little and Brown. 1851. 6 vols. 8vo.

THIS is a much more complete edition of Mr. Webster's works than has heretofore appeared, but it does not embrace the entire series of his writings. “Such a series,” the editor tells us, “would have required a larger number of volumes than was deemed advisable with reference to the general circulation of the work. A few juvenile performances have accordingly been omitted, as not of sufficient importance or maturity to be included in the collection. Of the earlier speeches in Congress, some were either not reported at all, or in a manner too imperfect to be preserved without doing injustice to the author. No attempt has been made to collect from the contemporaneous newspapers or Congressional registers the short conversational speeches and remarks made by Mr. Webster, as by other prominent members of Congress, in the progress of debate, and sometimes exercising greater influence on the result than the set speeches. Of the addresses to public meetings it has been found impossible to embrace

more than a selection, without swelling the work to an unreasonable size. It is believed, however, that the contents of these volumes furnish a fair specimen of Mr. Webster's opinions and sentiments on all the subjects treated, and of his manner of discussing them. The responsibility of deciding what should be omitted and what included has been left by Mr. Webster to the friends having the charge of the publication, and his own opinion on details of this kind has rarely been taken." The volumes before us should, therefore, be entitled *A Selection from the Works of Daniel Webster*; although it is but simple justice to the editor to say, that the selection has been made with taste and judgment, and we are aware of no omission that any of Mr. Webster's friends will seriously regret, unless it be some of his earlier speeches in Congress, especially the speech on the Conscription Bill. The speeches, addresses, law arguments, and diplomatic and state papers, on which his fame must rest, and which exhibit his character as a scholar, orator, lawyer, statesman, and diplomatist, are all included.

The editor, himself one of our most distinguished scholars and an eminent publicist, has preceded the collection by an admirable Biographical Memoir of the author, written with great judgment and delicacy. It is no easy task to write the life of an eminent man while he is still living, and yet the editor has done it in a manner to satisfy the partialities of friendship, without offending the modesty of the illustrious subject or the fidelity of history. The tone of the Memoir is of course laudatory, but it is subdued, and probably says no more in praise than posterity will ratify. Some few shades may be necessary to render the portrait a perfect likeness, but the judgments passed upon the talents, opinions, and services of the author are, in general, solid and just, such as time will confirm, not reverse.

Mr. Webster is of Scottish extraction, and was born in Salisbury, New Hampshire, January 18th, 1782. He pursued his preparatory studies at Phillips Academy, Exeter, and graduated, August, 1801, at Dartmouth College, in his native State. He immediately entered the office of Mr. Thompson, the next-door neighbor of his father, as a student of law, and subsequently studied awhile in the office of the Hon. Christopher Gore in this city. He was admitted to the practice of the law for the Court of Common

Pleas of the County of Suffolk, Boston, in 1805, and as an attorney and counsellor of the Superior Court of New Hampshire in 1807, when he removed to Portsmouth, where he appears to have been immediately and eminently successful in his profession. In 1812 he was elected a member of Congress, and again in 1815. In 1816 he removed from Portsmouth to Boston, which has continued to be his home ever since, although, when not called away by his official duties, he for a few years past has usually resided on his farm in Marshfield, in the Old Colony. In 1820 he was chosen a member of the Convention called to revise the Constitution of this Commonwealth, and in the autumn of 1822 was elected a member of the Eighteenth Congress, from Boston. Since then, with scarcely an interval, he has been connected with the general government, as Representative, Senator, or Secretary of State, and has, during the whole period of nearly forty years, been identified with the public history of his country, and exerted a large share of influence on our public policy.

It is not our purpose, in the few remarks we propose to offer on the occasion of a new edition of Mr. Webster's works, to speak at much length of his character as a lawyer or as a statesman. As a statesman, we have often spoken of him, and perhaps enough has been said. He has proved himself one of the very few American statesmen who are able to compare favorably with the higher class of European statesmen, and his views are such as may be honestly commended, with very slight exceptions, for their patriotism, comprehensiveness, and practical wisdom. It is rare that we should now, whatever may have been the case formerly, dissent from his domestic policy; but his foreign policy, although more in accordance with the general sentiment of the great body of his countrymen than the one we should approve, appears to us, in some respects, narrow and illiberal, wrong in principle and dangerous in tendency. In his judgment of the Continental monarchical states he is still a disciple of the eighteenth century, a believer, substantially, in the *contrât social*, and what is called a Liberal. He is not, intentionally, a Jacobin, or a Red Republican, and would, most likely, had he been old enough at the time, have sided with Burke in his denunciation of the old French Revolution; but he would, nevertheless, have denounced it in its excesses, rather than in its

principle. He and the Jacobin have the same point of departure, and differ only in this, — that the Jacobin will carry out the principle common to them both logically to its last consequence, while Mr. Webster, restrained by his good sense and practical wisdom, shrinks from going so far, and attempts to stop short of the proper logical extreme, apparently not perceiving that a principle that will not bear being pushed to its last logical conclusion is false, and ought not to be admitted at all.

Mr. Webster is, perhaps, not vehemently opposed to what may be called a parliamentary or representative monarchy, — we say not, as he would, *constitutional* monarchy, for every monarchy that governs by laws is a constitutional, even a limited monarchy; — but he evidently understands by a constitutional monarchy a representative or parliamentary monarchy, and recognizes the strict legality of no monarchical government unless it is, to use the expression of Lafayette, a monarchy surrounded by republican institutions, or a monarchy compelled to govern in conjunction with a parliament, in one or both of its branches chosen by popular suffrage. No government that does not recognize in some form the democratic element, or rather the sovereignty of the people, in the Jacobinical sense, is, in his view, a strictly legal or legitimate government. Hence, without sympathizing with the socialistic tendencies of the age in their developments, and without wishing in the least to weaken the foundations of law and of order, he is the determined enemy of all the monarchical governments of Europe which are not based on popular sovereignty, and do not rule by means of parliaments or representative assemblies; and he holds it the duty of our government to exert all the influence it can on and through public opinion in encouragement and aid of the party, in all monarchical countries, exerting themselves to revolutionize them, and establish popular institutions in their place.

Mr. Webster evidently adopts the Canning policy, adopted and pursued with such disastrous success during the last twenty years by Mr. Canning's pupil, Lord Palmerston, late Foreign Secretary of the British government, — the policy of intervention, if not by armed force, at least by diplomacy and public opinion, by exertions to create and foster a public opinion everywhere hostile to strictly

monarchical governments, and by encouraging the subjects of such governments to make illegal efforts to subvert them. Mr. Canning and Lord Palmerston adopted and pursued this policy for the sake of introducing into every European Continental state the parliamentary system of Great Britain; Mr. Webster, perhaps, would have little choice whether that system or our own were introduced, but one or the other he insists upon, as we may collect from his speech in Congress on the affairs of Greece in 1823, and his remarkable letter to Chevalier Hülsemann, in December, 1850, in defence of General Taylor's administration for sending Mr. Dudley Mann to treat, if he had a chance, with the rebellious Hungarians, then in arms against their sovereign. We need not say that we regard this policy as repugnant to the laws of nations, and as founded upon a false theory of the origin and principles of government. The sovereignty of the people, in the Jacobinical sense, is not a truth, and can be consistently asserted by no man who does not deny the existence of God. Its assertion is the assertion of atheism in politics, and hence every system of policy which presupposes it must be condemned by every one who believes in God and understands himself.

When Mr. Webster speaks as a lawyer, according to the principles and maxims of the Common Law, what he says is remarkable for its good sense, its profound truth, and its practical wisdom; for then he speaks in accordance with the teachings of our holy religion, which forms the basis of that law; but when he leaves that and undertakes to discuss questions which lie further back, he is the disciple of Hampden, Sydney, Locke, and Rousseau, and proceeds from principles which he did not learn from the law, and which are utterly repugnant to it. This is not a peculiarity of Mr. Webster; it was equally the case with the elder Adams, and, indeed, with the whole of the old Federal party; and it was this that prostrated them, notwithstanding their personal respectability and practical wisdom, before their less scrupulous, but more logical and self-consistent rivals, headed by Thomas Jefferson. They were *via media* men, adopting two contradictory sets of principles, and laboring to reconcile them by stopping half way with each; while their rivals had but one set of principles, which they were prepared to follow whithersoever they

should lead. Hence Federalism, inferior in a logical, but far superior in a practical point of view, or in practical wisdom and common sense, was obliged to succumb to virtual Jacobinism, greatly to the permanent injury, perhaps to the ultimate ruin, of the country, — certainly much to the regret of every intelligent and true-hearted American.

We own that we admire the English constitution as it originally existed, but we do not admire it in its present state. In the original constitution of England the democratic element in the modern sense, or rather the Jacobinical element, had no place, and the sovereign people were simply the King and Parliament. The excellence of the system consisted in its being a government of estates. The House of Commons did not represent the people of England, but the Commons Estate, with a negative on each of the other estates. The positive power was in the crown, which had the initiative of all measures, and the power of the Lords and Commons was, properly, only a negative power, or the veto which each could place on those measures of the positive power, — the Lords by refusing to advise them or to assent to them, and the Commons by refusing to vote the supplies. Thus the unity and efficiency of the government were preserved, while ample security against its power to oppress either the nobility or the commonalty was provided. But Parliament has now virtually usurped the positive power of government, and indeed formally; for, if we mistake not, the initiative of measures is no longer the exclusive prerogative of the crown, and since the Reform Bill of 1832, the House of Commons has very nearly become a representative assembly in the democratic sense, — representing not simply an estate, but the people of England. It may not do this perfectly as yet, but the clamor and agitation for reform will be continued till it does, and then, when the House of Commons represents, not the Commons Estate, but the English people, the king and peers will be found to be mere excrescences on the body politic; they will then be lopped off, and Great Britain will become a pure democracy, and thence a pure anarchy. The tendency to a pure democracy is now fearfully strong, and a democratic revolution in that country is not an improbable, perhaps not a distant event. Mr. Canning's policy, so steadily pursued by Lord Palmerston, of encouraging democratic

revolutions abroad, has reacted and is reacting with terrible force upon England herself, and can hardly fail to produce there the evils it has produced in such abundance on the Continent, especially in the Spanish and Italian peninsulas.

We sympathize fully with Mr. Webster in his love of liberty, and perhaps we should be found, in case of trial, a more unflinching enemy than he of despotism of every kind; but we think he falls into the common mistake of identifying liberty with popular institutions. It is a narrow and unstatesmanlike view to suppose that liberty is possible only where the people are represented in parliament, or have a positive power in enacting the laws under which they are to live. Liberty, we grant, is not possible under a despotism, that is, a government of mere will; but it is possible under any and every government that is a government of laws, where the sovereign governs only by a fixed code, or in accordance with laws previously enacted and promulgated, as is the case with every Christian or nominally Christian government in Europe, even with that of Russia. Laws prejudicial to individual liberty may, no doubt, be enacted and promulgated by governments constituted like the Prussian, the Russian, or the Austrian, and so they may be under governments constituted like the English, or even our own, as we may see in the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill enacted by the British Parliament, and in the "Maine Liquor Law," recently enacted by several of the States of the Union, and among the rest by the free and liberty-loving Massachusetts; for you shall in vain search the archives of the most despotic states of Europe to find enactments more repugnant, at least in principle, to the liberty of the subject, or more really arbitrary in their nature. Parliamentary governments with a king, as in Great Britain, or without a king, as with us, are a clumsy and a very expensive sort of government, and it is perhaps chiefly prejudice on our part that makes us regard them as necessarily superior, in themselves considered, to all other governments. Whether the state of our country and the habits of our people, which unquestionably demand such government and render every other unwise and impracticable for us, be a real advantage, or in fact only a disadvantage, is a question on which something may be said on both sides. Perhaps the fact that none but a republican

government, resting for its basis on universal suffrage, is practicable or to be thought of for our country, is not, after all, any conclusive proof in itself that we are so much in advance of other nations as we commonly suppose. We are not certain that France, if she were prepared for a republic like ours, as she evidently is not, could be said to be farther advanced in civilization than she now is, or than she was under Louis the Fourteenth or Louis the Ninth. A nation's rank in the scale of civilization is determined, not by the mere form of its government, but by the wisdom and justice of its laws, and the alacrity and fidelity with which they are obeyed. In encouraging the subjects of the European Continental states to rebel against their sovereigns, for the purpose of introducing parliamentary or representative governments, whether in the English or American form, it is far from being certain that we are encouraging them to effect a change for the better. God, in his providence, gives to each people the political constitution that is best adapted to its character and wants, and experience as well as philosophy makes it pretty certain that every fundamental change in that constitution invariably becomes a prolific source of evil. Mr. Webster's policy, that our government should take its stand on the side of modern Liberalism, and exert itself officially to create, throughout the world, and in monarchical states, a public opinion hostile to monarchy, and through that public opinion to cherish movements for popular institutions, is not, in our judgment, a policy likely to serve either the cause of good government or that of true liberty.

Mr. Webster is a lawyer, and we are surprised that he should attribute the freedom and prosperity of our citizens to our political institutions, instead of attributing them, as should be done, to the Common Law, or the system of jurisprudence brought here by our fathers, and inherited from the England that was before the Reformation. It is the Common Law, with the independent judiciary under it, which Mr. Webster has on more occasions than one so nobly and so powerfully defended, that constitutes the real ground and support of our liberties. Take away the Common Law, either by substituting a written code for it, or by suffering its principles to be tampered with by the legislatures of the several States, as has been done in those that have adopted the Maine Liquor Law, for instance, and

destroy the independence of the judiciary by rendering the judges elective for a brief term of office, and reëligible, and you will soon find that your political forms are impotent to preserve the freedom and prosperity of the citizen. Yet an independent judiciary is discovered to be anti-democratic, and the tendency is now everywhere to sweep it away; public opinion is setting in with a strong tide against the Common Law, and it is discovered to be democratic to abolish it, and substitute for it an inflexible written code, with new and inept systems of practice, which, while they increase litigation, render justice generally unattainable, except by mere chance.

But be all this as it may, the policy which Mr. Webster has adopted from Mr. Canning is in our judgment unjust, and repugnant to the laws of nations. It assumes for us a sort of dictatorship, or at least supervisorship, over other nations, wholly incompatible with their dignity and independence. We will not say that the government is not free to express officially its opinion, whatever it may be, on a fact accomplished in a foreign independent nation, but it has no right to express an official opinion for the purpose of bringing about a violent change in its form of government, except in those cases in which, if it deemed it expedient, it would have the right to support its opinion by an armed force, or a declaration of war. A government may express its opinion on a revolution in a foreign state when once really effected, and, unless bound by treaty to do otherwise, may treat the revolutionary government, or government *de facto*, as the legitimate government of the state; but it has no right to express any official opinion for the purpose of effecting, or causing to be effected, a revolution. There is no difference in principle between effecting a revolution by expressly creating a public opinion that brings it about, and effecting it by direct intervention with armed force. The means by which you effect a revolution cannot justify your effecting it, unless you have the sovereign right to effect it; and if you have the sovereign right to effect it, you may effect it by armed force, if you choose. It is an admitted principle in international law, that every independent nation has the right to choose its own form of government, and to determine its own domestic institutions, without the dictation or interference of its neighbors; and also, that nations exist to

each other only in their supreme government, or political sovereign. There can be no right, then, on the part of one independent nation, to intervene in any way in the domestic affairs of another, for the purpose of revolutionizing or changing its government. It has no right officially to address the people of a foreign state, or to hold any official communication with them, save through its sovereign, and it gives just cause of complaint whenever it attempts to do so.

This rule is founded in natural justice, and is necessary for the peace and happiness of mankind. It is as much for our interest to observe this rule, as it is for that of any other nation. We cannot assert the right of rebellion, and encourage the subjects of other states to conspire against their sovereign, without weakening the loyalty of our own citizens, and paving the way for a revolution at home, that is, such a revolution as is possible with us. A rebellion against the constituted authorities, except in certain localities and for a brief moment, is not possible in this country, because the power is already in the hands of the people, and the government is subject to their will. A revolution here must necessarily assume the form of removing the restrictions imposed by the law of the land on the exercise of the popular will, or, in other words, of destroying the independence of the judiciary, and abolishing the Common Law. The Common Law, which we have inherited from our English ancestors, is the law of the land, and the law that regulates the relations not only between individual and individual, but to some extent between the citizen and the state. It is our rule of justice, and as no constitution or legislative enactment has, or can have, the force of law, if contrary to justice, it follows that any constitutional provision or legislative enactment repugnant to the principles of the Common Law is *ipso facto* null and void, and may be declared so and set aside by the Common Law courts. This Mr. Webster has himself proved, if we understand him, in a most triumphant manner, in his masterly argument in the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dartmouth College case, — an argument which does him the highest honor, and which ought to be read and meditated at least once a year by every American citizen. The revolution we have to dread is not a revolution avowedly for the purpose of overthrowing the government, or chang-

ing its form, but a revolution which abolishes the Common Law, and leaves us no restraints on lawless power, and no standard of justice but the will or caprice of the majority for the time being. This revolution has commenced and is in process amongst us, and every word we utter in encouragement of revolutions abroad becomes a still greater encouragement to this silent, and as yet bloodless, revolution going on here at home. Liberty here no more than anywhere else is possible without the sacredness of law, and that sacredness is struck here whenever we strike it abroad. A false principle, asserted for the accomplishment of a foreign purpose deemed desirable, is sure, sooner or later, to return and effect a domestic purpose not desirable. There is a moral order in the government of the world, and nations no more than individuals can transgress it with impunity, and nations, as individuals, will find that they are generally punished in that wherein they have sinned, or that their sins prove to be their punishment.

We have dwelt the longer on this point, because it is almost the only thing in Mr. Webster's course as a statesman that we find to disapprove. In almost every other respect we can admire and honor his public life. It is the only instance in which we have found his general policy unjust or dangerous in principle, however we might dissent from it in some of its details. It is the only stain we are aware of on his public character. Yet we ought in justice to say, that in this he has but followed the public sentiment of his country, and of a powerful party in Great Britain. We ourselves once applauded him for it, and we still remember the exultation with which we read, in 1823, his speech in Congress on the affairs of Greece. At that time nobody in the country, to our knowledge, questioned the justice of the policy, however some might doubt its expediency. Under Mr. Monroe's administration the whole country seemed carried away with a spirit of propagandism, and, though the wild democracy against which we have such frequent occasion to warn our readers was then far from being fully developed, as it is now, the youth of that day boiled over with a patriotism and a love of liberty, as they understood or misunderstood the terms, of which we can now hardly form a conception. The movement for constitutional, that is representative government, was going on all over Europe, supported by the mighty influ-

ence of England, which she had so extended by the wars growing out of the French Revolution. A constitutional government was set up in Naples, and another in Spain; the Spanish American colonies declared themselves independent of the mother country, and introduced the republican form of government; and hope was high that it was all over with monarchy except in the English sense, and that republicanism would make the circuit of the globe. Our government and that of England acknowledged the independence of the Spanish American colonies, and President Monroe declared that this continent was closed to European colonization, and virtually that we assumed the championship throughout the world of every party struggling for representative government against monarchy. The writer of this was young then, and has outgrown the wild enthusiasm with which he was then carried away; Mr. Webster was older, and has remained unchanged. All we can say of him is, that in this respect he has not shown his ordinary superiority over the great body of his countrymen, and has followed instead of leading public opinion.

We need not say that Mr. Webster is a great man, for that every body concedes or asserts; but his greatness does not lie in the original apprehension or discovery of first principles. He takes his principles as he finds them in the common sense of his age and country, and where that errs he errs. His mind is English, and practical rather than speculative. His reading has been principally in the ancient Roman and the modern English classics, while his chief study has been history and the Common Law, with the ordinary writers on government. His views have, perhaps, been formed more by the principles of the Common Law than by any other study, and hence are in general sound, and remarkable for their practical wisdom. But in a large class of questions, not immediately solved by these principles, he has taken the principles ordinarily adopted by the old English Republicans, and the modern English Whigs; and consequently, along with the principles that are excellent, true for all times and countries, he has another class of principles, borrowed from modern innovators, which are invariably unsound, and such as he himself would be as ready to condemn as we are, if he were to subject them to the independent action of his own powerful mind, in the light of those principles along with which

he has received them, and which he so firmly holds and so frequently appeals to. The modern English mind, therefore modern English literature, is compounded of the traditional wisdom inherited by Englishmen from their ancestors, and of the innovations of modern reformers. The two elements exist side by side, but they will not coalesce. Consequently, the Englishman lacks unity of moral and intellectual life. When he speaks according to the traditional wisdom of his country, no man speaks with more truth, justice, or practical wisdom; when he leaves this traditional wisdom,—the good sense of his countrymen, for which no people are more remarkable,—and speaks according to the principles of modern innovators, he becomes false, impracticable, and absurd. It is somewhat the same with Mr. Webster. Ordinarily he speaks from the wisdom of our ancestors, for ordinarily the topics he treats are such as lie within the range of that portion of tradition which has been generally retained by Englishmen and Americans; but now and then he neglects it, and takes his principles from the modern innovators, or, what is the same thing, from ancient gentilism, and thus falls into the errors so rife and so dangerous in our times,—errors which in principle warrant the most extravagant conclusions of the Jacobin or the Red Republican. And yet, unless he had a sure means of ascertaining tradition in its purity and integrity, as he has, to some extent, in the case of the Common Law, we see not well how he could do otherwise.

Of Mr. Webster's rank as a lawyer, compared with the more eminent members of the legal profession in Great Britain and the United States, we have no occasion to speak, and, not being a lawyer by profession, we shall not attempt to speak. He is generally considered as having long stood at the head of the legal profession in his own country. But of his professional labors devoted to what is termed Constitutional Law, or the application of the Common Law to the constitutionality of legislative enactments, we must say a word or two. This department of law had, when he entered upon his professional career, been but imperfectly cultivated. "It fell to his lot," says his accomplished biographer, "to perform a prominent part in unfolding a most important class of constitutional doctrines, which, either because occasion had not drawn them

forth, or the jurists of a former period had failed to deduce and apply them, had not yet grown into a system. It was reserved for Mr. Webster to distinguish himself before most, if not all, of his contemporaries, in this branch of his profession." (Vol. I. p. xlviii.)

The first occasion on which Mr. Webster laid down what he took to be the principle of the Common Law, as applicable to the constitutionality of legislative enactments, was in the celebrated case of Dartmouth College, already referred to. "In the months of June and December, 1816, the legislature of New Hampshire passed acts altering the charter of Dartmouth College (of which the name was changed to Dartmouth University), enlarging the number of the trustees, and generally reorganizing the corporation. These acts, although passed without the consent and against the protest of the trustees of the College, went into operation. The newly created body took possession of the corporate property, and assumed the administration of the institution. The old board were all named as members of the new corporation, but declined acting as such, and brought an action against the treasurer of the new board for the books of record, the original charter, the common seal, and other corporate property of the College." This action was decided in the Superior Court of New Hampshire in favor of the validity of the State laws, and was carried up by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, where, on the 10th of March, 1818, it came on for argument before all the judges, who, in the term of the court holden the next February, declared, with only one dissenting voice, the acts of the legislature unconstitutional and invalid, and reversed the opinion of the court below.

The question for the Supreme Court to decide was, no doubt, whether the acts of New Hampshire did or did not contravene the Constitution of the United States; but Mr. Webster, in his argument for the plaintiffs in error, in order to facilitate the decision of that question by determining the real character of those acts, opened up the whole question of Common Law involved, and contended that the acts were invalid because against *common right* and the constitution of New Hampshire. He showed that the College was a private corporation, and that the legislature has no power to divest a private corporation, without its

consent, of any of its corporate rights, maintaining that those rights can be taken away only in case of abuse or forfeiture, of which the court, not the legislature, is the judge. The principle on which his argument rests, if we have rightly seized it, is, that all chartered eleemosynary institutions, under which head are included all educational institutions founded and endowed by private liberality, are private corporations; and that all the rights of private corporations, or rather that all private rights, whether of persons or of things, or rights of private individuals, whether personal or corporate, are determined or defined by the Common Law, and are inviolable, so that any legislative enactment which infringes them is for that reason alone unconstitutional and invalid. This is certainly a most important principle, and if sound, — and that it is, it would be temerity on our part to doubt, — it proves that we do really live under a government of laws, and not a government of mere will, and that ours is really a free government, or rather a government that recognizes and guaranties freedom. Deny this principle, maintain that private rights, whether of persons or things, are creatures of the political power, and subject to the will of the legislature, and you convert the government at once into an arbitrary government, a government of mere will, under which there is no real liberty, no solid security, for either person or property; and this just as much where the will that obtains is the will of the majority, as where it is the will of only one man, — just as much where the form of the government is democratic as where it is monarchical.

The real excellence or glory of our institutions, we take it, lies in this principle; not, as is too often assumed, in the form of our political organization. If we have not misapprehended Mr. Webster, the Common Law in its principles, maxims, and definitions is with us both logically and historically anterior to our political constitutions, as well as the legislative bodies instituted under them, and is to be regarded as common right, or, in a word, as law for the convention in framing what we call the Constitution, and for the legislature in its enactments. It is for us really and truly the “higher law,” and in the temporal order the most authoritative expression, which we as a people have, of the Divine law, from which all human laws derive their legality. It is the supreme civil law of the land, and

although the legislature may undoubtedly modify or abrogate such of its special provisions as are temporary or local in their nature, or depend on time and circumstance for their wisdom and justice, or utility, and therefore such as are not essential to it as a system of law, yet no special enactment, whether by the convention or the ordinary legislature, that is repugnant to any one of its essential principles, is or can be law for an American citizen. All such enactments are unconstitutional, and the courts have the right, and are bound, to set them aside as null. The Common Law is the fundamental constitution of the country, older than the political constitutions, and able to survive them. The political constitutions presuppose it, must conform to it, and be interpreted by it; for what we call our political constitutions are in their essence only a part — the more fundamental part if you will — of our written law, not that which creates and sustains us as a living people. They are the source of our political rights or franchises, but all our other rights, what we call our natural rights, both the rights of persons and the rights of things, are prior to and independent of them, and exist and are determined by the Common Law. They cannot be touched by the political power without usurpation, tyranny, and oppression, from which the Common Law courts, if suffered to remain in their legitimate independence, are competent to relieve us. Thus Mr. Webster contends that the courts of New Hampshire ought of themselves to have declared the law essentially modifying the original charter of Dartmouth College invalid, unconstitutional, as violating common right and the well-settled principles of the Common Law in the case of eleemosynary institutions. It would follow from his doctrine, too, that no State in our Union would have the right to pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts, even if not forbidden to do so by the Constitution of the United States. It is enough that such laws are repugnant to the Common Law. The courts of this State may then, unquestionably, set aside the recent enactment of our legislature in regard to the sale of spirituous liquors, as infringing the rights of property as defined by the Common Law, which is law for the legislature as well as for the courts.

Such we understand to be the principle of law in all the States of the Union in which the Common Law obtains, and it is only in this principle, administered by an inde-

pendent judiciary, that there is under our system of government, any more than under the most despotic governments of the Old World, any reliable support for the rights of person or property. Mr. Webster has labored long and earnestly to bring out and establish this doctrine, and the services in this respect which he has rendered the country deserve even a far higher appreciation than they have yet received, and entitle him to the warmest gratitude of his countrymen. Their importance may be judged of by the efforts of all our radicals and experimenters in politics and law to get rid of the Common Law, and to destroy the independence of the judiciary. These men follow their instincts, which are all in favor of anarchy on the one hand, and despotism on the other. And the simple fact that they are hostile to an independent judiciary and to the Common Law proves of itself that these are essential alike to the maintenance of order and of liberty.

The distinguishing excellence of the Common Law system is, that it is *lex non scripta*, unwritten law, that is, a living tradition, in the reason, the conscience, the sentiments, the habits, the manners, and the customs of the people, and therefore in some sense independent of mere political organizations, and capable of surviving even their most violent changes, and of preserving a degree of order and justice among individuals, when the political authority is for the moment suspended or subverted. It is probably owing chiefly to the fact that the Common Law is an unwritten law, a living tradition preserved by the people themselves, and administered by an independent judiciary, that political revolutions in England and in this country preserve a character of sobriety and reserve in comparison with those of the Continent of Europe. The Continental nations have inherited the Civil Law, the old Roman Law, which is a system of written law, and theoretically in the keeping of the prince, beginning and ending with the political sovereign. Under this system of law the sovereign is the fountain of justice, as he must be under every system of mere written law; the people are trained for the sovereign, and have no established law to guide or regulate their conduct where he fails to express in a formal manner his will. The state everywhere takes the initiative, and the people without it are incapable of any orderly or regulated civil activity. Hence, whenever the political power receives a shock,

all law is suspended, and the judiciary can perform legitimately none of its functions. Consequently, political revolutions in the Continental nations throw the whole of society into disorder, and subvert all social as well as political relations. The people receiving the law immediately from the sovereign, or written codes promulgated by the sovereign, and not having it in their own life, living in their own traditions, in their own habits, manners, and customs, are without law, and destitute of those habits of thought and action which would restrain them within moderate limits, and consequently are left liable to run into every imaginable excess.

But the Common Law, being an unwritten law, and living in the habits and manners of the people, gives them a sort of self-subsistency independent in a degree of the mere political power, and operates to restrain and regulate their social conduct, even when that power is temporarily overthrown or suspended. As long as the people remain in any sense a living people, the law survives, and survives as law, and preserves among them, in the midst of the most violent political convulsions, the elements of liberty and social order. England has gone through many changes, religious and political, but we have never seen English society wholly dissolved, or the main current of private and domestic life wholly interrupted, or even turned far aside from its ordinary channel. She has survived all her changes, and amid them all she has preserved her private and domestic life, social as distinguished from political order, but slightly impaired. She preserved a certain degree of individual freedom, to some extent the rights of persons and things, even under the Tudors, and something of social order under the Commonwealth, which she has continued to do even under the modern Whig rule and a Reformed Parliament. Much the same may be said of this country during what we call our Revolution. There was a time when our political constitutions were suspended, when the political authority was, as we may say, in abeyance, latent, undeveloped, potential, not actual; yet we did not fall into complete social disorder. Irregularity there certainly was, but the courts and the Common Law remained, and justice still continued to be administered, in the way and in the sense with which our people were familiar, and to which from time immemorial they had been

accustomed. In France and other Continental countries, the case has usually been different. The subversion of political power there subverts society itself, save so far as it may be preserved by religious institutions, and the people seem destitute of all recuperative energy, or power in themselves to reëstablish order; and if they do it at all, it is either through a military chieftain, or by a restoration. These different results, we think, are owing, not to difference of race or blood, or to different degrees of intelligence or moral virtue, as some in our time pretend, but mainly, if not solely, to the difference there is between a system of written and a system of unwritten law.

The great disadvantage of the European Continental nations is in the fact that they have no Common Law, and no Civil Law but written law. These nations are the heirs of the Roman empire, and their Civil Law is substantially the old Roman Law, and like all law embodied in codes is inflexible, and depends for its operation entirely on the political sovereign, who is supposed to prescribe and to administer it, either in person or by his ministers. It has no power to adapt itself to unforeseen emergencies, and to operate regularly in the midst of disorder. Between the written Civil Law and the unwritten Common Law, or between the Roman and the English systems, there is a fundamental difference. The Roman Law extends only to cases foreseen and provided for, the Common Law to all cases not taken out of its jurisdiction; the former is of gentile origin, simply modified by the Christian Emperors so as not to exclude Christian faith and worship; the latter is of Christian origin, and grew up among the Anglo-Saxons as they were converted from paganism and entered under the guidance of the Church upon the career of Christian civilization. The Common Law starts from the principle that society and the state are for man, and it seeks primarily the protection of private rights, the rights of persons and of things; the Roman Law starts from the heathen principle that man is for society, and society for the state, and it seeks primarily the protection of public rights, or the rights of the prince. The former abhors despotism, the latter abhors anarchy; the one makes the state absolute, supreme, omnipresent, the other presupposes a power above the state, limits the political power of the state, and asserts a law to which the state itself owes obe-

dience, which subsists, and can, when need is, operate without the express sanction of the political sovereign. The Roman Law knows no people but the state, the Common Law recognizes the people, so to speak, as a power distinct from, and capable of surviving, the state. A nation that has been trained under the Common Law system may become an orderly republic; a nation trained under the Roman Law system can never be other than monarchical in effect, whatever it may be in name and pretension, or at farthest a close aristocracy. These are some of the characteristic differences between the two systems, and they sufficiently explain the different results of English or American revolutions from those of Continental Europe.

The essential difference between the two systems does not consist in the mere difference between their respective special provisions, which could easily be made the same in both, but in their general principles, the one as the written law of the prince, and the other as the living traditional law of the people, originating and living in their very life as a people. That the advantages are all on the side of the latter, or the English system, we think must be obvious to every lawyer and every well-informed statesman. It is therefore with pain that we find our politicians ascribing what is excellent in our institutions, what constitutes the chief protection of liberty and order among us, to our mere political organization, and overlooking the merits of the Common Law, the immense superiority of an unwritten over a written law, and seeking to abolish it, and to substitute a written code in its place. The Common Law, as an essentially unwritten law, living in the traditional life of a people, can never be introduced into a nation whose character is already formed. It must be born and grow up with the nation. Consequently, when once eliminated from the life of the people, it can never be replaced. Once gone, it is gone for ever. It was born with the birth of England as a Christian nation, and grew up with it as the civil part of its Christian life. It became the public reason, the English common sense, and to it must we attribute the marked superiority of England and her institutions in the Middle Ages, and even in modern times, over the Continent of Europe. Happily England, in casting off, in the sixteenth century, the religion which gave her the Common Law, did not cast off the Common Law itself.

She preserved it; slightly marred, no doubt, in its beauty and symmetry, yet she preserved it in its substance; and from her we have inherited it, and it should be our study, as we detest anarchy and love liberty, to transmit it unimpaired, in its purity and integrity, to our latest posterity. A richer legacy, aside from the Christianity which gave it birth, we could not even wish to bequeathe to future generations.

But we had no intention, on setting out, to enlarge as we have on either of the topics we have taken up. It was not our intention to speak of Mr. Webster either as a statesman or as a lawyer, for his merits in both respects have been dwelt upon till the public, perhaps, are growing tired of hearing them extolled, and some may be beginning to feel with the poor Athenian who would ostracize Aristides because tired of hearing him always called the Just. As a statesman we do not think that Mr. Webster has upon the whole been overrated. He was educated in the school of Washington and Adams, the old Federalist school, which, though not without its defects, was the only respectable political school we have ever had in New England. Its error was in copying from the English Whig, instead of the English — we say not the *Irish* — Tory, and acceding to the Jacobinical definition of popular sovereignty. It had too great a sympathy with the urban system of government, or government resting for its main support on the commercial and manufacturing classes, and did not sufficiently recognize the importance of a permanent class of landed proprietors to the stability and permanence of government. But, except in the planting States, its errors were all shared, and in an exaggerated form, by the rival or Democratic school, or if not, were opposed by worse errors, and the worst of all errors, — by that of giving to the government a proletarian basis, whether urban or rustic. In the main Mr. Webster has remained faithful to his school, although he seems, as he has grown older, to have departed from some of its best principles, and approached the party it opposed. He seems latterly to have become almost a democrat. Whether from conviction, or because the country is so hopelessly wedded to democracy, that he considers it the part of wisdom to accept democracy and endeavor to regulate it, we cannot say. However this may be, few who know Mr. Webster will question the elevation

or honesty of his views, or suspect him of being capable of adopting any line of policy which he does not believe for the time and under the circumstances wise and just.

No man can question Mr. Webster's attachment to the Union, or his ardent love of country. His patriotic addresses prove this, no less than the general character of the measures to which he has always given his support during his connection with the general government. He is warmly attached to the political institutions of his country, — no man more so, — and this attachment sometimes, perhaps, blinds him to the danger of certain popular tendencies amongst us. In his masterly speech on the basis of representation, in the convention called for amending the constitution of this State in 1820, and in his address at Plymouth, December 22 of the same year, in commemoration of the landing of the Pilgrims and the first settlement of New England, he discusses at great length and with rare sagacity the importance, in a political point of view, of laws regulating the descent and distribution of property, and shows that, with our laws on the subject, monarchy becomes an impossibility. But it does not appear to have occurred to him to ask, if, with such laws, — laws which distribute property in minute parcels, which prevent its accumulation in any considerable masses, and thus render impossible the growth and preservation of families, — even a well-ordered republic can long survive, and if the only government that will ultimately be practicable is not mere military despotism. Family with us is destroyed, and the man who can boast a grandfather may think himself fortunate. Family influence there is none, family ties are broken, and we have only a mighty mass of isolated individuals. It may not be long before nothing but military force under a military chieftain will be able to keep them in order.

But leaving the field of politics, it may not be unpleasant to meet Mr. Webster in the department of literature. It was mainly of his works in a literary point of view that we intended to speak when we set out, and probably we should have done so, only we have lost, if ever we possessed, the faculty of treating any man's works as mere literary productions. We are forced to admit to ourselves, which by the by we will not do to the public, that we have ourselves very little of what is called literary taste or lit-

erary culture. We do not mean to say that we have not read the chief literary works of modern, if not of ancient times; but we cannot understand literature for its own sake, or say much of the form of a literary work without reference to its contents. This is no disqualification for writing essays, but it is, very likely, a serious disqualification for writing literary reviews, that will pass for such with our contemporaries, and hence we seldom have much to say of books, except as to their principles. The principles of literature, or which should govern the literary man in the production of literature, we can understand; we can appreciate the principles of art; we can even admire a work of art, whether a poem, a symphony, a picture, a statue, a temple, or an oration; but we could never describe a work of art, or even our raptures on beholding it. We can enjoy it, take in its full effect, and thank God for the genius and talent that has created it; perhaps we could in a homely way tell what it is in it that we enjoy, and in some instances why we enjoy or ought to enjoy it; but we cannot tell it so as to reproduce in our hearers our own emotions, or rather, so as to make them fancy they feel very much as they would on beholding it, which is, if we understand it, the great aim of the modern critic on art. We have not enough of German subjectivity for that, and we always find it difficult to express what we do not distinctly apprehend as objective, and independent of our own subjective state. We cannot pass off our own emotions for criticism, nor for the object criticized, and consequently are unable to aspire to a rank among our modern approved literary critics.

The form of artistic productions, of course, is not a matter of indifference, but it has little separate value, and is seldom worth dwelling on, except in a school for learners, as detached from the merits of its contents. We like to see a man well dressed, but we cannot value the man for the dress, or the dress without the man. We do not undervalue purely literary taste or culture, but we never esteem works merely for the literary taste and culture they display. As merely literary works, having no end, answering no moral purpose, beyond that of gratifying the literary tastes of the reader, no works are worth the labor of criticism. The orator must always have some end beyond that of producing a beautiful oration, the poet beyond that

of producing a poem according to the rules of poetic art, and the logician beyond that of producing an argument, and the first thing in one or another of these to be considered by the critic is the end the author has had in view. We utterly protest against the doctrine that excludes morality from art, or the German doctrine of æsthetics, that art itself is moral, nay, religious, and that the chief merit of the artist is to work instinctively, with no distinct consciousness of the end for which he works, as the bee builds her cell, or the blackbird sings her song. We cannot say with Goethe, —

“Ich singe wieder Vogel singt
Der in dem Zweigen wohnt,
Das Lied das aus der Kehle springt,
Ist Lohn der reichlich lohnet.”

Art may be used for purposes either good or bad; genius may prostitute itself, and display its charms but to corrupt, as any one may see in reopened Pompeii, or in many a modern gallery, — as any one knows who has read *Don Juan* and *Childe Harold*, by Byron, or *The Loves of the Angels* and *Lalla Rookh*, by Thomas Moore, to say nothing of works transmitted to us from ancient classic authors. Art, restricted in its application to exterior forms, or to the reproduction of exterior beauty, is indifferent to good or evil, and is as readily employed in the service of the one as of the other. Moreover, nothing is moral, save as it is done for the sake of an end. Morality is predicable not of the procession of existences from God, for in that procession God is the sole actor, and existences are created and simply prepared to be actors; it is predicable alone of the return of existences to God, as their final cause, and even here only of such existences as are endowed with free will, and capable of voluntarily choosing God as their ultimate end. If even these merely act instinctively, without apprehension and choice of the end, that is, without acting for the sake of the end, they are not in such actions moral, and their productions have no moral character. The German doctrine of the essential morality of all art is therefore inadmissible. Art must be for an end, and for a good end, or else it either has no moral character, or is immoral.

Our nature, again, is fallen, and, except so far as restored by grace, is the slave of concupiscence and corrupt pro-

pensions. It has been turned away from God as the true Final Cause of all creatures, and instead of instinctively returning to him as the Supreme Good, it instinctively tends from him, towards the creature, and through the creature, which has being only in God, towards death and nullity. Consequently, when man foregoes reason, which demands a final no less than a first cause, and simply follows his instincts or his perverted inclinations, he necessarily produces that which is bad, immoral, corrupt, and corrupting. The song of the blackbird which she sings instinctively is not immoral, nor of an immoral tendency, because it does not spring from a perverted or corrupt instinct. External nature is indeed cursed for our sake, but not in itself, for it has never transgressed the law of its Maker, and the curse is to us, in the use we make of it, and in the power which our sin gives it to afflict us. In itself it has no moral character, for it has no free will, and is subjected to a physical and not a moral law. Its beauty and harmony, the song of birds, the flowers of the fields, the silent groves, the dark forests, the lofty mountains, the majestic rivers, the laughing rills, the broad lakes and vast oceans, may all be to us occasions of virtuous affection or of sinful passion. All depends on ourselves and the use we make of them. To the pure all things are pure, to the corrupt all things are corrupt. The saint finds in all nature incentives to virtuous action, inducements to love and praise the glorious Maker of all; the sinner finds in all nature occasions of evil, or incentives to sin.

The artist, whether orator or poet, painter or sculptor, musician or architect, must have, then, an end in whatever he does beyond the mere doing, and also a good end, an end which lies in the moral order, and is referable to God, the Supreme Good and ultimate End of all things. When we have ascertained the end of a literary production, and ascertained it to be one which a wise and just man can approve, we may proceed to consider the literary taste and beauty with which the author has sought to accomplish it. As detached from its end, the work is no proper subject of criticism. As referred to its end, even its adaptation to that end, its form, its style, its diction, are proper and not unimportant considerations for the critic; for whatever is worth doing at all, is worth doing well. We are not purely intellectual beings, and it is not enough that he who writes

for us should have the truth, and be able to state it in a strictly logical form. We have will as well as intellect; we have imagination, affections, passions, and emotions,—a perception of the beautiful as well as of the true and the good,—and we can be pleased as well as instructed, and generally we refuse the instruction if not presented in a form that pleases, or at least in one that does not displease. Now, we are far from considering this form under which we present the true or the good to be a matter of mere indifference. A correct literary taste, a lively sensibility to the fit and the beautiful, the command of an easy and noble style, of appropriate, expressive, and graceful diction, are matters of great importance, and which no man who writes at all is at liberty entirely to neglect. Here we prize literary taste and culture, as highly as any one can, for here they are not for themselves, but for a legitimate purpose beyond themselves, and are prized as means to an end.

Tried by the standard implied, if not distinctly exhibited, in these remarks, we shall look in vain in the whole range of American secular literature for works that can rival these six volumes before us. In general, the end is just and noble, and, with fewer exceptions than we could reasonably expect, the doctrines set forth are sound and important. No man has written amongst us who has given utterance to sounder maxims on politics and law, and no one has done more to elevate political and legal topics to the dignity of science, to embellish them with the charms of a rich and chaste imagination, and to enrich them with the wealth accumulated from the successful cultivation of the classics of ancient and modern times. The author has received from nature a mind of the highest order, and he has cultivated it with care and success. We see in every page, every sentence, of his writings, vast intellectual power, quick sensibility, deep and tender affection, and a rich and fervid imagination; but we see also the hard student, the traces of long and painful discipline under the tutelage of the most eminent ancient and modern masters. Nature has been bountiful, but art has added its full share, in making the author what he is, and the combination of the two has enabled him to produce works which in their line are certainly unrivalled in this country, and we know not where to look for any thing in our language of the

kind really superior to them. As an orator Mr. Webster has all the terseness of Demosthenes, the grace and fulness of Cicero, the fire and energy of Chatham, and a dignity and repose peculiarly his own.

In these times a man is to be commended for the faults he avoids, as well as for the positive excellence to which he attains. Mr. Webster is free from the ordinary faults of even the more distinguished of the literary men of his country. American literary taste is in general very low and corrupt. Washington Irving and Hawthorne have good taste, are unaffected, natural, simple, easy, and graceful, but deficient in dignity and strength; they are pleasant authors for the boudoir, or to read while resting one's self on the sofa after dinner. No man who has any self-respect will read either of them in the morning. Prescott is gentlemanly, but monotonous, and occasionally jejune. Bancroft is gorgeous, glowing, but always straining after effect, always on stilts, never at his ease, never natural, never composed, never graceful or dignified. He has intellect, fancy, scholarship, all of a high order, but no taste, no literary good-breeding. He gesticulates furiously, and speaks always from the top of his voice. In general we may say of American literature that it is provincial, and its authors are uncertain of themselves, laboring, but laboring in vain, to catch the tone and manner of a distant metropolis. They have tolerable natural parts, often respectable scholarship, but they lack ease, dignity, repose. They do not speak as masters, but as forward pupils. They take too high a key for their voice, and are obliged in order to get through to sing in falsetto. You are never quite at your ease in listening to them; you are afraid they will break down, and that the lofty flights of oratory they promise you will turn out to be only specimens of the bathos. They fail to give one confidence in their strength, for they are always striving to be strong, and laboring to be intense. From all faults of this kind Mr. Webster is free. He inspires you, whether you are listening to his words as they fall from his lips, or read them as reproduced by the reporter, with full confidence in his ability to get through without any break-down, and he seldom disappoints you. He appears always greater than his subject, always to have the full mastery over it, and never to be mastered or carried away by it. In him you see no labor

to be strong or intense, no violent contortions, or unnatural efforts to escape being thought weak, tame, or commonplace. He is always himself, collected, calm, and perfectly at his ease. He is so, not only because he really is a strong man, and has thoroughly mastered his subject, but because he is also a modest man, and is not disturbed by a constant recurrence of his thoughts to himself. He has through his natural modesty, which is one of the most striking traits in his character, and through cultivation, the power of forgetting himself, and of not thinking of the impression he is making on others with regard to himself, and consequently is able to employ the whole force of his intellect, imagination, and learning in stating, illustrating, and embellishing his subject. Being at his ease, having all his powers at his command whenever he rises to speak, and naturally a delicate taste, chastened and refined by the assiduous study of the best models, ancient and modern, he without difficulty avoids the ordinary faults of the orators of his country, and reassures, pleases, instructs, and carries along with him his whole audience.

We know not how Mr. Webster compares as an orator with the great orators of other times or other countries, for mere descriptions of oratory are rarely reliable; but he comes up more nearly to our ideal of the finished orator for the bar, the senate, the popular assembly, or a patriotic celebration, than any other to whom our country has given us an opportunity of listening. His elocution and diction harmonize admirably with his person and voice, and both strike you at once as fitted to each other. His majestic person, his strong, athletic frame, and his deep, rich, sonorous voice, set off with double effect his massive thoughts, his weighty sentences, his chaste, dignified, and harmonious periods. Whatever we may say of the elocution, the rhetoric is always equal to it. Mr. Webster is perhaps the best rhetorician in the country. No man better appreciates the choice of words or the construction and collocation of sentences, so as to seize at once the understanding, soothe the passions, charm the imagination, and captivate the affections. He is always classical. His words are pure English, and the proper words for the occasion, the best in the language; and his sentences are simply constructed, never involved, never violently inverted, but straightforward, honest, sincere, and free from all

modern trickery. We know in the language no models better fitted than the orations and speeches in these volumes for the assiduous study of the young literary aspirant who would become a perfect rhetorician, or master a style at once free and natural, instructive and pleasing, pure and correct, graceful and elevated, dignified and noble. Mr. Webster's artistic skill is consummate, and evidently has been acquired only by great labor and pains; but you must study his works long and carefully before you will detect it. Such writing as we have here comes not by nature, and no genius, however great, can match it without years of hard labor in preparatory discipline.

The casual reader may be apt to underrate Mr. Webster's merits as a logician, and we recollect hearing a distinguished Senator, who ought to have known him well, characterize him one day as "a magnificent declaimer, but no reasoner." He is not of a speculative turn of mind, nor does he appear to have devoted much time to the study of the speculative sciences, though he evidently has not wholly neglected them,—and he seldom reasons, as we say, in form; but he gives full evidence, after all, of possessing the logical element in as eminent a degree as he does any other element of the human mind. His style of expression and habits of thought are strictly logical, and his conclusions always follow from his premises. The only thing to be said is, that very often one of his premises is understood and not expressed, and sometimes rests on the prejudice, conviction, or actual common sense of his countrymen, not on a true ontological principle. His defect is not a defect of logic, but a defect of original apprehension, resulting from the neglect to go back from the common sense of his countrymen to first principles. In consequence of this, his conclusions are sometimes unsound, not because they do not follow from his premises expressed or understood, but because one or the other of his premises is unsound. This is more or less necessarily the case with all Englishmen and Americans, who follow what is called common sense; for the common sense of Englishmen and Americans, as we have already remarked, is made up from modern innovations, as well as from the traditions of our ancestors, and is therefore on one side untrue. But where his principles are sound, as in his law arguments, and in the greater part of his speeches in Con-

gress, and in several of his diplomatic letters, his logic is sound and invincible, although it is presented in a popular form, the most suitable for his purpose. Ordinarily he strikes us as comprehensive rather than acute, but he can be as acute, as nice in his analyses and distinctions, as need be, as we may know from his argument to the court and jury in the trial of the Knapps for the murder of Captain White of Salem, which upon the whole is one of the most finished of his performances, as they stand in the volumes before us.

Some readers, again, will regard Mr. Webster as chiefly remarkable for his pure intellectual power; and be disposed to deny him much power of imagination. But this would be in the highest degree unjust. He possesses an uncommonly strong and vivid imagination. Take up any one of his speeches, if but tolerably reported, on any subject, no matter how dry or uninteresting in itself, and you find that he at once informs it with life, elevates it, and invests it with a deep interest. This no man destitute of imagination can ever do. The test of imagination is not a florid style, abounding in tropes and metaphors. Such a style indicates fancy, not imagination, and, in fact, it is the general tendency of our countrymen, nay, of our age, to mistake fancy for imagination. Washington Irving and Hawthorne have imagination, though not of the highest order; Bancroft has fancy, a rich and exuberant fancy, but very little imagination. To test the question whether a man has imagination or not, let him take up a dry and difficult subject, and if he can treat it so that without weariness, and even with interest, you can follow him through his discussion of it, although he uses always the language appropriate to it, and seems to employ only the pure intellect in developing it, you may be sure that he has a strong and fervid imagination, so strong and active as to impart life and motion to whatever he touches. Mr. Webster has an exceedingly rich and active imagination, but he does not suffer it to predominate; he makes it subservient to his reason, and so blends it in with the pure intellect, that you feel its effect without being aware of its presence. No matter how apparently dry and technical the subject he has in hand, the moment he begins to unfold it, and to indicate its connections with other subjects, and through these its high social or moral relations, his hearer's

or reader's attention is arrested, fixed, and held till he closes. He no sooner speaks, than the dry bones of his subject assume flesh, move, and stand up, living and breathing, in proper human shape, well formed and duly proportioned, not misshapen monsters, that frighten by their hideous or disgust by their grotesque appearance.

What we most admire in the style of Mr. Webster is its simplicity, strength, and repose. The majority of our writers who study to be simple in their manner are plain, dry, or silly. They are simple in a sense in which simplicity is not a compliment. Those who wish to escape this charge become inflated, bombastic, and unable to say any thing in an easy and natural manner. They select high-sounding words, pile up adjective upon adjective, and send their fancy over all nature, and through all its departments, animal, vegetable, and mineral, over all nations, among the English, the French, the Italian, the Dutch, the Russian, the Tartars, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Hindoos, the Egyptians, the Abyssinians, the Negroes, the Malays, the savages of Oceanica and of North and South America, and through all times, from the entrance of Satan into the garden of Eden to seduce our great-grandmother Eve, down to the battle of Buena Vista, in which General Taylor flogged General Santa Ana, or the last Baltimore Convention for nominating a Whig or a Democratic President, to cull flowers and collect images to adorn and illustrate some poor, commonplace thought, or some puny conceit, that might have proved stillborn without in the least affecting the flux and reflux of the ocean tides, interrupting the course of nature, or changing the general current of historical events. Mr. Webster avoids both extremes, and speaks always in accordance with the genius of his native idiom, and in his natural key. Take, for instance, the opening paragraph of his speech on the completion of the Bunker Hill Monument.

"A duty has been performed. A work of gratitude and patriotism is completed. This structure, having its foundations in soil which drank deep of early Revolutionary blood, has at length reached its destined height, and now lifts its summit to the skies." — Vol. I. p. 83.

Or this from the same speech : —

"The Bunker Hill Monument is finished. Here it stands.

Fortunate in the high natural eminence on which it is placed, higher, infinitely higher in its objects and purpose, it rises over the land and over the sea ; and, visible, at their homes, to three hundred thousand of the people of Massachusetts, it stands a memorial of the last, and a monitor to the present and to all succeeding generations. I have spoken of the loftiness of its purpose. If it had been without any other design than the creation of a work of art, the granite of which it is composed would have slept in its native bed. It has a purpose, and that purpose gives it its character. That purpose enrobes it with dignity and moral grandeur. That well-known purpose it is which causes us to look up to it with a feeling of awe. It is itself the orator of this occasion. It is not from my lips, it could not be from any human lips, that that strain of eloquence is this day to flow most competent to move and excite the vast multitudes around me. The powerful speaker stands motionless before us. It is a plain shaft. It bears no inscriptions, fronting to the rising sun, from which the future antiquary shall wipe the dust. Nor does the rising sun cause tones of music to issue from its summit. But at the rising of the sun, and at the setting of the sun ; in the blaze of noonday, and beneath the milder effulgence of lunar light ; it looks, it speaks, it acts, to the full comprehension of every American mind, and the awakening of glowing enthusiasm in every American heart." — p. 86.

With the exception of the phrase "the milder effulgence of lunar light," which we cannot much admire, this is simply and naturally said, and yet it is in the highest strain of genuine oratory, and we shall not easily forget the emotion with which we heard Mr. Webster, standing in front of the monument, pronounce it, or the deep and prolonged applause it received from the some two hundred thousand of our citizens assembled in honor of the occasion. All true greatness is simple and sedate. It affects no display, for it is satisfied with what it is. It speaks and it is done, commands and it stands fast. Take another passage, of a different description indeed, but illustrating the same simplicity of style and expression. The extract is from the opening of his speech on the trial of the Knapps for the murder of Captain Joseph White of Salem.

"I am little accustomed, Gentlemen, to the part which I am now attempting to perform. Hardly more than once or twice has it happened to me to be concerned on the side of the government in any criminal prosecution whatever ; and never, until the present occasion, in any case affecting life.

"But I very much regret that it should have been thought necessary to suggest to you that I am brought here to 'hurry you against the law and beyond the evidence.' I hope I have too much regard for justice, and too much respect for my own character, to attempt either; and were I to make such attempt, I am sure that in this court nothing can be carried against the law, and that gentlemen, intelligent and just as you are, are not, by any power, to be hurried beyond the evidence. Though I could well have wished to shun this occasion, I have not felt at liberty to withhold my professional assistance, when it is supposed that I may be in some degree useful in investigating and discovering the truth respecting this most extraordinary murder. It has seemed to be a duty incumbent on me, as on every other citizen, to do my best and my utmost to bring to light the perpetrators of this crime. Against the prisoner at the bar, as an individual, I cannot have the slightest prejudice. I would not do him the smallest injury or injustice. But I do not affect to be indifferent to the discovery and the punishment of this deep guilt. I cheerfully share in the opprobrium, how great soever it may be, which is cast on those who feel and manifest an anxious concern that all who had a part in planning, or a hand in executing, this deed of midnight assassination, may be brought to answer for their enormous crime at the bar of public justice.

"Gentlemen, it is a most extraordinary case. In some respects, it has hardly a precedent anywhere; certainly none in our New England history. This bloody drama exhibited no suddenly excited, ungovernable rage. The actors in it were not surprised by any lion-like temptation springing upon their virtue, and overcoming it, before resistance could begin. Nor did they do the deed to glut savage vengeance, or satiate long-settled and deadly hate. It was a cool, calculating, money-making murder. It was all 'hire and salary, not revenge.' It was the weighing of money against life; the counting out of so many pieces of silver against so many ounces of blood.

"An aged man, without an enemy in the world, in his own house, and in his own bed, is made the victim of a butcherly murder, for mere pay. Truly, here is a new lesson for painters and poets. Whoever shall hereafter draw the portrait of murder, if he will show it as it has been exhibited, where such example was last to have been looked for, in the very bosom of our New England society, let him not give it the grim visage of Moloch, the brow knitted by revenge, the face black with settled hate, and the blood-shot eye emitting livid fires of malice. Let him draw, rather, a decorous, smooth-faced, bloodless demon; a picture in repose, rather than in action; not so much an example of human nature in its

depravity, and in its paroxysms of crime, as an infernal being, a fiend, in the ordinary display and development of his character.

"The deed was executed with a degree of self-possession and steadiness equal to the wickedness with which it was planned. The circumstances now clearly in evidence spread out the whole scene before us. Deep sleep had fallen on the destined victim, and on all beneath his roof. A healthful old man, to whom sleep was sweet, the first sound slumbers of the night held him in their soft but strong embrace. The assassin enters, through the window already prepared, into an unoccupied apartment. With noiseless foot he paces the lonely hall, half lighted by the moon; he winds up the ascent of the stairs, and reaches the door of the chamber. Of this, he moves the lock, by soft and continued pressure, till it turns on its hinges without noise; and he enters, and beholds his victim before him. The room is uncommonly open to the admission of light. The face of the innocent sleeper is turned from the murderer, and the beams of the moon, resting on the gray locks of his aged temple, show him where to strike. The fatal blow is given! and the victim passes, without a struggle or a motion, from the repose of sleep to the repose of death! It is the assassin's purpose to make sure work; and he plies the dagger, though it is obvious that life has been destroyed by the blow of the bludgeon. He even raises the aged arm, that he may not fail in his aim at the heart, and replaces it again over the wounds of the poniard! To finish the picture, he explores the wrist for the pulse! He feels for it, and ascertains that it beats no longer! It is accomplished. The deed is done. He retreats, retraces his steps to the window, passes out through it as he came in, and escapes. He has done the murder. No eye has seen him, no ear has heard him. The secret is his own, and it is safe!

"Ah! Gentlemen, that was a dreadful mistake. Such a secret can be safe nowhere. The whole creation of God has neither nook nor corner where the guilty can bestow it, and say it is safe. Not to speak of that eye which pierces through all disguises, and beholds every thing as in the splendor of noon, such secrets of guilt are never safe from detection, even by men. True it is, generally speaking, that 'murder will out.' True it is, that Providence hath so ordained, and doth so govern things, that those who break the great law of Heaven by shedding man's blood seldom succeed in avoiding discovery. Especially, in a case exciting so much attention as this, discovery must come, and will come, sooner or later. A thousand eyes turn at once to explore every man, every thing, every circumstance, connected with the time and place; a thousand ears catch every whisper; a thousand excited minds intensely dwell on the scene, shedding all their light, and ready to kindle the slightest circumstance into a blaze of dis-

covery. Meantime the guilty soul cannot keep its own secret. It is false to itself; or rather it feels an irresistible impulse of conscience to be true to itself. It labors under its guilty possession, and knows not what to do with it. The human heart was not made for the residence of such an inhabitant. It finds itself preyed on by a torment, which it dares not acknowledge to God or man. A vulture is devouring it, and it can ask no sympathy or assistance, either from heaven or earth. The secret which the murderer possesses soon comes to possess him; and, like the evil spirits of which we read, it overcomes him, and leads him whithersoever it will. He feels it beating at his heart, rising to his throat, and demanding disclosure. He thinks the whole world sees it in his face, reads it in his eyes, and almost hears its workings in the very silence of his thoughts. It has become his master. It betrays his discretion, it breaks down his courage, it conquers his prudence. When suspicions from without begin to embarrass him, and the net of circumstance to entangle him, the fatal secret struggles with still greater violence to burst forth. It must be confessed, it will be confessed; there is no refuge from confession but suicide, and suicide is confession." — Vol. VI. pp. 51 – 54.

We continue the extract from this same speech, for the sake, not only of the style, but of the sentiment it expresses with regard to the detection of crime, and the merited rebuke it quietly gives to our romantic philanthropists, whose sympathies are all for the criminal, and who would deem it very low and illiberal to make any account of the sufferings of the innocent which his crimes inevitably occasion. The community in which we live is coming to a strange pass. Crimes are daily and hourly multiplying in our midst, both in frequency and magnitude, and yet the great study is to mitigate punishment, and to convert the criminal into a hero. Virtue goes unhonored, and we are doing our best to have crime go unpunished.

"Much has been said, on this occasion, of the excitement which has existed, and still exists, and of the extraordinary measures taken to discover and punish the guilty. No doubt there has been, and is, much excitement, and strange indeed it would be had it been otherwise. Should not all the peaceable and well-disposed naturally feel concerned, and naturally exert themselves to bring to punishment the authors of this secret assassination? Was it a thing to be slept upon or forgotten? Did you, Gentlemen, sleep quite as quietly in your beds after this murder as before? Was it not a case for rewards, for meetings, for committees, for the united efforts of all the good, to find out a band of

murderous conspirators, of midnight ruffians, and to bring them to the bar of justice and law? If this be excitement, is it an unnatural or an improper excitement?

"It seems to me, Gentlemen, that there are appearances of another feeling, of a very different nature and character; not very extensive, I would hope, but still there is too much evidence of its existence. Such is human nature, that some persons lose their abhorrence of crime in their admiration of its magnificent exhibitions. Ordinary vice is reprobated by them, but extraordinary guilt, exquisite wickedness, the high flights and poetry of crime, seize on the imagination, and lead them to forget the depths of the guilt, in admiration of the excellence of the performance, or the unequalled atrocity of the purpose. There are those in our day who have made great use of this infirmity of our nature, and by means of it done infinite injury to the cause of good morals. They have affected not only the taste, but I fear also the principles, of the young, the heedless, and the imaginative, by the exhibition of interesting and beautiful monsters. They render depravity attractive, sometimes by the polish of its manners, and sometimes by its very extravagance; and study to show off crime under all the advantages of cleverness and dexterity. Gentlemen, this is an extraordinary murder, but it is still a murder. We are not to lose ourselves in wonder at its origin, or in gazing on its cool and skilful execution. We are to detect and to punish it; and while we proceed with caution against the prisoner, and are to be sure that we do not visit on his head the offences of others, we are yet to consider that we are dealing with a case of most atrocious crime, which has not the slightest circumstance about it to soften its enormity. It is murder; deliberate, concerted, malicious murder." — pp. 54, 55.

Other extracts in abundance we might make, full of interest in themselves, and illustrating the several features of Mr. Webster's style and manner which we have indicated; but we must refer our readers to their own recollections, or, where these fail, to the volumes themselves. The extracts we have made will serve to illustrate, not only the simplicity of his language, but the strength of his expressions, and the repose of his manner. The quiet majesty of his style in the more felicitous moments of the orator, or when the reporter has been the more competent to his task of reporting his speeches word for word as delivered, has seldom been surpassed, if equalled, by any American, or even English writer. Burke is the English writer with whom we most naturally compare him. As an orator he is far superior to Burke, as a profound and comprehensive think-

er, perhaps, he falls below him ; as a writer he is as classical in his style, as cultivated, and as refined in his tastes, and simpler and more vigorous in his expression. In many respects Burke has been his model, and it is not difficult to detect in his pages traces of his intimate communion with the great English, or rather Irish statesman, who, perhaps, taken all in all, is the most eminent among the distinguished statesmen who have written or spoken in our language. We have no thought of placing Mr. Webster above him ; but he surpasses him in his oratory, for Burke was an uninteresting speaker, and in the simple majesty and repose of his style and manner. Burke is full, but his fancy is sometimes too exuberant for his imagination, and his periods are too gorgeous and too overloaded. Now and then he all but approaches the inflated, and is simply not bombastic. His work on the French Revolution is a splendid work, a vast treasure-house of historical lore, of sound political doctrines and wise maxims for the statesman, but it frequently lacks simplicity, and is sometimes a little overstrained in its manner. The effort of the author to sustain himself at the height from which he sets out is now and then visible, and his voice, in executing some of the higher notes of his piece, wellnigh breaks into falsetto. His strength, though sufficient to carry him through, is not sufficient to carry him through with ease. Our countryman appears to us to possess naturally a stronger and more vigorous mental constitution, and to carry himself more quietly, and more at his natural ease. The only modern writers, as far as our limited reading extends, who in this respect equal or surpass Mr. Webster, are the great Bossuet and the German Goethe, though we must exclude Goethe's earlier writings from the comparison. The simple, natural majesty of Bossuet is perhaps unrivalled in any author, ancient or modern, and in his hands the French language loses its ordinary character, and in dignity, grandeur, and strength becomes able to compete successfully with any of the languages of Modern Europe. Goethe is the only German we have ever read who could write German prose with taste, grace, and elegance, and there is in his writings a quiet strength and a majestic repose which are surpassed only by the very best of Greek or Roman classics. Mr. Webster may not surpass, in the respect named, either of these great writers, but he belongs to their order.

We have dwelt the longer on these features of Mr. Webster's style, because they are precisely those which our authors and orators most lack. The American people have no simplicity, no natural ease, no repose. A pebble is a "rock," a leg or arm is a "limb," breeches or trousers are "unnamables," a petticoat is a "skirt," a shift is a *chemise*, the sun is the "solar orb," the moon the "lunar light." Nothing can be called simply by its proper name in our genuine old Anglo-Saxon tongue. We are always striving to be great, sublime; and simple natural expressions are counted tame, commonplace, or vulgar. We must be inflated, grandiloquent, or eccentric. Even in our business habits, we strive after the strange, the singular, or the wonderful, and are never contented with old fashions, quiet and sure ways of prospering. We must make or lose a fortune at a dash. We have no repose, are always, from the moment we are breeched till wrapped in our grave-clothes, in a state of unnatural excitement, hurrying to and fro, without asking or being able to say why or wherefore. We have no homesteads, no family, no fixtures, no sacred ties which bind us, no hearths or altars around which our affections cling and linger. We are all afloat upon a tumultuous ocean, and seem incapable of enjoying ourselves save amid the wildness and fury of the storm. Our authors and orators, as was to be expected, partake of our national character, and reproduce it in their works. The best thing we can do is to give our days and nights to the study of the volumes before us, which present us admirable models of what we are not, but of what we might and should be.

It is very evident from Mr. Webster's writings that his reading has not been confined to Blackstone and Coke upon Littleton, nor to Harrington, Sydney, and Locke, — that he has made frequent excursions from the line of his professional or official studies among the poets and in the fields of polite literature, and that literary or artistic cultivation has been with him a matter of no inconsiderable moment. He is perfectly familiar with the British classics, whether prose or poetry, and well read, if not in the Greek, at least in the ancient Roman literature. His style is to no inconsiderable extent formed after those very different writers, Cicero and Tacitus; but perhaps it owes still more of its peculiar richness and beauty to his diligent reading,

—whether for devotion or literary purposes we know not, — of the English Protestant version of the Holy Scriptures. This version is of no value to the theologian, for it has been made from an impure Hebrew and Greek text, and is full of false and corrupt renderings, but in a literary point of view it has many and rare merits. As an accurate rendering of the sacred text it cannot as a whole compare with our Douay Bible, but its language and style are more truly English, or at least present the English with more idiomatic grace, and greater purity and richness. The Douay Bible borrows terms from the Latin, which, though more precise, are less familiar, and less expressive to the ordinary English reader; at least, so it seems to us, who first studied the Scriptures through the medium of the Protestant version. The English language had reached its fullest and richest development in the sixteenth century, and the men who made the Protestant version of the Scriptures, whatever they were as theologians, were among its most accomplished masters. Hence their version has become the first of English classics, and perhaps we have no work in the language that can be so advantageously studied by the orator or the poet, so far as relates to pure English taste, to the formation of style, and richness, aptness, and beauty of idiomatic expression, though we think there is at present a tendency among some of our Catholic scholars to underrate the literary merits of the Douay Bible, and we find ourselves appreciating them much higher in proportion as we become better acquainted with them.

But we have exhausted our space, and must bring our remarks to a close. We have intended to be fair and just towards Mr. Webster, and our readers will readily perceive that we have written on the principle of saying the best we can, and not the worst, without violating the truth. We have done so, because we have never been one of Mr. Webster's partisans, and have on more occasions than one expressed in strong language our dissent from his particular measures, or the line of policy he has recommended. We have also done so, because Mr. Webster is really a great man, and our country is not so rich in great men as to permit us to overlook or to deal harshly with one so eminent as he unquestionably is. He is one of the few survivors of a generation of distinguished men, who are passing away without leaving any successors. Lowndes,

Hayne, Calhoun, are gone, Clay is dying, and may be dead before this sees the light, and of the great men who commenced public life with him, and who might claim to be his peers, Mr. Webster alone survives, and at farthest can survive but a few years longer. We could not well forget his merits, and remember only his faults; in doing so, we should have shown little patriotism and less Christianity. There are so few of our authors, orators, and statesmen that we can honor at all, that we are disposed to honor fully every one who does not strike us as being wholly unworthy.

Our great men are dying, and who is to take their place? The tendency with us is downward. The generation to which Mr. Webster belonged was inferior to the generation of great men who achieved our independence and founded our national government, and he is perhaps the only man born since the Declaration who could compare favorably with the Washingtons, the Adamses, the Hamiltons, the Madisons, and others of the same class, and in many respects not even he can do it. The generation next in time, and the one to which we ourselves belong, is of a yet lower grade of intellect and still more superficial attainments, and the best thing, perhaps, that can be said in our favor is that some of us feel and lament our inferiority. The generation that follows gives no promise of not falling still lower in the scale. Thus we go on, falling lower and lower in the intellectual and moral order with each new generation, and to what depths we shall ultimately sink, it is impossible to foresee. The democratic order is exceedingly unfavorable to either intellectual or moral greatness. If it has a tendency to bring up a degree or two the very low, which may be questioned, it has a still stronger tendency to bring all down to a low and common level. There is no use in quarrelling with this statement, for it is a fact so plain that even the blind may see it. If, then, a man amongst us rises superior to the unfavorable circumstances created by the political order of his country, and places himself on a level with the great men of other times and other countries, let us cherish him, and yield him ungrudgingly all merited honor.

We have written without any reference to the fact that Mr. Webster is or may be a candidate for the Presidency of the United States. Who will be the candidate of either

of the great parties of the country, it is impossible to say at the time we are writing, though the question will be settled before our Review issues from the press. In questions of domestic policy Mr. Webster is anti-sectional and conservative, and is unobjectionable to us and our friends; but his foreign policy has been such as we cannot approve. Ostensibly directed against foreign despotism, it has been really directed against our Church, and the liberty and peace of Continental Europe. The sympathy and support Mr. Kossuth obtained here were obtained on the supposition that he represented the Protestant cause, and that he was in league with Mazzini and others, not only for the overthrow of monarchy, but also of the Catholic Church. Hence it is that our Catholic population have almost to a man refused all sympathy with the eloquent Magyarized Selave. But Kossuth is Mr. Webster's *protégé*; Mr. Webster liberated him from prison and brought him here, and Mr. Webster is the man who in his behalf has insulted Austria, and compelled her representative to retire from the country. It were suicidal in any Catholic to vote to raise him to the Presidency of the United States. He would in so doing, if left to the choice of a better man in this respect, be false to his religion and to his country.

We love our country and delight to honor her really great men; but our God before our country, and our country before men, however great or distinguished. What we have censured in Mr. Webster he owes to his age and country, what we have commended he owes to himself and the traditional wisdom of our ancestors, and we honor him all the more that he is one of the very few of our countrymen who respect that wisdom, and do not believe that whatever is novel is true, and whatever is a change is an improvement. We have read his writings from time to time and as here collected, we would fain hope not without profit, for which we owe and would willingly pay him a debt of gratitude. If not all that we could wish, they are among the best things which our country has given us. The author has done something, more than any other man in our day, to sustain and enhance the true glory of the American name, and while we live we shall cheerfully honor him, and we shall delight to see him honored by his countrymen. We would willingly see the

laurel that binds his brows remain green and fresh, for the honor it bestows is identified with our common country, and is a patrimony to be inherited by our children.

ART. IV. — *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis*, Auctore JOANNE PETRO GURY, S. J., in Collegio Romano et in Seminario Valsensi prope Anicium Professore. Lugduni et Parisiis. 1850. 2 vols. 18mo.

COLLEGIANS who assemble in the class-room, on the first day of the term, to hear the preliminary discourse, can always form a tolerably accurate conjecture as to what the Professor will say to them. It is morally certain that they will be favored with an elaborate demonstration of the great importance of that scientific branch which he professes to teach. When an exception occurs, it commonly signifies that the speaker is *doctor utriusque juris, totiusque scibilis magister*,—a universal genius, prepared, at a moment's warning, to sit in any chair, and to fill it with credit to himself and with profit to his disciples. Yet even he, in his opening lecture, will be very prone to insist upon the transcendent importance of the matter selected for his discourses, partly because such is the custom, partly because the young men before him are by all means to be urged to acquire as much knowledge as will enable him and them to make a creditable display at the close of the term. Professors who are *homines unius scientiæ*—and any man in these would-be encyclopedic and therefore superficial days may be content to know one science, few can know more—are generally enthusiastic in their language when they speak of the dignity of their science, and of its importance to the world of scholars. Their earnestness is natural, for their thoughts are seldom far from the discipline which gives them employment, bread, and a name. The student, nevertheless, if he be a real student, is sorely puzzled at the end of the first scholastic day, because he has listened to perhaps seven grave men, professors of seven weighty sciences, all of which are of transcendent interest, all of them to be mastered in a space

hardly sufficient for the thorough digestion of the prolegomena of one.

We were accustomed to hear earnest, though not always effective, preliminary discourses of this sort, but we remember one which appeared to our inexperience as an unusual and extravagant estimate of the science which the lecturer professed to impart. It was spoken before the class of Moral Theology. The professor said, in substance, that Moral Theology was the very queen of sciences. A thorough knowledge of it would make of any man a theologian, *veri nominis*, which no amount of learning in the other branches would do. This language seemed to imply a slight upon the coördinate objects of theological inquiry, and it afforded us matter for serious reflection, while our doubts were by no means solved on hearing the contradictory testimony of two eminent men, whom we consulted for a settlement of the conflicting claims of the sciences which were contending, through their representatives, *quæ earum videretur esse major*. "*Caro figlio*," said the first, "*il uomo é matto!*" That which is the source of things is more important, more noble, than the things which descend from it. But faith is the beginning, root, source, and foundation of all science, whether concerning human or divine things. Dogmatic theology deals with those things that are of faith; it is therefore the science of sciences." The speaker was professor of dogmatic theology, and his answer was a *résumé* of what he had said to his pupils on the morning of the first day. He was a man who ignored all theologians later than Tournely, and seemed to be unaware that heretics had arisen who knew not Arius and cared not for Luther. We sought another professor, an old man, who was regarded as a good universal scholar. "*Il professore ha ragione*," said he. "In a very important sense it may be truly said that moral theology is the queen of sciences, for it governs them. All sciences, even that of dogmatic theology, would be unsound, and therefore worthless, without its presence."

In discussions like those of which we have been speaking, the state of the question is generally unsettled, and hence both disputants may be right. Objectively, theology is more noble than any mixed science, like metaphysics, or any human discipline, not only because it presses them into its service, and because it gives them their first and

last principles and their method, but because its object is God, or, if it considers the world and man, it is with direct reference to God. The object of theology is God, or God in his creatures. The object of other sciences is, or should be, the creation in God.

The dispute between moral and dogmatic theology, as to the respective nobility of each, covered a wider ground, inasmuch as in all theology the discourse is upon God. Yet it was useless discussion. Each party considered his favorite discipline, not as it is in the concrete, but in the abstract. Dogmatic theology refers primarily to the intellect; moral theology, to the will. So the dispute resolved itself into the old and not very grave question, as to which is more noble, the intellect or the will. Much ink and many words have been wasted in the abstract consideration of two sciences which cannot, after all, be separately considered, inasmuch as each depends upon the other, and, in rigor of terms, both form one science viewed under diverse aspects. Dogma gives to moral science its elements, moral theology gives to dogmatic its method.

Moral theology belongs to the second cycle; to palinogenesis, — the return of beings to God without being absorbed in him. It is the second cycle, regarding the latter in its formal acceptance. In the first cycle creatures in the physical order, beings in the intelligible order, proceed from God, and are manifested by and in him through the creative act. Things belong to the first cycle inasmuch as they *are*, — inasmuch as they have a *being*. Things, beings, exist, — *are*, in so far as they are true, — in so far as they conform to the eternal ideas in the Divine mind. The first cycle, then, formally considered, is created truth. The things, beings, created and manifested by God must return to him in the second cycle, as is clear from the first principles of the Catechism, from which we learn that all things made by God were made for himself alone. No other end for creatures than God is possible. They return to him through the force of LAW. That law constitutes palinogenesis, — the second cycle, in its formal acceptance. And moral theology embodies and applies the law.

Several notable truths are demonstrated from these principles, thus briefly stated. The law which it is the province of moral theology to declare and apply to all human

acts, and by virtue of which all things return to God, their final cause, is a law which admits no exception whatever. No exception is conceivable. Even the perverse will that stubbornly turns itself away from God, and so passes into the hidden world, glorifies the justice of God in hell. The great heresy of the age, — which, in its full development, is Atheism, the negation of God in every order; which, in its most ordinary development, is Protestantism, the illogical assertion of God in the religious order, and the negation of God in every other; and which, in a too common development, is Catholicism, the logical admission of God in the religious order, and the illogical negation of God in the political, scientific, and other orders, — the great heresy of the age, which never deceived so many, never appeared to men so like an angel of light, as in these latter times, is met, indeed, and refuted from principles furnished by dogma, but the weapons for its effectual overthrow are to be found only in the armory of which moral theology is the key. "A man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still." If a mere speculative assent to the truth would save men from eternal damnation, the road to hell might be as broad as ever, but it would not be so crowded as it is. Affected or supine ignorance is a great evil. It is the sin of the professed atheist. Yet even the atheist will admit that it is very wrong to conceal from himself the truth, either by racking his brain to invent reasons why he should not receive it, or by studiously neglecting to consider reasons which might disturb his boasted indifference to the things which are good for his soul. The Protestant is often thrown, sometimes by the mercy of the Holy Ghost, in a state of doubt. Alas! how many answer the call by saying that they have bought oxen, taken farms, and married wives! Pride or avarice opposes their clinging to the Rock whereon is inscribed the promise that hell shall never prevail against it. Procrastination is the sin of the unworthy Catholic. His day of salvation is always to-morrow. To-day he listens to the preacher, assents to all that he hears, and promises himself that he will repent and confess to-morrow. To-day closes too frequently with the night in which no man can work. These unhappy men, the atheist, the doubting Protestant, the impenitent Catholic, who know their duty and do it not, need the moral theologian,

—the judge, the teacher, and the physician. They die within reach of the bread of life, knowing well that it is bread, but wanting strength to arise and eat.

The truth upon which we are now insisting was treated, in one of its aspects, in our last number, where we discoursed concerning the Two Worlds. The difficulty which we are now considering arises from the fact, that the position of the world towards the Church has been gradually changed within the last three centuries. The Church is a kingdom, and her tribunal is supreme and infallible in faith and in MORALS. Ancient heresy admitted the Church to be a kingdom, — a visible kingdom, moreover; the dispute was, Who is the king? Not the Patriarch of Rome, said they, but Father Nestorius; or Patriarch Photius. The necessity of obedience was and is strongly inculcated among them, but they were loyal to the wrong throne. And, as always happens with heretics, the virtue of obedience, transplanted from Rome to the East, and made to grow in a strange garden, became a vice. Obedience, always enlightened in the Church, became mental slavery among heretics. We need not go to the East for examples, for we have them at hand, furnished by Protestantism, which exhibits a mental slavery, an ignorance and superstition, which are scarcely equalled among the old-fashioned Eastern heretics. And these not only admitted that the Church is a kingdom, but they held, and do hold, that its decisions concerning faith and morals are binding upon the conscience. They, in common with some few Protestants, profess to believe that the Church is a real government. It is not very long since they gave an interesting proof of their belief. The Anglican Establishment, knowing that the Greek Church, as well as itself, had been thrust out from the city of God, that the gates were barred, and that only one mode of reëntrance was left, a small wicket, near which sat Moral Theology, whom they could not pass, unless one at a time, and with a sincere and humble confession of sin, besought the Greek Church to unite with it in a war against the Pope. Perhaps the experiment might have succeeded, but the English heretics sent to the Greeks a document which they called a Confession of Faith. The Patriarch answered the request for union with an anathema, conceived in as forcible terms, and asserting the principle of authority and the necessity of

obedience on the part of the Anglican heretics as strongly, as if the excommunication had been fulminated by the Successor of St. Peter.

In the Protestant world we occasionally hear a faint assertion of the principle of authority, and a whining remonstrance against the temerity of laymen who demand a share in the government of their religious establishments, and who not seldom succeed in obtaining the lion's share; but the unhappy clergymen are commonly silenced by acts of Parliament, by judicial decisions, by resolves of lay committees and vestries, and even by newspaper articles. The unhappy men climbed into the church by a window, and no clinging to the horns of the altar can save them from the slavery entailed upon them by the principles which, as Protestant ministers, they must profess to teach. Modern gentilism asserts the right of private judgment, declares the inborn privilege of men to believe as much or as little as they choose, and, having declared men independent of God, of course asserts their independence of ministers. Yet some appearance, at least, of subordination is necessary to save the unfortunate Protestant bodies from anarchy, and one of the most amusing chapters in the history of Protestantism is that which records the illogical and almost unavailing efforts of the reverend window-climbers to keep their congregations from reversing the order of things by barring out the minister, and resolving themselves into a self-taught and self-governed church. Sometimes the ministers *are* literally barred out,—it has more than once happened here, in Boston, within the last few years. Most of the unfortunate pretenders to the ministerial office compromise the matter by canonizing all the extravagances of their hearers; by giving, each Sunday, some theological reason for the lay vagaries of the previous week. Thus Kossuth becomes a second Messiah, thus Lola Montes is transformed into a missionary for the conversion or extinction of the Jesuits, and thus every insane device of the hour becomes a part of the Divine scheme for the renovation of the world.

Protestants, therefore, who talk of platforms, confessions of faith, churches, spiritual authority, and the expediency, even, of obedience, are immeasurably behind their age; for it has declared itself independent, not only of these, but of God. Here, we repeat, is a consideration worthy the ear-

nest attention of theologians. There have been, and there are now, some ecclesiastical seminaries in which dogmatic theology occupies a trifling space, in comparison with the time given to moral science. In those institutions moral theology was really queen. Of course, — *oportet unum facere et alterum non omittere*, — dogma should not be neglected in favor of moral theology, and it cannot, without causing evil, for dogma furnishes principles, and without these moral theology is not a science. Yet the system of instruction which we have mentioned, when reasonably applied, has many good points. Dogma, when it is not governed by moral theology, from which it receives its method, becomes heresy. The doctrines revealed and proposed in the first cycle, and which come from God as First Cause, must return to him as the Final Cause, and they return to him by the act of faith in which the disciple assents to all those things which God has revealed, and which the Church teaches. To believe these things is to love God with the whole *mind*. The mind returns to God, — is united to him through the assent which it is enabled by Divine grace to give to revealed truth. Dogma shows what is to be believed; moral theology shows how belief is made real. Dogma enables man to recite an act of faith, moral discipline shows him how to *make* it. In a certain sense, one is the science, the other the art, of believing. It is indeed an art! *Ars artium, regimen animarum*! Devils believe and tremble; heresiarchs believe and scoff; mere students of dogmatic theology believe and dispute. It is noticeable that young men, who are almost ungovernable in the class-room of dogmatic theology, are very submissive in the moral circle. From all this, we gather that the system of instruction which makes the most of moral theology is not to be lightly judged. If dogma is the science of the procession of truth from God to man, moral theology is the science of the return of the same truth from man to God. Gentilism prevents the truth from reaching man, by clouding his mind, and by distorting his will. The angel that will not accept the truth, or, assenting to it, will not refer it to God, becomes a devil. The man who does likewise becomes a heretic. A thing is unintelligible when it denies its first and final cause. Moral theology, which is the science of the final cause of all things, is the director and guardian of dogma.

The apostate always begins, not with denying his obligations, but with neglecting his duties. An humble, sacramental confession might have postponed the rebellion of the sixteenth century, for it would have done more for the unhappy Luther than the Papal bulls and the Tridentine decrees did for him and his. The science of the return of creatures to God is the queen of sciences, because that return is the end of creation. It is worse than useless to see the truth unless the beholder accept it. It is fatal to proceed from God, as creatures, unless we also return to him.

The knowledge of the True does not necessarily infer the pursuit of the Good. This should not be so, but it is; for the apprehension of the First Cause does not coerce the admission, in the world of human acts, of the Final Cause. Man is free, because, although his will cannot disturb the order of things in the first cycle, and although it cannot prevent even itself, or any thing else in the universe, from glorifying God, the Final Cause, in the second cycle, yet it can be perverse, it can turn itself away from God, it can refuse to coöperate intelligently with God in the great work of declaring the Divine glory, and it can degrade itself to the condition of an instrument, used by God, as all unintelligent creatures are, for the accomplishment of his great purposes, and then thrown aside, and destroyed, as a tool that has fulfilled its purpose. The human tool is not physically destroyed, but it is cast aside, and so it is damned. A thorough knowledge of dogma does not include necessarily even a tolerable skill in moral theology; it gives to the latter its principles, but principles which are not reduced to application do little service in the world. On the contrary, a good moral theologian must be a respectable master in dogmatic science. One reason is, that, in moral discipline, references to dogmatic theology are habitually made. Perhaps another reason may be given. The good dogmatic theologian is a man of science. The good moralist must be a man of prayer. Now, *Deus est scientiarum Dominus, et ipse præparat* COGITATIONES. If it be true, then, that no science can be really mastered without an earnest prayer to the Lord of sciences, it is eminently true of theology, the more especially of that part which is the *artium ars*. Ecclesiastical experience has verified this thing. The student who reads, *learns*. The

student who also prays, *knows*. It is a remarkable circumstance, that the love of the ecclesiastical student for moral theology, and his greatness therein, increase in a direct ratio with his love of prayer. Whence it has frequently happened that theologians, decorated by universities with degrees, carry their doubts to some man of prayer, whose only book is the crucifix.

It may be inferred from this that the priest, in his character of a moral theologian, is more useful in the Church than he is in the capacity of a mere controversialist. We do not care to dispute the inference. Two heads of evidence, both of them very practical, may be cited in its support. Many dogmatic controversies have been instituted within the last century. Few conversions have resulted from them, and in no case, we believe, did the dispute end in the retraction, on the part of the Protestant antagonist, of his error. Purely controversial sermons seldom result in the conversion of Protestant hearers. Of the ecclesiastics, concerning whom it is said that the grace of winning souls to heaven had been poured upon them, we believe that by far the greater number were in the habit of giving only simple, plain homilies, setting forth the duties of a Christian, expounding in a familiar way what he must do, and in a catechetical style what he must believe, in order to be saved. In one of the old, quaint *seicentisti*, a receipt, piously hoped to be infallible, is given for curing heretics. The principal ingredient is the battery of prayer, to be fired at heaven, in incessant volleys, for nine days. The patient to take part in the exercises, but never to fire his own guns, but ours. That is, his prayers must be conceived in the spirit of the publican's prayer. His pride is to be purged by pills compounded of fasting, mortification, alms-deeds, confession, and the Catechism, while the presence of controversy is to be strictly interdicted. His questions are to be fairly answered, but disputing with him is not to be tolerated for a moment, while he is to be encouraged to seek light in his doubts in humble prayer to the Father of lights. We believe that this prescription suggests a moral which may be very profitably made the subject of earnest meditation by our younger laborers in the vineyard of the Lord.

It would be an inquiry leading to curious results, if one could ascertain whether missionaries, who have gathered families, villages, towns, whole nations, to Christ, or who

have recovered lost missions, were expert controversialists, or rather skilful moralists. We suspect that the latter would prove to be the true state of the case. We apprehend that the authorities of the Church, in sending missionaries to benighted or strayed people, are prone to regard excellence in moral science as of transcendent importance. Most excellent missionaries are sent from the seminaries elsewhere mentioned, in which the professor of moral theology, when he declares his to be the queen, nay, the sum of sciences, has no one to gainsay his words. Deacons, and even laymen, catechists, are permitted, under certain circumstances, to help the missionary in teaching the people those things which are to be believed. But the priest ordinarily reserves to himself the imparting of instruction as to those things which are to be done, or left undone, and only he, as judge, master, and physician, can sit as one having authority to guide and govern souls.

The truth is, that, under ordinary circumstances, the Church has much less to fear from heresy than from other sins. We mean, that the overwhelming majority of her children who love their souls incur damnation for other sins than that of heresy. Formal heretics, Protestants, and Gentiles universally are practically out of her jurisdiction, and she is in no wise answerable for their damnation. Men within her pale are not, as a general rule, exposed to the peril of apostasy. The most important exception to this rule occurs when the singular phenomenon which, for the sake of analogy, we may call a *stampede*, takes place among Christians, when men appear to lose their reason, to be seized with a sudden and unaccountable madness, and to rush like wild animals, whither, they know not, — very likely, and in the present case certainly, to the brink of a fatal precipice. It has happened several times within the memory of the Church, once, when *totus orbis ingemuit se Arianum esse*; again, on the occasion of the great Protestant *stampede*. Against occurrences of this sort, no human prudence, no theological skill, no precaution on the part of the Church, not even the ordinary means of grace, have proved sufficient barriers. The question has been raised, whether moral theology, had it been fairly treated, would not have prevented, either wholly or partially, the great Protestant rebellion. We dare not offer an opinion hereon. Our own age is as wicked, to say the least, as any preced-

ing age, and yet no one contemplates the possibility of a *stampede*. Nay, in most of the great nations, we hear of a revival of Christianity, and strong hopes are expressed that the Queen "will hae her ain again," a circumstance which would seem to indicate that this has been the worst of ages. "When things can grow no worse, they begin to mend," — a self-evident proposition, by the way, inasmuch as nothing can be stationary; whatever is, acts, either for good or for evil. It is worth while to note, as facts in themselves striking, as well as connected with our present thesis, that during the ages of faith the preponderance of moralists over great dogmatists was remarkable. At no time within the memory of the Church were there more or greater dogmatic theologians than during the period immediately preceding, following, and marking the great Arian and Protestant *stampedes*. The revival of Christianity, after these storms had spent their force, was and is a time distinguished more than any other period for the number and excellence of moral theologians.

God forbid that any one interpret our words as uttered in disparagement of the divine science which elucidates dogma! We trust that we have made it plain, in our preliminary remarks, that such is not our meaning. We simply offer a comment upon the rule, *Oportet unum facere et aliud non omittere*. We wish to note that some have unwisely depreciated the study of moral theology, and our plea, which is addressed by a student to young students, is that moral theology may not be ranked beneath any other science. If it be, the world will suffer greatly.

We repeat, that, under ordinary circumstances, the Church has less to fear from heresy than from other sins. Christ came not to preach a new doctrine, but to give a new commandment. He annexed to the keeping of the commandments the promise of eternal life. His people were to walk in holiness; to imitate him, to hear the Church, to remember the beatitudes. *Non omnes doctores*. The different mental habits of men will always render it certain, that, at any given time, there will always be a number, sufficient for the purposes of the Church, of ecclesiastics who make a particular study of dogmatic theology, and of these some will be excellent; one at least will leave his mark upon his age. The study is absolutely necessary to the priest for three purposes, — to be able for himself to

distinguish truth from error, to be competent to teach the true doctrine to his people, and to be equal to the defence of it against enemies, not that they may be converted, for that result is in the hands of a just God, but that he may see to it, as far as in him lies, *ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*. He must repulse wolves. Now the first two of these objects may be attained by a thorough study of moral theology, joined with a moderate proficiency in dogma. And this is enough to satisfy the ordinary requirements of the Christian world. Exceptional times, such as those to which we have alluded, when Catholics apostatize in masses, require exceptional attainments in dogmatic theology, and accordingly God raises up great men to meet the emergency. At other times, the knowledge of which we have spoken is generally found to be quite sufficient, the more especially as really great masters in dogma are never wanting to satisfy the occasional and local necessities of the Church.

One fact is continually recurring in ecclesiastical experience, and it is worth while to describe it, it is so clearly *ad rem*. In many ecclesiastical colleges, although moral theology is not neglected, yet dogma is regarded as the great occupation of the course, which lasts four years, during all of which dogma is studied continuously, while moral theology is confined to a certain space within the first two years. Under the most favorable circumstances, the time given to moral, as compared with dogmatic theology, is as one to four. It should be, under ordinary circumstances, as two to one. The student learns somewhat concerning the Arian, Nestorian, Eutychian, and Macedonian controversies; hears something, but less than he might, about the Pelagian and Manichæan heresies, which, after all, under different modifications, are the great heresies of every age, and are as prevalent, to say the least, in the nineteenth century as they ever were; he hears about the heresies of Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius; disputes concerning the orthodoxy of Zozimus, Honorius, Liberius, and John, and — *voilà tout*. His text-book might as well, for aught he knows, be Petavius, Ariaga, or Gonet, as Perone or Kenrick. In his world, no such men as Hermes, Strauss, Schleiermacher, La Mennais, or Gioberti, ever lived. So the student gets his degree, goes out into this wicked nineteenth century, and finds, to his no small aston-

ishment, that Nestorius is actually dead, that Arius is forgotten, that Luther is by no one regarded as a saint, and that our adversaries do not care whether a Pope may or may not have been a heretic. He finds their liberality so astounding, that the whole argument, major, minor, and *consequentia*, every thing but the *status questionis*, the *elenchus*, and here and there the *consequens*, is conceded to him. The tactics of the enemy are new, quite transcending his dogmatic experience. The old issues are abandoned, the Church is admitted to have been right in her struggles with the world during the first fifteen centuries, inasmuch as, although she may have made some mistakes, yet her general action was for the advancement of humanity, and therefore in a healthy direction. Hence, although some jests are perpetrated at the expense of the Church, in that she was always accustomed to attach too much importance to the opposition of her ancient enemies, yet it is generally conceded that they were busybodies, nobodies, pretenders, or hypocrites. Neologists do not care to defend even one of the ancient heretics, and with regard to the moderns, Audin may, for aught they care, demonstrate that Luther and Calvin were bad men. The whole state of the question between the Church and the world is changed. The adversaries whom the student met in the class-room, and demolished, were men who believed, or rather pretended to believe, in a fixed, immutable doctrine. They professed to be willing to repeat with the Apostles, Though we or an angel bring you another doctrine, let him be anathema, — regardless of the consequences which the adjuration might bring upon their own heads. Whereas the enemy who now lives and moves believes in progress, — believes the Church to have been once, and until lately, the pillar of truth; thinks that he himself is now, and suspects that some one else will be to-morrow. Moving in accordance with received school-room tactics, what can one do with such an adversary? One has not to learn his alphabet over again, it is true, but the collocation of letters, words, and sentences is changed.

We do not, of course, intend to say any thing in disparagement of the present method of teaching dogmatic theology, still less to recommend a new system. We dislike change, unless when made by those who are in authority, and can legitimately make it. And a method

which is approved by so many venerable and learned professors, who know what is the state of the question between the two worlds better than we do, is not to be gainsaid by us. *Qui potest majora, minora certe potest*. It is a great mistake to depreciate the men of ancient times, orthodox or even heretics, in an intellectual point of view, or to suppose that modern heretics are greater men than those of the ancient world. Catholic theologians have, do, and will acknowledge no higher authority, after that of the Church and of the Scriptures, than that of the Holy Fathers. A clear decision, say of St. AUGUSTINE or of St. THOMAS, cannot be ruled out of court. Modern heretics need never expect to equal the men whom the giants of Catholic theology met and overcame, and the student who, under the guidance of the Fathers, detects the weak points of the ancient heretics, need not fear their descendants, whose strongest men are scarcely equal to the weakest of early times. Heresy has not grown stronger, it has changed its method. Whether a partial change should be made in our schools, is a matter concerning which we do not venture an opinion. Considering that the student who pursues his course according to the received method is well grounded in theological principles, and has, or should have, made up his catechism from the Council of Trent, perhaps it is as well that he should upon his entrance into real life find his adversaries wearing a mask so different from that which they wore in the school-room, and the consequent exercise of his wits should do him no injury, particularly as their right exercise will certainly show him that his living adversaries are but *simulacra*, — counterfeits of the dead men whose *Dies iræ* he used to chant in the school-room, — lesser in degree, differing only in form.

We wish to direct the attention of students, in an especial manner, to this branch of our subject, partly because we have no intention of conveying the idea that we are disposed to advocate any substantial innovation upon the received method of training theological beginners, a conclusion which we are so far from accepting, that we should be delighted to find the rule of St. Ignatius faithfully observed in every school of dogmatic theology, and St. THOMAS practically recognized, not only as the Angel of the Schools, but the Master in them, — the THEOLOGUS.

Ipse Sanctus Alphonsus dixit, is a reference in the school of moral theology, where the professor is a safe man, which commonly silences doubts. We should be glad if an *Ipse Sanctus Thomas dixit* were heard as often, and to as effectual a purpose, in both class-rooms. Some persons may say that this is going too far back for the requirements of the times. No, good friends, no! So far as theology is concerned, the requirements of the times are always substantially the same. Error is not only always error, but it is always in reality *the same error*, — it has little invention, less originality, and its utmost evidence of progress is a newly fashioned garment, which a close examination will finally discover to be made of old, worn-out materials. If St. Thomas be not so often cited, so habitually consulted, in many schools, it is from some motive arising out of convenience, custom, or the difference in theological *tact* among professors of the science; but the respect which a pertinent citation from the writings of the Angelic Doctor, *qui de Christo Deo et homine tam bene scripsit*, receives, is sufficient to prove that, if, as happens with all guardian angels, his presence is not always sensibly felt, or his voice continually heard, his influence is there, living and potent, and his words, whenever uttered, are commonly sure to fall upon respectful and confiding ears. Every student knows that St. Thomas cannot lead him astray, — a knowledge which is very comfortable in the pursuit of any science, and is of the utmost importance in theological studies. A school which does not own him as decisive authority will be found to be of suspicious orthodoxy. And his guidance is of the utmost value for another reason pertinent to our present subject. We were speaking of the different masks which heresy wears, from time to time, somewhat to the perplexity of young students. Talk of authors suited to the age! Why, there is not a question even among questions the most modern, among those which our wildest neologists are forcing upon the attention of theologians, which may not be disposed of in the light of principles set forth in that wonderful book, the *SUMMA*. It is indeed a *Summa*! Heresy cannot, we verily believe, assume a form which will not be found, on examination, to have been detected and refuted in advance by St. Thomas. No master of theology, since the days of the Angelic Doctor, understood the wants of his own age as

well, or met them as forcibly, as the great Dominican does in his *Summa*. It is as new as it was four hundred years ago, and we fear even more so. But some one may say: "If you wish for old authorities, why not go still farther into antiquity. Great theologians lived before St. Thomas!" Granted, most learned friend! It is true, that in proportion to one's knowledge of the great Master, one is the more disposed to say of him, with a slight alteration of terms, what the Church says of St. John the Baptist:—

"Non fuit vasti spatium per orbis
Doctior quisquam genitus Thoma!"

Yet, if that suggestion were adopted, and the very ancient masters were brought, not only textually, but *corporaliter*, into the schools, a result might be obtained that would startle many people. We should find, for example, that we are no wiser than our fathers, and that the world has not made much progress after all. We venture to say that from St. Augustine and St. Clement a text-book might be compiled that would not only *meet* current wants, but would even look astonishingly modern, nay, some portions of it would convey the idea that the saints knew all about Hermes, Strauss, La Mennais, Gioberti, and other Titans of the present age of mutual admiration tendencies. We cannot pursue this topic now, — perhaps it will be made the subject of a future paper.

Some one has said that the nerve of a theological student is more severely tried during the three or four years succeeding his exit from college and his entrance into the vineyard than at any other period of his life. This is certainly true of many young priests. As we have said, the enemies whom they knew in the school are dead, and lesser men have arisen, who know not Arius or Luther, who discourse strangely, vaunt themselves loudly, and endeavor, in as far as in them lies, to satisfy the Athenians, who are not yet dead, and *advenæ hospites, qui ad nihil aliud vacant nisi aut dicere aut audire aliquid novi*. If the young theologian treat them as if they were old or consistent heretics, as if they cared aught for antiquity, precedents, logic, or heresiarchs older by twenty-four hours than themselves, he finds that the state of the question has changed. Nay, he discovers that, such is the activity of the heretical intellect, new and hitherto unheard of adversaries present themselves at every turn, and he does not always

discover that their strength is very like the strength of a theatrical army, made up of one man who runs across the stage an indefinite number of times, changing some article of his dress each time before he issues from the side scenes. "What am I to do with my four years of dogma, and my two years of moral theology?" *ait, tacitus*. "Where are the well-known adversaries, — who are *these*, — what are they, — what are they talking about, — what means this gibberish concerning humanity, solidarity, universal love, infinite progress, people-god, etherology, mental dynamics, spiritual communications? Where is Berengarius, Luther, or even Jansen?" Now it is certain that, if the student has made a respectable course of theology, he need not be long at a loss, inasmuch as he has laid the foundations of a *habitus* which will enable him to dispose of these, and any number of the like adversaries, with sufficient ease. If he knows the *title-pages* of the Fathers, and the *indices* of St. Thomas, — no trifling acquisition, by the way, — his work will be the more easily done, for these masters knew, at least, quite as much as is dreamed or likely to be dreamed of in modern philosophy. But here occurs a difficulty which many students experience on issuing from college. It lies in forgetting that they have only laid the foundations, more or less securely, of the theological *habitus*; in supposing that they have acquired it, that they have finished their studies, that they are theologians. The title of D. D. does not always produce the beneficial result it might, if all its possessors would remember that he who would be at all times prepared to teach must never be unprepared to learn. So it happens that the aspect of the battle-field is so different from that which he led himself to expect, that the young soldier is, for the moment, more or less puzzled. If he immediately recall to mind his principles, it is well; but this is not always done, and a superficial observation would scarcely show its necessity. How many persons are aware that even the latest developments of heresy — even such problems, if they be problems, as Mesmerism and Spiritual Communications afford, to say nothing of the apparently less silly questions furnished by the heterodoxy of the last fifty years — find a ready solution in St. Thomas or St. Augustine? It sometimes happens, therefore, that the student begins to conceive a disrespect for a method of teaching which he erroneously supposes

to contain little suited to his present exigencies; he begins to study the world, and gradually to form for himself a method of treating its diseases. Sometimes he looks at it under only one, and that the least important, of its aspects, and so arranges his order of battle. He satisfies himself as to what the real evil of the world is, and so he gallantly sets his face against that evil;—he becomes a controversialist, or a hospital or asylum builder, a designer of magnificent churches, a constant visitor of the wicked rich, or an habitual eater with the wicked poor, a metaphysician, a controversialist, an apologist—in the modern sense of the word—for the faith, a book-maker, an editor, *et sic usque ad finem*. All very well, if, *faciendo hoc, aliud non omittat*, if he does it in the Catholic spirit which prompted division of labor in the old monasteries, and which is one of the elements of the greatness of the Order of Jesus. *Non omnes doctores*, we say again. All not very well, if he regard his theory as a *compendium totius cursus*. And this is by no means an imaginary danger; it is precisely the rock on which young and gifted minds, particularly if pride or vanity be active, are prone to bruise, and not very seldom to ruin themselves. Hermes, La Mennais, Gioberti, and others, fell; Ventura barely saved, if he have saved, himself; Rosmini escaped, yet so as by fire, while several others, whose names it is not necessary to mention, toyed with themselves upon the brink of the precipice. The Athenians, we say again, are not yet dead, and the desire of saying or hearing something new is as strong as ever it was, and quite as fatal. In an age, too, when every body reads, few *think*, and most people quarrel for liberty of thought,—a liberty as inane as some other species for which men quarrel,—the passion for saying something new is perhaps stronger than ever. Quacks, professing to cure all diseases with one nostrum; adepts, promising to teach an art in a few hours; philosophers, dreaming that they can remedy all evil, and bring about all good by one formula,—were never so numerous, and Catholics, theologians even, being in the world, are *exposed* to the danger of becoming of the world.

Some one may say that, if the young student attend to his ordinary parochial duties, he need not encounter any of these difficulties. His duties are simple and plain, and perils like those described await only the great, and more

especially the would-be great, among us, as also those in whom pride or vanity is a motive power. It may be so, yet we again repeat that every body reads in these days, and every thing is read. The great problems of religion, politics, society, life, and the like, *were* discussed only in the schools; now, they are talked of in the shops. The little village of Porkington has its literary, scientific, philosophical, and religious circles, as well as Cambridge, in which all imaginable things are treated, and perhaps treated no worse than at Cambridge. *Omnis mens corruptit viam suam*. It is well for the student, particularly if he be gifted, when he does not become in any way infected with the spirit of the age; for he certainly has to meet it everywhere, and to fight with it. If he wishes to find among the people the simplicity of Catholic ages, he need not enter upon the missions in what are called civilized nations. He must retire to a monastery, or go and preach Christ to savage men.

We have made it sufficiently plain, we believe, that in our plea in behalf of moral theology we neither depreciate the study of dogma, nor advocate any substantial change in the method of treating it, nor favor any thing like what is miscalled progress, or mischievously termed development in theological science. Our argument, thus far, suggests the following inquiries:—1. Whether it may not be expedient, in the dogmatic class-room, to give somewhat more time to the application of dogma to the current heresies of the age,—Manichæanism, Pelagianism, the negation of God in every order, and carnal Judaism. 2. Whether the problems which we have, in these days, to meet, may not suggest the expediency of returning to the old masters,—to St. Thomas, St. Augustine, and others. True, they have always been used; but as lighthouses, scarcely as lanterns. 3. Whether somewhat more time might not be conceded to the study of moral theology. Or, 4. Whether that science might not occupy a portion of the time, as is the case in the Sulpician seminaries, during the whole scholastic course. The last two questions only appertain directly to our present subject, but we do not intend to treat them here. Their discussion, certainly their settlement, falls within the province of the professor. We continue our discourse concerning the young theologian.

We think that, in some quarters, an almost impercepti-

bly growing disposition is apparent to a close observer, not of neglecting the study of moral theology, but of ranking it as of less importance than other sciences. Some suppose that it is easily acquired. Others suspect that its application is comparatively limited. Others, again, think that it is a confused mass of positive decisions. Some object to the study of necessary portions of it, because of the uninviting nature of the subjects treated, while others, of a mathematical turn of mind, regarding the diversity of opinions manifested by those who are masters in the science, and imagining that *quot doctores, tot sententiæ* obtain in the schools, suppose that in moral theology no certainty can be had. We have heard all these reasons assigned by students as an excuse for not bestowing great attention upon the science. Of course, these reasons indicate that their authors know not what moral theology is.

Its application is absolutely universal, as we have seen in the first portion of the article. The world, once created, returns to God through human acts. The lower creatures return to God,—fulfil the end of their creation, by ministering, each after its own manner, unto man, that he may glorify God, in whom and for whom all live. Every human act must end in God, and this law includes words and thoughts also. Moral theology contains, nay, *is* the law by virtue of which all things return to God, their Final Cause. As every thing must return to him, and as the last term of the returning series, in which all others unite, is the will of man, specifying all his voluntary acts as human acts,—as God cannot rightfully be defrauded of any thing, not even of a thought or word, which he threatens to remember and punish, if idle,—as, in one word, every thing falls under the great law of the second cycle,—it follows that the dominion of moral theology is imperative, as wide as the universe, as high as heaven, as deep as hell. The human heart has no recesses, however hidden, which are exempt from that jurisdiction. The moral theologian must know what constitutes sin; what is lawful, what unlawful; the commandments of God and of the Church, and the laws appertaining to the administration of the Sacraments, are things which he must declare and apply to Christian life. He must know whether any given act leads the soul to God, or turns it away from him; he must know what should be done and what undone by men in every

state or condition of life; he must be ready to sit in judgment upon the acts of men, with their endless variety of circumstances and accidents; he must teach the Christian soul the things it should know for eternal life, and he must be prepared to apply the remedies ordained by Christ for the healing of spiritual maladies. And, as man has but one life here to live, but one soul to lose, the confessor must do all this with the knowledge of the duties of *his* state, and of the penalties which follow neglect. God commands the penitent to hear him, and God commands him to hear, teach, and heal the penitent. It is his duty to direct souls to God, and if he criminally misdirect a soul, it will be required at his hand. He must have common sense, prudence, knowledge, and piety. A dreadful responsibility rests upon him; — on no point are the Councils and Fathers more explicit than on this. Look at the knowledge required in moral theology. It may well be called, as it is, *artium ars*. It is the science of sciences, the science of human acts, the science of the Final Cause, the science, therefore, of the universe. No science or discipline so imperatively requires its professor to aim at the mental possession of the index to encyclopedic knowledge. And the confessor, in sitting in judgment upon human acts, should know an almost endless number of positive decisions, any one of which, at any moment, may be required to meet the case before him; or, at least, he must know that such decisions exist, and where to find them. The consequence of any misdirection on his part may be an entire or partial aversion of the soul from God, its Final Cause. Certainly, all this knowledge, in its perfection, is not required in the young theologian, — scarcely in the old and experienced one; but all are bound, each according to his measure of gifts, to aim at it, and to be content with nothing less. Masters of the science, after St. Liguori, never tire of saying to the young theologian, that if, in this holy science, he has learned enough to doubt in graver matters, he may safely regard himself as being likely to fall into few serious mistakes. A young priest who decides all cases, simple and intricate, hastily and confidently, who never doubts, who cuts all knots in the Alexandrine manner, is an unsafe person. Such are too prone to leave their books of reference on the shelf unopened. It is not easy to excuse the confessor who does not, in some way, review his moral

theology from time to time; and, in the judgment of many, two years, the time ordinarily given to the course in schools, are quite sufficient for the purpose.

In view of these things, it is easy to see that those seminaries which provide a course, the greater portion of which is given to moral theology, if they err at all, err on the safer side. A respectable knowledge of dogma, perhaps almost sufficient for ordinary parochial purposes, must, from the very nature of the case, be obtained by the student who devotes even his whole time to the faithful pursuit of moral science. And no priest has failed to remark, that, whereas extraordinary dogmatic attainments were not required in his professional life for several years, perhaps never, a respectable proficiency in moral theology was required in him from the moment of his first decision in the confessional, and that, although days, weeks, and months might pass without bringing a case requiring very high attainments in moral science, yet at any moment he might be called upon to deal with a matter calling for the highest proficiency in the *artium ars*. And — it is a common experience, but very singular withal — the inexperienced theologian may have more weighty difficulties to dispose of during the first week of his professional life than he will have during the remainder of the first year. The fact has been often noticed, explain it who can.

And the young theologian, if he be a conscientious man, finds that, where he has to consult his dogmatic authorities once, he must refer to his moral text-book, or ask advice, ten, twenty, or a hundred times. The explanation of this fact — which proves that respectable attainments in moral theology, or at least the capacity of doubting in difficult cases, are of supreme necessity to the priest who has the care of souls — is found in the peculiar form or mark which heresy wears in our age, which is carnal Judaism, — practical atheism. We have said that the heresies of our day are by no means as intellectual as were the ancient heterodoxies. The fact which we have just stated is the best proof of it. Few men not Catholics care for articles of faith, and, whatever may have been the sentiments of the Protestant world in former times, it is certain that they do not now object to any extravagance which affects only doctrine, while they are willing to recognize Catholics as men and brethren, if these will simply stifle that element

of Catholic life which makes it really life, — we mean that article which declares the Church to be a kingdom, which affirms its universal sovereignty, and makes it, on earth, supreme judge in morals as well as in faith. Protestants will bear any thing but that. Hence, no men are better received in Protestant society than they who declare that their faith is sound, but that they find nothing in it which forbids them to rail at the Pope, or which compels them to take their political, social, or scientific opinions from any bishop or priest. The Pope and the Confessional form the sum of Protestant objections against the Church, because by these she is a living, universal, and imperial power. Lukewarm, liberal, or nominal Catholics never, if we are to believe them, dream of denying the faith. Like the Roman followers of Mazzini in 1848, they protest that they are Catholics, but that their religion, for which they are ready to die, though not to live, does not compel them to uphold the temporal power of the Pope, or to allow priestly interference in their secular affairs. These unfortunates fall, of course, into the great heresy of the age, which denies that all human acts must end in God, and that he is the Final Cause of all things. The real obstacle or trouble is the necessity of sacramental confession, which is an intolerable grievance, and not the less so, in that a few good, humble confessions ordinarily suffice to eject the devil which rails at the Pope and at priestly interference in secular concerns. Take from Catholic faith the truth that the Church is supreme judge in morals, proclaim it to be an obsolete pretension, and the great objection of the gentiles and of their baptized imitators to Catholicity would disappear. They can tolerate *dead* articles of faith, but a living authority is too much for their nerves. Hence the work of a priest, as a dogmatic theologian, is almost as nothing, compared with his duties as a moralist. The confessional is the stumbling-block to nominal Catholics and to Protestant adversaries. The problem of his life is solved when he induces the former to frequent the holy tribunal. Nay, if he can bring the Protestant into the same predicament, the work of conversion is done. The truth is, our boasted civilization is based upon the predominance of the animal over the man, in human nature. *Omnis caro corrumpit viam suam*. Speculative dogmas are universally tolerated; practical commandments are systematically violated. Our

age is the age of the reign of matter over spirit, — of the flesh over reason. It is useless to quote the Council of Trent against the evil, for men have lost their logic; they will admit the premises, or say to them, *Transeant*, but they sturdily deny the conclusion, admitting, nevertheless, the *consequentiam*. The confessional is a sovereign remedy for the evil; priests, then, must, above all, be enlightened confessors. Q. E. D.

Kings, in former times, contended that they, being sovereigns, were accountable to God alone, and that, therefore, if they were subject to the moral law, a thing which some of them denied, they were not at all bound to listen to the exposition of that law made by popes, bishops, or priests. It was their privilege to interpret the law for themselves, and they, being sovereigns, always interpreted it rightly, of course; whence it followed that they were not sinful men, or, if sinful, that they could obtain absolution immediately from God; wherefore it again followed that they were not at all bound to sacramental confession. They had their confessors, but as necessary or usual puppets in their train. It is true that, when they were mortally sick, these doctrines were not so clear to them, and they ordinarily confessed, like common sinners; but when they were in health, the Church had some trouble with them. She gained her point, however, for she placed the proudest emperors in her presence on a level with the humblest beggars, and not seldom below them. When they relied so strongly upon their sole accountability to God, as to commit open, deadly, and scandalous acts of injustice, — when they ruthlessly violated contracts, of which she was the guardian, whether these were with their lawful wives or with their people, — she stretched forth her arm and dragged them from their thrones. And so *they* fell. The Church created them, — protected them from the lawlessness of the nobles, who had not then lost their faith, until they were able to protect themselves. Presently the nobles became sovereign, and they emulated the conduct of the kings, and received the same lesson at the hands of the Church, their second creator. God permitted kings here, and the populace there, to arise and destroy them. And so *they* fell. The Church created and protected what is now called the people. The people have become either sovereign, or aspiring after the sovereignty, and *one* sure sign

that this new sovereign will fall into the pit into which kings and nobles fell is, that the people treat the Church as the kings and nobles treated her. Like the kings and the nobles in the ages of their revolt, the people are very tolerant of dead creeds, very intolerant of living Popes, practical Catholicity, and thronged confessionals. In speaking of the interference of ecclesiastics with secular affairs, as they call it, they use the same proud language which the sovereigns, their predecessors, the kings and nobles, once used. Poor people! They have mounted their tower, they have fixed their throne above the stars, they will be like the Most High! Poor people! they will fall, — they are falling; their *ignis fatuus* has led them to the precipice over which royalty and aristocracy fell. Ecclesiastical, regal, aristocratic, popular sovereignty, — the cycle is completed; will it begin again, or are we near the day of wrath which is to usher in the visible sovereignty of God over all flesh that has corrupted its way? *Popule Dei, quid fecit Ecclesia tibi, aut in quo contristavit te? Introduxit te in terram satis bonam, propter te Chanæorum reges percursit, dedit tibi sceptrum regale, et magna virtute exaltavit te!*

This is the field into which the priest is sent. It looks dreary, — O, how dreary! In the ages of faith there was sin, alas! — sin abounded, yet did grace abound withal. Because they were ages of faith, they were ages of hope, charity, and contrition. Kings, nobles, and people refused not to do penance in the days when they were Christian. A prophet, too visible to the eye of faith, walks through this Nineveh, this great city of the world, and he cries, Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown! Will the Ninevites do penance? will they put on sackcloth and ashes? Alas! alas! *Via Sion lugent, eo quod non sint qui veniant ad solemnitatem!*

The confessional is the brazen serpent erected in the wilderness of our days, that the people may live. How to persuade the bitten people to look at it is the problem. Contrition comes from faith, faith comes from hearing; the teacher is therefore necessary. But, looking at the present state of the world, of two bodies of men, one composed of only moral theologians, the other made up of only excellent dogmatists, give us the moral theologians. Send the others to monasteries, or to savage tribes, — the world is ready to subscribe to all their dogmatic points, save one!

And so, in every text-book of moral theology, the student finds chapters devoted to the exposition of the duties appertaining to every state of life, from the kingly to the beggarly state. Magistrates, statesmen, judges, merchants, tradesmen, all, all have been bitten by the fiery serpent; its brazen antidote must be set up in the hall, the store, the barn, and the street. All flesh has corrupted its way.

It is plain enough that moral theology is not a science of limited application, but universal in every sense, inasmuch as it deals with the means of removing sin and augmenting grace, two things which are necessary to every man at every time of his life, and in every possible circumstance in which he may be placed. It is plain, too, that moral theology is not an easy science,—the Lord have mercy on the man who thinks that it is. As for the objection that there is little certainty in it, the charge is not well considered. It is made by those who think that the science is easy, and that a little common sense and an acquaintance with the contents of one or two pious books are all that is wanting to make a useful director of souls. Common sense! yes, it is necessary; the condiment would be insipid without it, but it is not the condiment. In the first place, absolute certainty is obtained in all the principles upon which moral theology is based. Those principles are neither few nor of unfrequent application. A decision from the authorities of the Church also imports certainty, and in the administration of most of the Sacraments positive decisions accompany almost every step. So far as the Sacrament of Penance is concerned, as the direction of souls implies that the director must sit in judgment upon human acts, and as every real human act is accompanied by its accidents, absolute, metaphysical certainty is not to be had, neither is it required. What is required in them is a *certain* conscience,—that which prudent men use in their daily actions. No man is positively certain that, if he eat, or if he go out, he may not be poisoned, or killed. Yet this lack of metaphysical certainty alone will not justify him in starving himself, or locking himself within doors. A more or less high degree of probability is all that is attainable in these matters, inasmuch as every act of a man is accompanied by accidents,—circumstances, over some of which he has no control, some of which he cannot foresee, and some of

whose existence he has no suspicion. In the direction of our acts to the Final Cause, God requires, in each act, what we require in ourselves and in others in any act affecting our lives or fortunes; that is, he requires a prudent judgment, on our part, that the act is expedient, — good, — adapted to obtain the appointed end. In the overwhelming majority of cases, this judgment turns out to be correct, and this probability is the certainty of moral theology in its actual application to human acts, which, being mutable, cannot give the immutable, as metaphysical certainty must be. In moral theology, then, *in actu primo remoto*, to use a convenient formula, metaphysical certainty is always had, because of the immutable principles which constitute the science. *In actu primo proximo* is the region where *speculative* doubt can begin; metaphysical certainty, owing to the aforesaid principles, and to positive decisions, is frequently attainable, — moral certainty always. *In actu secundo*, or in the actual application of principles and decisions to individual acts, a prudent judgment is necessary, and, being necessary, can always be had. Moral theology becomes here an art, — *ars artium, regimen animarum*. It must not be forgotten, either, that, although in this matter probability only is *per se* attainable, yet frequently such is the clearness of the case, and the evident application to it of immutable principles, that the certainty of the confessor becomes hypothetically metaphysical. One must not suppose that the real cases which he encounters in the confessional are often like those which he finds in books. This result is obtained more frequently than might, at first sight, be supposed, where there is in the confessor judgment, common sense, knowledge, piety, the fear of God, and the love of souls. *Faciendi quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam*, — a very comfortable promise, without which few conscientious directors would dare enter the confessional.

It is scarcely worth while to notice the peculiar objections concerning treatises on certain subjects, were it not for the fact that we have heard them repeated by young Levites as a reason for neglecting the whole science. Undoubtedly the subject is a disagreeable one, but such delicacy is not very creditable to a man. Every one admits that these things must be studied by physicians; — is the cure of bodies more necessary than the cure of souls?

Protestants overlook this obvious answer; they overlook also the fact, that, while they object to the study by professional men, for professional purposes, of these treatises, they eagerly buy vernacular translations of these very treatises, and allow them, with other obscene publications, to circulate in their families. Protestantism has no moral theology, for it denies the Final Cause; whence we have a key to the excessive immorality of Protestant and Protestantized countries, a sight which urges one to bless God that Catholic countries are, after all, as moral as we find them. Evil communication corrupts good morals. The answer to the objection is briefly this. The soul must be pure, to see God. Impurity averts it from its final cause; it is worthy of hell, and in baptized Christians it can be remedied only in the Sacrament of Penance. The delicacy which is not ashamed to do a thing, but is ashamed to confess it, is the delicacy of a harlot. An excellent practical answer may be given by pointing to the females who frequent the Sacraments, and by contrasting the purity of their lives with the impurity of the world that rejects the confessional. It is to be noted, moreover, that in the Holy Scriptures cases and decisions appertaining to this matter might be collected in sufficient numbers to form a goodly treatise *de sexto, de nono, et de matrimonio*.

This last observation suggests a theme upon which we would like to dwell a little, but we must dismiss it here with a few sentences. We refer to the *history* of moral theology. It is a common error to suppose that, because previous to the Council of Trent there were few books bound and labelled *Compendium, Medulla, or Cursus Theologiæ Moralis*, there was no such thing as the science of moral theology. This is a mistake worse than that which admits in the world no metaphysical science previous to Aristotle's *post-physics*. The necessities of the times, the condition, wants, and facilities of students, the *errores*, or *peccata insurgentia*, the convenience, taste, or judgment of masters, have given to different times differently shaped treatises, but the science remained the same. In the prophetic schools of the old law, and, previous to the invention of printing, in the episcopal houses, moral science was taught orally, and treasured up, for the most part, *memoriter*. The *disciplina arcana* obtained, to a certain extent, in the Jewish and Christian schools, and rigidly, at one period, in the latter. It is noticeable that the earliest

treatises — we mean what moderns would call treatises — on moral theology are the most voluminous, indicating that their authors had no lack of authorities or materials. Truly they had not, and the difficulty with them was, to make a good selection from the abundant matter before them. St. Thomas had done this for theology in general, and in a way that placed him at once and for ever at the head of the schools. Without referring to any doctor of moral theology for the last four centuries, and using the acts of the Roman Congregations for later decisions, one skilled in moral theology might compile from the Holy Scriptures, the writings of the Fathers, the decrees of Councils, the Penitential Canons, and a few other sources, a course of moral theology that would wear a sufficiently modern look. It might be done from St. Augustine and St. Thomas, with the Council of Trent and the Roman decrees. The early students of moral theology had their own method of pursuing the science, and, as we are accustomed to regard them as decisive authorities, it is not very easy to suppose that their method was inferior to ours, to say nothing of the fact that they lived near the sources of the science. The truth is, commandments of God and of the Church were always to be kept, the Sacraments were always to be properly administered, the seven deadly sins were always to be avoided, and Christ, finally, was always to be imitated. Moral theology is the science of the imitation of Christ. From all this it is clear enough that we need not commiserate the early students of moral theology on any lack of means for the pursuit of the divine art. If we do, we betray our ignorance. The *things* created by moral theology, that is to say, the Common Law, Christian kings, nobles, and peoples, Christian institutions of ages heroic in Christ, will arise and silence us.

Text-books on moral theology are growing common, and we are glad that it is so. What were text-books are voluminous, and now serve as authorities, books of reference, particularly since the inimitable *Medulla* of Busembaum, a book so very useful that even the beloved St. Liguori, the great light of the science in modern times, thought that he could render no better service to students than by giving the text of Busembaum, accompanied with copious notes, exceeding the original in bulk, and equalling it in value. This is a work that no moralist can spare from his library. Among the later compilations we have the work of Dr.

Kenrick, now Archbishop of Baltimore, on the three volumes of which the illustrious author has bestowed much thought and labor. It is of especial value to American theologians, inasmuch as it treats questions and cases which are almost peculiar to our own country and times.

The book of Father Gury, a distinguished member of the learned Society of Jesus, which we have cited at the head of this article, is a very remarkable work. It would be presumptuous in us to call it the best text-book in existence, but we like it better than any that we have ever seen, and we hope that, with Liguori, it will find a place in every ecclesiastical library, however small. *Multum, non multa*, is as good a motto for a library of works on moral theology as any other, perhaps better. The book is very small, there being only two octodecimo volumes, of about five hundred pages each, in rather large type. Father Gury has contrived, not to crowd, for the matter has not a crowded appearance, but to embody in this comparatively small space all necessary information concerning his favorite science, and to impart it in a remarkably clear and distinct manner. His method is well chosen. The tracts *De Pœnitentia*, *De Justitia et Jure*, and *De Contractibus*, are full and satisfactory. The little dissertation on the use of probabilism is excellent. If the book be used as a text-book in seminaries, for which it is well adapted, the student may require a more diffuse author for his reading; but from its compact form, clearness, and comprehensiveness, joined with singular brevity, it will be invaluable as a manual for priests. Some few of the decisions of the author strike us as being a little strange, among them that concerning the use of animal magnetism, but we do not venture to criticize them here, our argument being, as we have said, that of a student addressed to students. We beg our brethren to note the summing up, on p. 257, Vol. I., of the question, *De obedientia et reverentia civium erga temporalem auctoritatem*, as a favorable specimen, exhibiting most of the author's good qualities, and as a satisfactory decision on a subject which the wickedness of the times must soon force upon the attention of those having the care of souls.*

* This article is not from the pen of a layman. Another article more especially in review of Father Gury's excellent work is in preparation. —
ED. B. Q. REVIEW.

ART. V. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *A History of the Irish Settlers in North America, from the Earliest Period to the Census of 1850.* By THOMAS D'ARCY MCGEE. Second Edition. Boston: Donahoe. 1852. 12mo. pp. 240.

THE author of this interesting work is well known to our Irish American public. He was some years ago editor of *The Boston Pilot*, afterwards one of the editors of *The Dublin Nation*, subsequently to that editor of the *New York Nation*, and is now the editor and proprietor of *The American Celt*, recently removed from this city to Buffalo, N. Y. He is a man of fine talents, a vigorous writer, and a graceful and effective speaker. His career, till within the last year, was one which we could not approve, and many things which he wrote in *The Nation*, at New York, gave great pain to the friends of religion. He was an Irish radical, and of all radicals, an Irish radical, calling himself a Catholic, is to us the least endurable, because he is one who does violence both to his nature and his religion. An Irishman is naturally aristocratic, and Catholicity is conservative. We want no radicals in this country, least of all Irish radicals. Irish radicals here, where the Irish population is so large, and in consequence of the ages of oppression they have endured from Protestant ascendancy in Ireland, predisposed to extreme democratic views, are exceedingly dangerous both to religion and to society. We are, therefore, not a little pleased to find that Mr. McGee, powerful as he is for good or for evil, has through Divine grace been enabled to see the errors into which in the ardor and inexperience of youth he fell, and that he is now disposed and firmly resolved to use whatever of genius, talent, or strength he may have on the side of truth, piety, and sound politics. He has and will have great influence with his countrymen who have come here to be our countrymen also, and we are truly grateful to Almighty God that we are permitted to feel that it will henceforth be used for good, and no longer, as formerly, for evil. We can now freely acknowledge his talents without fearing that we are contributing to strengthen a party with which we have and can have no sympathy. He has learned wisdom from what he has suffered, he has profited largely by experience, and he can hardly fail to be a most efficient laborer in the field of Irish-American literature.

The first edition of the work before us we did not read, and we have only glanced through the second. We see in it the evidence of much industry and research, as well as a genius for historical and biographical writing of a very high order. That the work is always correct or always satisfactory to our individual taste and judgment, we do not pretend. We have, of course, our American nationality, and no Irishman, whatever his intentions, can treat of Irish nationality in a manner to meet in all respects our own national feeling; but though the tone may now and then not accord with our feelings, we can overlook it, if the principle be sound, and the intention just and honorable. We do not set ourselves up as a standard to which all must conform on pain of excommunication.

The Introduction is well written, but the brief sketch it attempts of the state of Europe in the fifteenth century is far from being satisfactory. It is written with too low an appreciation of the Middle Ages, and too high an appreciation of the progress of events since. The author has studied

history in the writings of Protestant, or, at best, of paganized authors. The longer he lives, the less will be his confidence in the current notions, even among Catholics, of Christendom prior to the sixteenth century, and the more and more will he be disposed not to boast of the progress society is supposed to have made during the last three or four centuries.

We confess that Mr. McGee's book has surprised us, and we hardly know what to think of it. If the author is correct, we who have the misfortune to be of English origin, whether Saxon or Norman, cut but a sorry figure in our own country. It would seem that the greater part of the population of the United States are either Irish or of Irish extraction, and that nearly all the names honorably distinguished in our history are the names either of Irishmen or of the descendants of Irishmen. Instead of regarding ourselves as Anglo-Americans it would seem that as a people we should regard ourselves as Irish-Americans. We have ourselves no prejudices against the Irish, and we delight in the glory of Irishmen as much as we do or can in the glory of any other race, but we apprehend that a good many of Mr. McGee's Irishmen were Scotchmen, and not a few of them wholly destitute of Milesian blood. But be this as it may, the book is extremely interesting, and we most cordially recommend it to all our readers, whether of Celtic or Saxon origin, as worthy of their serious consideration, and as proving beyond a doubt that Irishmen have a right to consider themselves at home here.

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2. *Catechism of the Christian Religion; being, with some small Changes, a Compendium of the Catechism of Montpellier, in which, by the Light of Scripture and Tradition, are explained the History, Dogmas, Morality, Sacraments, Prayers, Ceremonies, and Usages of the Church of Christ.* By the REV. STEPHEN KEENAN, Author of the "Controversial Catechism," &c. Boston: Donahoe. 1852. 12mo. pp. 549.

WE did not, in consequence of some opinions we found in it, feel at liberty to recommend Mr. Keenan's Controversial Catechism; but in the present work, with the exception of the answer to the second question on page 168, we have in the slight perusal we have given it discovered nothing to object to. The author is evidently a Gallican, and inclining to give a very free interpretation to the dogma of exclusive salvation; but in all other respects, his Catechisms, as far as we have examined them, are excellent, and especially this Catechism of the Christian Religion. It is admirably adapted to the instruction and edification of the faithful. It is published with the approbation of the Right Reverend Bishop of Boston.

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3. *A Tour in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Greece; with Notes and an Appendix on Ecclesiastical Subjects.* By J. L. PATTERSON, M. A. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1852. 8vo. pp. 460.

MR. PATTERSON is a very entertaining travelling companion. One can read his book without much weariness. The Appendix contains much valuable information respecting the Oriental Christians. The author is a convert from Anglicanism.

4. *The Life of Henry the Eighth, and the History of the Schism of England.* From the French of M. AUDIN. By E. G. K. BROWNE. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1852. 8vo. pp. 441.

WE have not had leisure to read and compare this translation with the original. The French work is interesting, and, no doubt, the best work on the subject to be had; and we are happy to meet it in an English dress. But we must say, very frankly, that we are no warm admirers of any of M. Audin's publications. In the work before us, he makes Henry a hero, and fails in his respect to the Holy See. The impression he leaves on our mind is, that in his opinion Henry was harshly treated, and that Clement the Seventh was weak, ignorant, vacillating, without a single noble or manly virtue. We could write of no Pope as he does of Clement, who was really a learned and an eminent man, and a great, though in some respects an ill-starred Pontiff. We should not insult his memory by charging to him the loss of England. We shall, however, return to this volume hereafter, and make it the occasion of some remarks on the origin and character of the Anglican schism.

5. *Recollections of a Journey through Tartary, Thibet, and China, during the Years 1844, 1845, and 1846.* By M. HUC, Missionary Priest of the Congregation of St. Lazarus. New York: Appleton & Co. 1852. 2 vols. 24mo.

THIS is a mutilated edition of an exceedingly interesting and valuable work. In consequence of its being a mutilated edition we cannot recommend it. It is true, the parts omitted consist of matter which, to some extent, may be found elsewhere, but not in works accessible to the great mass of readers. If we republish at all the works of an author, we should republish them as he has chosen to leave them. The English edition of Hazlitt's translation appears to be complete, and is sold in New York at only a trifle above the price charged by Messrs. Appleton for their mutilated edition. The work itself is one of great interest and value, as throwing much light on the condition, manners, customs, laws, and religion of the various inhabitants of Eastern Asia, especially the Mongolian Tartars and the Thibetans, of whom so little is known in Western Europe and America. It consists of recollections of a journey made by two Catholic missionaries for the purpose of ascertaining the prospects of establishing missions among the Thibetans, — a journey of exploration in the interests of the Cross, — and is, to a considerable extent, a mere personal narrative, giving us less knowledge of the people among whom the missionaries travelled than we could wish; but it will, after all, be found to contain a vast amount of useful and curious information not elsewhere accessible. It also gives a vivid picture of the hardships which are endured by the soldiers of the Cross in their efforts to conquer the heathen and barbarous tribes to our holy religion. We should be glad to see a faithful and un mutilated translation of the original French work circulating amongst us.

6. *Madeleine: a Tale of Auvergne, founded on Fact.* By JULIA KAVANAGH. New York: Appleton & Co. 1852. 12mo. pp. 300.

THIS is precisely one of those books which embarrass the Catholic Reviewer. It has so much in it that is really good, that we are not willing to censure it, and so much that we do not like, that we are unwilling to speak well of it. How much of it is fact, and how much of it is fiction, it is not easy to say. The author disturbs us by her long and tedious descriptions of natural scenery, — descriptions fine enough in themselves, but unnecessary to the action of the piece, and therefore out of place. She makes Madeleine engage in her noble enterprise as a relief from the pains of disappointed affection, rather than from true charity, or genuine love of God and of the poor and the infirm for Christ's sake. She represents Madeleine as unable to answer questions the answers to which no Catholic peasant-girl of Madeleine's standing could be ignorant of, and supposes that the poor girl continues through all her labors, which God so wonderfully blessed, to bear concealed in her heart the wound of disappointed love. This might be the case with a Protestant girl, but not with a true Catholic girl. Grace does not merely enable us to bear the pains of wounded affection: it cures them, and enables us to be serene and happy. It is a gentile, not a Christian notion, that the heart early wounded by loving the human object of its affection can never be made whole again. Religion, when it is genuine, can raise, and does raise, us above all grief, save grief for sin. Bating a few things of this sort in the book, it may be read with interest and profit, and, for those who will read works of fiction, perhaps it is as little hurtful as any likely to be read. So, upon the whole, we conclude to approve rather than condemn it; adding merely, that we have ourselves rather dipped into than read it.

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7. *Course of the History of Modern Philosophy.* By M. VICTOR COUSIN. Translated by O. W. WIGHT. New York: Appleton & Co. 1852. 2 vols. 8vo.

M. COUSIN we always wish to speak of with respect, owing to our former correspondence with him, the personal kindness he manifested to us when we were among his disciples, and the real advantages we derived from the study of his writings, however faulty they may be; but his system has had its day, and all attempts to bring it into vogue again, here or elsewhere, are perfectly idle. As opposed to the sensism of Locke and Condillac, his system is sound; as opposed to the idealism or subjectism of Kant, it is meritorious; but as eclectic, or rather syncretic, it lacks unity and true scientific character, and as pantheistic it cannot aspire to so much as to be a philosophy. Its study in this country by our Protestant countrymen, owing to the low state of speculative science among them, may, however, be rather useful than otherwise. But as all M. Cousin's books are placed on the Index at Rome, no good Catholic will read except to refute them. The translation, though in some respects faulty, and borrowing terms from the Scotch philosophers which we are sorry to see adopted into our noble English tongue, is, upon the whole, very well done, and quite creditable to the translator.

8. *Sketches of the Life, Times, and Character of the Right Rev. BENEDICT JOSEPH FLAGET, First Bishop of Louisville.* By M. J. SPAULDING, D. D., Bishop of Louisville. Louisville: Webb & Levering. 1852. 16mo. pp. 406.

THIS is a work of too much interest and importance to be dismissed in a brief literary notice, and we must seize the earliest opportunity to make it the subject of an extended review. At present we can only say that the work contains a considerable mass of information with regard to the labors, trials, struggles, and privations of the early Catholic missionaries west of the Alleghanies. We wish the information had been fuller, and the Right Reverend Author must forgive us if we express our regret that he had not taken the time to give us a full history of Catholicity in the West, instead of simple sketches of it, during the times of the illustrious Bishop Flaget. Nevertheless, we are thankful for the sketches, which give us no little information entirely new to us. They are extremely useful to us of the present generation, to prevent us from forgetting the devotion, the toil and sacrifices of our fathers. The reading of this work has given us a juster estimate of the difficulties under which our earlier missionaries labored, and of their heroic charity, than we had hitherto formed, and made us feel that we must often have said things which could not but seem undeserved and harsh to those who were better acquainted than we with our early Catholic history. Of the illustrious subject of this memoir we have no room now to speak. He was a saintly man, a devoted missionary, a tender, faithful, and vigilant pastor, to whom the Church in this country, and especially in Kentucky, where our religion is so firmly established and so flourishing, owes much, and his memory must for ever continue to be dear to every Catholic American. We hope this little volume, by his not unworthy successor, will find a large circulation, and be attentively read by all our younger Catholics. It will deepen their love for the Church; it will animate their zeal, and invigorate their faith and piety.

9. *The Life of St. THERESA.* Written by Herself, and translated from the Spanish by the REV. JOHN DALTON. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 12mo. pp. 437.

THIS is a work that needs no review. Simply to announce it is enough, for it is a standard work, and to be read and meditated by all who aspire to Christian perfection. All the writings of St. Theresa are classics in Spanish, and the translation of her Life before us appears to be well executed.

10. *The Way of Perfection and Conceptions of Divine Love.* By SAINT THERESA. From the Spanish by the REV. JOHN DALTON. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 12mo. pp. 274.

WHAT we have just said of the *Life* of St. Theresa may be repeated of this standard spiritual work.

11. *A Salve for the Bite of the Black Viper. Compounded by DR. EVARISTE DE GYPENDOLE, First Surgeon-Major of the Old Guard, Physician in Ordinary to the King of Lahore, Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, &c., &c.* Translated from the French of the ABBÉ MARTINET, Author of "Religion in Society," &c. By V. D. BARRY, LL. D. Louisville: Webb & Levering. 1852. 18mo. pp. 141.

THIS little work was first introduced to the American public in our Review for April, 1845; and all who have read the original French have recognized the justice of the high praise we then gave it, and have also admired the quiet wit, the sarcasm, the lively and brilliant style, with which the author shows the efficacy of his carefully compounded antidote for the Black Serpent's fatal bite. It is a work we have long desired to see translated into the English language; but the translator, although a man of good literary attainments, does not seem fully adequate to the task, and a difficult one it certainly is, for he has failed to seize the spirit and the tone of the original. It is not that his knowledge of the French language is imperfect, but that, in endeavoring to translate too exactly, — *mot à mot*, — he gives us indeed the words which in English answer to the French; not, however, the phrases. For example, he renders Dr. Evariste's French translation of the Latin words *sunt bona mixta malis*, "every thing on journeys is not a rose"; this is very true, and sounds well in French, but in English it ceases to be expressive. "Every rose has its thorn," is, in our opinion, altogether preferable. We think, also, *serpent* a better translation of *vipère* than *viper*; for *viper*, in the American acceptance, is not the venomous *vipère* whose deadly bite is to the body what infidelity is to the soul. On the 64th page we find *Madame Cardinal* literally translated. Now *Madame Cardinal* is the French for *Mrs. Jones*, *Mrs. Smith*, or any other very common name. Again, on the 14th page, he gives up in despair all hope of translating "*façon de vinaigre des quatre ministres, pardon, des quatre voleurs*." Now *vinaigre des quatre voleurs* is a vinegar so called, highly aromatic indeed, and is used by physicians as a guard against infection; but the play in the French lies in passing by the technical use of the term, and coupling ministers with thieves.

The typographical execution of the work is not creditable to the publishers, nor such as the translation deserves; which, notwithstanding the faults we have found with it, is calculated to do much good, and which will obtain, we trust, a large circulation.

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12. *La Civiltà Cattolica, Pubblicazione periodica per tutta l' Italia il 1° e 3° Sabato di ciascun Misse.* Roma. All' Ufficio centrale della Civiltà Cattolica. 1850-52. 8vo.

THIS is a periodical published at Rome by members of the Society of Jesus, and devoted to Catholic civilization. It was commenced in March, 1850, and is issued twice each month, each number containing about 120 pages. It is conducted with spirit and ability, and, as a periodical issued in the capital of the Christian world, it deserves the patronage of all who are able to read the Italian language. Its principles with regard to liberty, government, civilization, and its judgment of the various revolutionary and socialistic movements of the times, are sound and just. Much in its pages is no doubt local in its character and interest, but no Catholic can

be indifferent to any thing that affects the well-being in a religious or a political point of view of the Italian peninsula, and most of the articles discuss questions which have their application in every country, and more or less at all times. To us it is an exceedingly interesting and valuable periodical, and we shall take the liberty, from time to time, to translate some of its articles for the benefit of such of our readers as are not able to read the original.

13. *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review*. Conducted by FREEMAN HUNT. New York: Freeman Hunt. June, 1852. 8vo.

WE have for some time been trying to find room to notice Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, which in its way we consider a really meritorious periodical. A notice from us is not needed by the work itself, which has a wide circulation, and is highly appreciated; but we have wished to notice it in order to bear our feeble testimony to the ability and impartiality with which it is conducted, and also to pay our respects to our old friend, its enterprising and industrious editor. There are unquestionably doctrines and views set forth in its pages with which we do not sympathize, and the religious opinions of the editor which now and then peep out in his book notices are such as we abominate; but its discussions on political economy, its commercial and financial intelligence, and its important statistical tables, render it a work of great value to the banker, the merchant, and the practical statesman. In its line it is unrivalled in this country, and, as far as our knowledge extends, in Europe. It is designed for the business man, and our business men and politicians universally ought to patronize it.

14. *History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent*. By GEORGE BANCROFT. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1852. 8vo. pp. 462.

WE are preparing an elaborate review of Mr. Bancroft's History, which will probably appear in our next issue, and will only add here, that this long looked for volume fully sustains the reputation the author has acquired by its predecessors.

15. *Essays and Reviews, chiefly on Theology, Politics, and Socialism*. By O. A. BROWNSON. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1852. 12mo. pp. 521.

OUR readers will not expect us to pronounce any judgment on the merits of this work. It would be asking too much of us to ask us to be our own reviewer, although, were we to review our own work, we should have the advantage of reviewing a work which we had at least read, an advantage which does not always fall to our lot, any more than to other reviewers. The volume, however, we may say, is made up of Essays and Reviews which have appeared in this journal from time to time, and of such as we have thought the public might like to have collected in a

single volume, and especially since complete sets of our Review are no longer to be had. It contains our general principles on several important questions, and is such as we of course should like to have widely circulated among our countrymen.

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16. *History of the Irish Insurrection of 1798, giving an Authentic Account of the various Battles fought between the Insurgents and the King's Army, and a Genuine History of Transactions preceding that Event, with a valuable Appendix.* By EDWARD HAY, Esq. A new Edition; to which have been added Abstracts from Plowden, Teeling, Gordon, and Madden. Boston: Donahoe. 1852. 16mo. pp. 432.

WE have not read this book, but we are told that it is the best book to be had on the subject.

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17. *The Union of the "Church of God," or the Necessity of the Oneness of Professors of Christianity, and the Evils of Sects amongst them.* By JOHN REIS. "There is one body and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all." Eph. iv. 4-6. "He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me." John xiv. 21. "Thus saying, thou reproachest us also." Luke xi. 45. Hygeia Printing Office, near Cincinnati, Ohio. 1852. 24mo. pp. 519.

WE have done the author the honor of quoting his entire title-page, motto and all: we have not, however, much to say of his book. Were we an astrologer, we should suppose him to have been born when the *Great Dipper* was in the ascendancy, for he is a *great dipper*; he believes in *dipping*; and to bring about the *union of the Church of God*, he wants us all to be dipped, either in clear water or foul, or, if you like it better, in dirt, mire, milk, sand, oil, or tar. We must have no more effusion, no more aspersion; we must be immersed, — dipped. We must confess that he adduces some very potent arguments in support of his position; for instance, on page 168: "The object immersed (dipped) is never governed by a preposition; the object sprinkled or poured is always governed by a preposition."

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18. *The Protesting Christian, standing before the Judgment-Seat of Christ, to answer for his Protest against that PARENT CHURCH, which Christ built upon a Rock, with the Promise: "The Gates of Hell shall not prevail against it."* Matt. xvi. 18. By the Rev. J. PERRY, Catholic Pastor of Aston-le-Walls. Third Edition. Baltimore: Heidan & O'Brien. 1852. 12mo. pp. 46.

THE aim of this small publication is to show *Protesting Christians* upon how weak a foundation rest their pretensions, and how signally they will

be confounded at the judgment-seat of God, whither the author leads them, and there confronts them with their Supreme Judge, who condemns them from out their own mouths. The author writes with equal candor and charity, and with no inconsiderable degree of skill; and we cordially recommend his work to the earnest consideration of all Protestants. Catholics also may derive profit from it; especially those who love to boast of what *they* would do in certain contingencies.

19. *Correspondance de Rome.* Rome, Feb. 24, 1852.

THIS is a journal printed in French, and appears three times a month at Rome. It is chiefly filled with notices of books, and the publication of the different Roman ecclesiastical congregations.

In the number for February 24, we find a notice of our Review, which we hope we shall be pardoned for laying before our readers. After translating the letter of the Archbishops and Bishops of the United States, so flattering to us, it remarks that such an approval surpasses all eulogiums, and continues:—"We have not yet received the January number. The number for last October contains four articles upon different subjects, but of equal interest and importance. The first is a remarkable article upon the true basis of Theology: Rationalism and the opposite error of the Traditionalists are both here combated. The writer shows that he is a perfect master as well of the different ancient as of the modern philosophical systems, and possesses an intelligent appreciation of facts and doctrines. Our readers can judge for themselves from the analysis of it which we propose to give.

"The last article is an extraordinary dissertation on the temporal power of the Church. We frankly confess, that, to the best of our knowledge, no European writer has treated this question with more freedom and ability. For his own part, Mr. Brownson professes to be an *ultra-Ultramontane*, and admits the little sympathy he has with Gallicanism and the various explanations its adherents have proposed. We should like to give a fuller account of this article, the conclusion of which presents a summary of the whole."

And here it translates a portion of the last two pages.